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PREFACE
The European University Institute (EUI) and the Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center (FIC, Wharton School, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania) organised a conference entitled “Politi-
cal, Fiscal and Banking Union in the Eurozone” at the EUI in 
Florence, Italy, on 25 April 2013. The event was financed by 
the PEGGED project (Politics, Economics and Global Gov-
ernance: The European Dimension) and a Sloan Foundation 
grant to the FIC. The conference brought together leading 
economists, lawyers, political scientists and policy makers to 
assess the prospects and potential for, as well as obstacles to, 
the various forms and degrees of integration needed within the 
Eurozone in order to address the root causes of Europe’s cur-
rent malaise. The aim was for open discussion and debate on 
the relationships between these different levels of union.  Was 
one type of union achievable without the other?  Or would the 
intractable difficulties of achieving each level of union spill over 
to lessen the chances of the other ever being a likely practical 
possibility?
The President of the EUI, Marise Cremona, opened the event, 
which consisted of three panels, a keynote speech and a dinner 
speech.  The first panel, chaired by Elena Carletti (EUI), con-
sidered the current state of the emergent Banking Union in the 
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Eurozone. Luis Garicano (London School of Economics) first 
discussed whether the measures being implemented to bring 
about the Banking Union will in fact succeed in breaking the 
vicious circle that exists between banks and sovereigns. Rich-
ard Herring (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) 
then gave an assessment of the European initiatives on reso-
lution frameworks and creditor bail-in.  Jan Pieter Krahnen 
(Goethe University Frankfurt) reflected on the future of Euro-
pean banking following the report of the Liikanen group  (of 
which he was a member) and Philip Wood talked about some 
fundamental legal aspects of implementation of banking union 
measures often obscured in the constant flow of technical pro-
posals and measures. 
In the keynote address to the conference, Andrea Enria (Chair 
of the European Banking Authority) noted the significance of 
the policy shift that the establishment of the EBA, the agree-
ment to move to a Banking Union and the centralisation of 
supervisory responsibilities all represented. However, he coun-
selled, remedial institutional work is still needed and the pres-
sures and exigencies of crisis management ought not to detract 
from that. Repair work is made all the more necessary by the 
need to combat the vicious and destructive loop between banks 
and sovereigns as well as to combat the growing balkanisation 
of the Single Market. He assessed the steps taken to date in 
developing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and highlighted 
challenges to greater integration of other parts of the necessary 
safety net. Finally, he reminded the audience of the Europe be-
yond those countries participating in the Banking Union and 
the need to strengthen the functioning of the Single Market as 
a whole, especially resolution frameworks.
The second panel, chaired by Franklin Allen (Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania) considered both the mechanics 
and possibilities of achieving any real Fiscal Union in the Eu-
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rozone in the areas of fiscal policy and taxation. Daniel Gros 
(Centre for European Policy Studies) discussed the links be-
tween monetary policy, supervision and fiscal policy. Robert 
Inman (University of Pennsylvania) then provided a comment 
on the historical experience with Balanced Budget laws and 
considered what lessons emerge from this for Europe today. 
Mattias Kumm (NYU, Social Science Research Center Ber-
lin and Humboldt University) then considered the need for a 
genuinely European tax competence to match European level 
competences in banking and financial markets and made the 
case against any Transfer Union and for an Economic Justice 
Union instead. Finally Hélène Rey (London Business School) 
talked about the economics of growth and austerity, and the 
handling of the crisis by creditors in the international mon-
etary system.
The final panel, chaired by Joanna Gray (Newcastle Univer-
sity), considered some of the historical, cultural and practical 
policy aspects to Political Union in the Eurozone and provided 
an opportunity for a more general and less technical perspec-
tive than the preceding two.
Mitu Gulati (Duke University Law School) presented the results 
of detailed analysis of key contract terms in euro area sovereign 
debt contracts between 1990 and 2011 and argued that the 
evidence challenges the rationale behind the recent introduc-
tion of mandatory collective action clauses. Edmond Alphand-
ery (Nomura Securities) considered the effect of the Eurozone 
crisis on the Franco-German axis and how new alignments 
and alliances are taking shape within both the Eurozone and 
the EU which was for so long the pivotal relationship in Eu-
rope. Peter Lindseth (University of Connecticut) highlighted 
different meanings of “Political Union,” the tensions between 
“De facto” and “De jure” forms of union as well as barriers to 
real political union and their sources. Finally, Richard Parker 
situated the Eurozone crisis in a constellation of crises besetting 
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what he termed modern democratic republicanism, which he 
traced through its various historical stages of evolution. 
At dinner, Tony Barber (Financial Times) spoke of the Euro-
zone crisis as a series of morbid symptoms as the old European 
order yielded place to a new European reality of which and 
about which we are all still profoundly uncertain. The Euro 
has confounded expectations and begun to raise doubts in the 
hearts and minds of even the technocratic elites of Italy, Ger-
many and France as each country feels the effects of and hence 
perceives the Eurozone crisis differently. This challenges the 
European identity of each and every citizen in each and every 
member state.
The book ends with a postscript, “Monologic Thinking during 
the Eurozone Crisis,” contributed by one  the rising generation 
of Europeans, Dr Patrick O’Callaghan (Newcastle University) 
who participated in the conference. It considers the various al-
ternative and competing narratives of the Eurozone crisis which 
have taken root and concludes with a plea for more imaginative 
ways to regenerate trust among EU citizens. He  identifies the 
plight of the young unemployed in Europe as being the deepest 
scar of the persistent policy failures and challenges considered 
during the day’s proceedings.
The conference follows the 2012 conference, “Governance for 
the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration” and that of 2011, 
“Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default.” 
As with those two conferences, the debate after each panel 
and guest speakers was lively and thoughtful. We prefer not 
to take a stance here on any of the issues but simply present 
all the papers presented and let the reader draw his or her own 
conclusions.
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In Spain, the Diabolic Loop is 
Alive and Well
Luis Garicano
Since the start of the crisis, the link between banks and their sover-
eigns has only been strengthening, with dire consequences for the 
periphery’s economies. To focus on Spain, in October 2008, the 
Spanish financial system had 78bn of Spanish government bonds. 
By February 2013, these holdings had increased to 259bn, almost 
30% of GDP, according to Bank of Spain data (see Figure 1). Ad-
ditionally, the banks direct lending to all government levels, which 
was a negative 22bn in 2008 (government deposits were larger than 
loans), was 49bn by February 2013 (see Figure 2).
The loop is also strengthening in the other direction. The hidden 
losses in the banking system are starting to materialize, with 37bn 
injected this year by the Spanish state plus a stock of slightly over 
100bn of state guaranteed bank debt that existed by the end of 2012 
(see Figure 3).
The European leaders are aware of the growing danger of these con-
nections and committed themselves at the June 2012 Euro Summit 
to “break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” Specifi-
cally, they promised that “when an effective single supervisory mech-
anism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area 
the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to 
recapitalize banks directly.”
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Figure 1: Bank holdings of public debt, Spain
(Current Euros, Dec 89-Feb 13)
Source: Bank of Spain. OTHER MONETARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 8.5 Assets. Domestic B) Aggre-
gated balance sheet according to the euro area returns Debt securities: general government 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a0805e.pdf
Figure 2: Net  bank lending to governments
(Loans-Deposits, Current Euros, Dec 97 - Feb 13)
Source: Bank of Spain. Own calculation 8. OTHER MONETARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 8.25 Loans 
to/deposits held by general government C) Breakdown of assets and liabilities from/with other MFIs, by 
sub-sector 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a0825e.pdf
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Figure 3: Bank Failures and Government Solvency
Source: Eurostat, Supplementary tables for the financial crisis Spain: 10/4/2013
Regrettably, this good purpose was quickly “clarified.” A senior EU 
official told the Wall Street Journal only a few days after the sum-
mit (on July 6th), “I need to make clear what the ESM can do: the 
ESM is able–if one were to decide ever on such an instrument–to 
take an equity share in a bank. But only against full guarantee by the 
sovereign concerned … Does it still remain the risk of the sovereign 
or [does it go to] the ESM? It remains the risk of the sovereign.” 
Later, the Dutch, Finnish, and German Summit finance ministers, at 
a summit on September 29, 2012, stated that “(2) the ESM can take 
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direct responsibility of problems that occur under the new supervi-
sion, but legacy assets should be under the responsibility of national 
authorities(...) “
Mr Wolfgang Schauble has been backpedalling other hopes for a 
banking union and trying to turn it into a banking union “on the 
cheap.” In the recent Dublin summit, he said Banking Union “only 
makes sense… if we also have rules for restructuring and resolving 
banks. But if we want European institutions for that, we will need a 
treaty change.“ Other rules cheapening the banking union include 
no deposit insurance, and no resolution authority for the ECB with-
out (certainly hard to envision and long in coming) Treaty changes. 
In fact, the only decision that has been made is the one that ostensi-
bly involves no cost, the new Single Supervisory Mechanism to start 
in March.  
Sadly, Mr Schauble has it exactly backwards. The key to restart 
growth and ensure the survival of the Euro process is to recognise 
that “mistakes were made” by all in the design of the Euro, and that 
these mistakes have had very severe consequences for a number of 
countries (the debtors) which are now spreading to the rest. In other 
words, sharing of legacy debts is fair, and, provided the institutions 
are firmly put in place to avoid future credit bubbles, growth enhanc-
ing.
We can again turn to Spain for evidence that the deterioration of the 
aggregate sovereign-finance balance sheet is at the root of the cur-
rent contraction. In spite of the improved credit access by the state 
caused by the lax monetary policies and the OMT threat by Mario 
Draghi, credit conditions are tight, and families and business are still 
struggling. 
Spain has been applying the German receipe to the letter. First, be-
fore the SSM is constituted, Spain has been trying to clean up its 
own mess with state funds. In the current round, the subordinated 
liability exercises raised 12.7bn euros and the state injected €37bn 
for nationalized Cajas (Q4 12), plus €1.8bn (Q1 13) for surviving 
ones, for a total of around 5% of GDP. The 3 to 1 public to private 
participation ratio is similar to the SNS Reaal recap using the new 
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Dutch intervention act, which invested 3.7 bn  in the Dutch state, 
and subordinated debt for €1 billion. Spain, moreover, set up a bad 
bank whereby the weaker Cajas and  Banks transferred a gross total 
of over 100bn, for a net asset value of €50.781bn (transfer finished 
March 2013) in assets. Senior creditors have benefited from all exist-
ing (SLE) bail in exercises. Regrettably, the liability exercise again 
left out senior creditors, who are in fact the ones who have the best 
monitoring ability (thus able to provide good incentives to coun-
tries) and loss absorption capacity 
But the bank recap combined with Draghi’s magic words about  im-
proving credit access is not improving credit access. True, the OMT 
means the state is financing itself at much better rates, with cheaper 
and better credit to banks and a halving of risk premia. But the Bank 
Lending Survey from the Bank of Spain for January shows that 22% 
of banks have tightened their lending to large companies, and 10% 
to SMEs, and to families for both home purchases and consumption. 
The most recent data show that lending to corporations is falling by 
about 6% per year and this fall will continue, or accelerate, this year. 
Aggregate figures show a huge rise in credit to general government 
and a brutal drop in credit to businesses and households. But, of 
course, credit drops could be, regardless of what surveys say, caused 
by lack of demand, rather than excessive supply restrictions.
Evidence of the causal link between supply restrictions and growth in 
Spain is provided by a recent trio of papers. In a recent AER publica-
tion, Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina show that  weaker Banks 
deny more loans, even when the loans are identical (which helps 
identify the supply, rather than demand channel) and that busi-
nesses cannot in general replace  the absent loan  from a weak bank 
by going to another bank. Also, in a recent (April 2013) working 
paper, Bentolila, Jansen, Jiménez and Ruano show that businesses 
whose credit came from weak financial entities that later received 
intervention(the old “Cajas”) reduced employment by an additional 
3.5 to 5 percent points relative to those whose credit came from 
the strong ones. Finally, in a paper co-written with my colleague 
at the London School of Economics, Claudia Steinwender (Survive 
another day: Does Affect the financing uncertain composition of 
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investment?, Center for Economic Performance, LSE) we show that 
Spanish owned companies reduce employment substantially more 
(6%) and increase investment by much more (by 19%) than the 
Spanish operations of foreign companies, pointing out the key role 
played by investment.
In sum, the Spanish state owns more bank risk, the banks own more 
of the public sector debts, credit is being restricted, and growth is 
suffering. The low cost banking union being proposed shifts the cost 
of the clean up on the individual member states, in an attempt to 
address through these problems. Several of the key Schaubleian nos-
trums must be rejected: 
– Legacy debt cannot possibly be absorbed by individual states. 
The Eurozone countries must recognize that they signed up 
for a flawed Eurozone and that we are where we are today, at 
least in part, as a result of these flaws. The two key objectives 
being pursued, minimizing taxpayer and EMS involvement, 
as well as ensuring an adequate credit supply, are in contra-
diction. Maintaining the supply of credit across the Eurozone 
must be the priority.
– As Cyprus shows, member states cannot individually guaran-
tee deposits, and deposit insurance which right now is com-
pletely off the table, must be part of the union.
– Some instrument for joint lending (a form of Eurobonds) 
that may allow the gradual easing of the link between banks 
and sovereigns is necessary. I have proposed, with a group of 
European economists, the ESBies, a solution based on secu-
ritization that avoids joint liability. This solution generates a 
large liquidity premium shared by all and redirects flight-to-
safety flows from across national borders to across tranches.
– A banking union needs strong centralized resolution pow-
ers within the supervisor. As the Cajas debacle showed, local 
authorities are too close to management and do not internal-
ize cost to the system of wobbly banks. Moreover, the ESM 
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must have ability to directly inject funds into banks, at mar-
ket prices, and also lend to local deposit insurance schemes, 
but sharing costs requires centralized decision making.  
– A deposit guarantee scheme is needed to break the link be-
tween sovereigns and banks. Its cost, with a credible resolu-
tion framework able to impose losses on creditors and unin-
sured depositors, does not have to be excessive. 
After the German elections, Europe has a short window of opportu-
nities to rescue the Euro project. It is now the time for Germany to 
accept what it originally signed up for when it joinied the Euro, or 
leave.
Note: A version of this article appeared in the Economist blog Free Ex-
change as “Banking Union on the Cheap will Fail”
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The Danger of Building a Banking 
Union on a One-Legged Stool
Richard J. Herring*
Introduction
The initiative to build a European banking union, announced by the 
Heads of State of the euro area on June 29, 2012,1 aims to achieve 
two worthy objectives: first, to advance and deepen the Single Mar-
ket in Financial Services and second, to break the toxic interactions 
between weak banks and weak sovereigns in order to ease the crisis 
in the euro area.  
The European Commission (2012) proposed a three stage approach: 
first, the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM); 
second, the establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); 
and third, in the indefinite future, some sort of common, euro-area 
deposit guarantee scheme (CDGS).2 Plans for the SSM have ad-
1 This was preceded by the “Four President’s Road Map” (Van Rompuy, 2012). 
2 Most of these proposals are crafted to include the entire European Union not just 
the euro area.  Nonetheless, Great Britain, the home of the largest financial markets 
in the EU, is unlikely to participate fully in the SSM, SRA or the CDGS in the 
foreseeable future.  For simplicity and because this chapter focuses on the euro crisis, 
the implications for the broader European Union are generally ignored. 
* Jacob Safra Professor of International Banking at the Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank (without implicating) Jacopo Carmassi for 
valuable comments on an earlier draft.
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vanced rapidly, but as of May 2012, the future of the SRM is much 
less certain and the CDGS seems to be simply an aspirational goal. 
This chapter argues that it is important the SSM be accompanied not 
only by an SRM, but also by a centrally backed CDGS. 
The initiative to form Single Market in Financial Services lost for-
ward momentum not long after it was launched. It began with a bold 
move intended to increase cross-border competition and integrate 
national markets. Subject to minimum levels of safety and sound-
ness, a bank that established a subsidiary in any one member state 
gained a “single European passport” that would enable it to branch 
into any other member state. This approach was intended to cut 
through existing barriers that insulated national markets.  In time, 
however, national governments found ways to protect domestic fi-
nancial firms, often on grounds of consumer protection. In addition, 
many governments managed to protect “national champions” by 
erecting regulatory barriers to obstruct some cross-border mergers. 
Although considerable progress was made in harmonizing interest 
rates across the euro area, national markets remained distinctive in 
terms of institutional frameworks and indeed legal frameworks for 
consumer protection and bank resolution. And, although all coun-
tries are subject to the same capital requirements, enforcement of 
these and other prudential regulations has been uneven. 
Strains caused by the crisis in the euro area
The crisis has actually reversed much of the initial progress and caused 
euro area banking markets to disintegrate. Figure 1 shows that bank-
ing flows from the stronger euro-area countries – France and Ger-
many – to the troubled peripheral countries have not only declined, 
but also reversed dramatically. Undoubtedly this has reflected the 
concerns of creditor banks about the declining creditworthiness of 
these regions, but it also reflects pressures from national regulators 
in creditor countries who wish to insulate their economies as much 
as possible from troubles in the peripheral countries. Evidence of 
disintegration within the euro area can be observed in the widening 
spreads paid by peripheral countries over the benchmark, 10-year 
German Bund rate.  
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Figure 1: Crisis has caused a disintegration of European Banking Markets
Even more worrisome, the average interest rates paid by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in peripheral countries have in-
creased sharply relative to rates paid by SMEs in France and Germa-
ny. (See Figure 2.) Since SMEs are the main engine of growth in most 
of Europe, the widening risk premiums paid by SMEs in peripheral 
countries mean that recovery in those countries will be much slower 
and weaker than in the stronger countries.  Moreover, these diff er-
ences in the fl ow of credit to SMEs will exacerbate existing dispari-
ties in growth rates and standards of living among member states. 
Th is disintegration of credit markets also means that expansionary 
monetary policy initiatives by the European Central Bank are likely 
to have only limited impact in the peripheral countries because the 
interest rates paid by SMEs in those countries are largely attributable 
to the risk premium rather than the level of the euro-area risk-free 
interest rate.
Th e toxic interaction between weak banks and their weak home-
country sovereigns became painfully obvious as the crisis unfolded. 
It surfaced most dramatically in Ireland.  When the Irish government 
issued a blanket guarantee to protect its banks from a run, it quickly 
transformed a banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis. 
German banks
German and French banks’ falling exposure to crisis-hit eurozone countries Change between Q1 2008 and Q1 2012 (€bn)
Spain
Portugal
Ireland
Greece
Italy
Key
(-49.7%)
Total reduction in
exposure to the five
periphery countries
-301.8
(-53.3%)
-81.7
(-43.4%)
-78.0
(-29.4%)
-6.5
(-38.5%)
-13.0
(-49.3%)
-103.8
(-35.3%)
-48.1
(-84.0%)
-25.3
(-26.5%)
-91.7
(-39.6%)
-19.9
French banks
(-33.4%)
Total reduction in
exposure to the five
periphery countries
-203.9
(-66.8%)
-37.7
Contraction by
German banks
Contraction by
French banks
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Figure 2. Crisis has caused a disintegration of SME Lending
Th is dynamic has unfolded with variations in many of the other pe-
ripheral countries. (See Figure 3.) Banks tend to hold large concen-
trations of claims on the governments in which they are headquar-
tered for a number of reasons including political pressures from home 
country governments that wish to place their bonds at least possible 
cost. Th ese pressures were reinforced by the framework for evaluat-
ing capital adequacy, which placed zero risk-weights on such bonds 
in the calculation of risk-weighted assets. When the home country’s 
creditworthiness declines, so does the value of its bonds. Th is causes 
losses to all holders of its debt including banks. Moreover, when a 
country’s creditworthiness declines, its prospects for growth and the 
profi tability of most of its fi rms decline as well. Th us loan losses are 
likely to rise, putting further strain on the capital positions of banks 
in that country.  
Figure 3: Toxic Interactions Between Banks & Their Sovereigns
Banking CrisisSovereign Debt Crisis
Losses on sovereign bonds
Falling Bond Prices
Rising ﬁscal deﬁcits
Declining demand
Need to assume credit
 risk in LLR operations
Need to recapitalize
banks or backstop
deposit insurance
Loan losses on loans
from weak economy
Costs of dealing with a 
liquidity problem
Pressure to sell good assets 
to restore capital
Can threaten euro & delay recovery
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Many European banks are funded to a substantial extent by non-
deposit liabilities or uninsured deposits. (See Figure 4 showing the 
proportion of large, uninsured deposits in various countries in the 
EU.) Because these funds are not protected by explicit deposit insur-
ance, they tend to disappear when market participants become con-
cerned about the creditworthiness of the bank. (Typically providers 
of wholesale funds tend to rely primarily on quantity rationing and 
only to a limited extent on price rationing.) These liquidity pres-
sures will cause banks to pay more for whatever funding they can 
attract and will be forced to sell assets to meet the cash demands of 
funders that wish to flee when their uninsured bank deposits or non-
deposit liabilities mature. When liquidity reserves are drawn down 
and the bank has exhausted its ability to undertake refinancing with 
the ECB, it will have no choice but to sell illiquid assets into thin, il-
liquid markets, incurring substantial losses from distress sales, which 
further erode capital. While the ECB has the possibility of provid-
ing emergency liquidity assistance it must act through the national 
central bank, which will be obliged to accept the credit risk in the 
transaction, thus adding to the national debt burden.
Figure 4: Large & Uninsured Deposits Roughly 50% of Total Deposits
Source: European Commission, J.P. Morgan
Of course, banking problems can arise without sovereign debt prob-
lems, but if the size of the banking system is a multiple of GDP, 
as is true in many European countries, widespread problems in the 
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banking sector can quickly cause trouble for the sovereign as well. 
Moreover, several European banks are large relative to the size of 
national GDP. (See Figures 5a and 5b.) First, if banks need to seek 
emergency liquidity assistance, it must be channeled from the ECB 
to the national central bank, which is obliged to take on the credit 
risk. Second, if confidence in banks diminishes to the point that even 
insured depositors start to run, the deposit guarantee fund will be 
tested. In some countries these guarantees are not pre-funded and in 
most countries they are not funded adequately. And so this is likely 
to lead to additional borrowing by the government to make good on 
deposit guarantees. Third, if banks must be recapitalized, it usually 
falls on the government to provide initial funding and can often be 
a very substantial proportion of GDP. Fourth, a weak banking sector 
is likely to diminish aggregate demand, which in turn will diminish 
tax revenues and increase transfer payments to compensate for the 
decline in demand. When the government runs a fiscal deficit and 
the country has a current account deficit, it will have no choice but 
to sell assets to foreigners or, more typically, borrow from foreigners. 
When foreign borrowing increases too rapidly relative to the coun-
try’s ability to service its debt, its debt rating will fall as will the prices 
of its debt in international markets. At some point it may not be able 
to borrow at any price.
Figure 5a: Total assets of MFIs in the EU, by country (in % of national GDP) 
 
Notes: Assets as of March 2012, GDP data for end 2011. Based on aggregate balance sheet of monetary fi-
nancial institutions (MFIs). Vertical axis cut at 1000% (ratio for Luxembourg is 2400%). Data on MFI includes 
money market funds.
Source: ECB data. Eurostat for GDP data.
1000%
900%
800%
700%
600%
500%
400%
300%
200%
100%
0%
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Ire
la
nd
Cy
pr
us U
K
De
nm
ar
k
Fr
an
ce
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
Au
st
ria
Fi
nl
an
d
Ge
rm
an
y
Be
lg
iu
m
Sw
ed
en
Ita
ly
Gr
ee
ce
Sl
ov
en
ia
La
tv
ia
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Es
to
ni
a
Hu
ng
ar
y
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Po
la
nd
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Ro
m
an
ia
M
al
ta
Notes: Assets as of March 2012, GDP data for end 2011. Based on aggregate balance sheet of monetary ﬁnancial institutions
(MFIs). Vertical xis cut t 1000% (ratio for Luxembourg is 400%). Data on MFI includes money market funds.
Source: ECB data. Eurostat for GDP dat .
Figure 5a: Total assets of MFIs in the EU, by country (in % of national GDP) 
15Richard J. Herring
Figure 5b: Total assets of the largest EU and US banking groups 
(2011, in % of GDP)
Why start with the SSM?
In the context of this toxic interaction between weak banks and 
weak sovereigns, an outsider is tempted to pose a naïve question: 
Why start the European Banking Union with an SSM? Wouldn’t 
an SRM be more helpful since the ability of a country to resolve a 
weak bank would no longer depend on the financial resources of the 
national government? Or, indeed, wouldn’t it be better to begin with 
a CDGS3 so that an insured bank depositor has no reason to prefer 
the deposits in one member state over another? 
 
Under current conditions the quality of deposit insurance depends 
on the creditworthiness of the national government.4 Moreover, the 
3 Goyal et al (2013) note that existing deposit guarantee schemes are national, with 
varying coverage limits, contributions and fund sizes.  “Most schemes are under-
funded.  The EU Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes has set minimum stan-
dards on coverage … and the payout period.  The … EC has proposed harmonizing 
national schemes (e.g., introduce common standards on financing and set a target 
fund size of 1.5% of eligible deposits) and clarifying responsibilities (e.g., improve 
insurance payments for cross-border banks), with the possibility of borrowing ar-
rangements across national schemes with adequate safeguards.”  Note that even this 
ambitious agenda does not contemplate a CDGS.  
4 Of course, if a country has a sufficiently large, pre-funded deposit guarantee 
scheme, this burden need not fall on the government. But an event large enough 
to deplete the pre-funded scheme is certain to have an impact on the government’s 
creditworthiness because insured deposits are an implicit liability of the govern-
ment. 
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scope of coverage may vary from state to state. Some categories of de-
posits are insured in one country, but not another. When depositors 
become apprehensive – precisely the time when deposit guarantees 
matter most – depositors will have an incentive to shift their funds to 
nations with stronger credit-standing or a more expansive definition 
of insured deposits.5
This, of course, has a strong relation to resolution policy. If losses 
must be allocated – which will inevitably occur if banks are not closed 
promptly before the point of insolvency – what classes of creditors 
should be bailed in?  Is it possible to establish a predictable waterfall 
of claims, starting with equity and extending to preferred shares and 
subordinated debt and then to general unsecured creditors, that will 
enable market participants to understand precisely what to expect 
in the event of insolvency? But this highlights a difficult problem 
that was exposed by the crisis in Cyprus. Under current laws in most 
countries in the euro area, uninsured depositors stand pari passu with 
unsecured creditors. Although during the Cypriot crisis many com-
mentators expressed the view that depositors should have preference, 
it is not yet a matter of law and the ambiguity is likely to intensify 
uncertainty in a crisis.  
The adoption of the SSM alone cannot be expected to mitigate the 
toxic interactions between weak banks and the weak countries in 
which they are domiciled. Indeed, it is doubtful that an SSM can be 
effective without an SRM or CDGS. Even under ideal conditions, 
the SSM should not be expected to dampen the toxic interactions 
between weak banks and weak sovereigns. But the circumstances un-
der which the SSM will be launched are likely to be far from ideal. 
In principle, the supervision authority should be highly integrated 
with the resolution authority since they both require the same in-
formation and the ability of the SSM to take appropriate action 
with regard to a distressed bank depends on the ability of the SRA 
to resolve the distressed bank efficiently without causing disruptive 
spillovers to the rest of the financial system. I would argue that close 
5 Di Noia (2013) makes the case that “Even with perfectly functioning supervision 
and crisis resolution, [the] banking union is likely to fail without an EU deposit 
guarantee scheme.” 
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coordination with the CDGS is equally important. If the SSM and 
the SRM do not take account of the interests of the CDGS, they 
are likely to delay intervention, unduly increasing costs that must 
be borne by the CDGS. This interdependence is recognized in the 
US and some other countries by placing resolution powers with the 
deposit guarantor.6 
Ideally the primary supervisor should monitor banks and try to dis-
tinguish sound banks from weak banks that require deeper scruti-
ny. It must then decide which weak banks can be rehabilitated and 
which should be resolved. Once it is determined that at least parts 
of an institution are viable, the resolution authority can choose from 
among a variety of resolution techniques. In the US, the resolution 
authority is required by law to estimate the cost of each approach and 
choose the approach that is least costly to the deposit insurance fund 
– unless a systemic risk exception is invoked. (A least cost standard is 
under discussion in Europe.) If the institution is not viable, it should 
be liquidated. This is seldom the optimal outcome for creditors or 
for society because banks usually have at least some salvageable going 
concern value. But it is an important benchmark to be measured be-
cause it represents the minimum that creditors should receive if the 
authorities choose a different resolution approach.  (See Figure 6.)
Under the current plan, the general policies regarding banking su-
pervision will be set by the European Council, and proposed as 
legislation by the European Commission with the final law to be 
agreed with the Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament. The European Banking Authority (representing all the 
members of the EU and located in London) will set the rules and 
write the supervisory handbook. The SSM will implement the rules 
in the euro area (and in other member states that opt to join the 
regime). The ECB, through its newly-established Supervisory Board, 
will have direct oversight of the largest banks (140 in total) and in-
direct oversight of the remaining smaller banks. With regard to the 
smaller banks, the national supervisory authorities will have the pri-
mary role, but the ECB can intervene if systemic concerns arise.  
6 In a cogent and comprehensive critique of the EC proposal for the transfer of su-
pervisory responsibilities to the ECB, Carmassi, Di Noia and Micossi (2012)  argue 
that the European deposit insurance fund should become a separate “section” of the 
European Stability Mechanism. 
18 Th e Danger of Building a Banking Union on a One-Legged Stool
Figure 6: Supervision Process & Range of Resolution Tools
Th e perils of launching an SSM without an SRM and CDGS
How much can the SSM be expected to accomplish? A common set 
of rules and consistent enforcement can help integrate the banking 
market within the euro area. But without an SRM and a CDGS, it 
can do little to ease the euro crisis.  
If the SSM intends to fulfi ll its function rigorously, it will need to 
intervene in a faltering bank before the point of insolvency. Unfor-
tunately, the Financial Stability Board’s “Key Attributes of Eff ective 
Resolution for Financial Institutions” is unnecessarily vague and pos-
sibly contradictory regarding the intervention point. It recommends 
that “Resolution should be initiated when a fi rm is no longer viable 
or likely to be no longer viable, and has no reasonable prospect of 
becoming so.” Given the self-interested optimism of management, 
shareholders, and often of auditors and supervisors as well, waiting 
to intervene until there is “no reasonable prospect of becoming vi-
able” will almost certainly result in massive losses to creditors, the 
deposit insurer and possibly taxpayers as well.  
Fortunately, the European Commission’s proposal (2012) takes a 
more precise view of the trigger point, emphasizing that early inter-
vention measures should be instituted “…when a bank is in breach 
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of, or is about to breach, regulatory capital requirements.” If these 
metrics require intervention while the bank still has true economic 
value as a going concern this may work. But the lesson from the 
application of an early intervention strategy in the US is that even 
when the intervention point is stated precisely in quantitative terms, 
if the measure of regulatory capital is based on accounting values, it 
will tend to overstate economic capital markedly, leading to delayed 
intervention that can be very costly. Unfortunately, the European 
Commission’s Proposal stops short of defining a precise metric that 
will ensure pre-insolvency intervention, preferring instead to retain 
a substantial measure of discretion for the regulatory authorities. 
Given the inevitable pressures to forbear, this is a worrisome omis-
sion.7 
In addition, the authorities may lack the statutory powers to seize 
the control rights of shareholders before bankruptcy. In such circum-
stances, shareholder rights clearly conflict with the broader interests 
of society.8 But intervention must occur before insolvency in order to 
avoid losses to creditors and taxpayers. The delays caused by a share-
holder suit in Belgium during the resolution of Fortis in 2009 raised 
the question of whether each member state has an appropriate legal 
framework to permit early intervention and require prompt correc-
tive action (Claessens et al, 2010).
Worse still, without an SRM and CDGS in place, an SSM may be 
unwilling to act even if it has the legal authority to do so. When 
confronted with a weak bank in a weak country, the SSM may per-
ceive that it has no good choices. So long as resolution and deposit 
insurance remain the responsibility of the country in which the bank 
is headquartered, funding may be inadequate to preserve financial 
stability. On the other hand, if the SSM chooses to forbear, the weak 
bank will likely need access to emergency liquidity assistance eventu-
ally. While the ECB can provide such assistance, under current ar-
rangements it must be channeled through the national central bank, 
adding to the burden of national debt. This would exacerbate the 
7 Carmassi, Di Noia and Micossi (2012, 2013) emphasize the importance of adopt-
ing a clear prompt corrective action 
8 Elliott (2012) emphasizes this trade-off. 
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link between weak banks and the creditworthiness of the country in 
which they are headquartered.
Moreover, without the ability to mutualize resolution and deposit 
insurance costs across the euro area, the SSM is likely to be reluctant 
to implement appropriate prudential regulations. For example, one 
of the key weaknesses in current prudential standards is that they 
have failed to constrain very large accumulations of bonds issued by 
the home country government. Indeed, because a zero risk weight 
is applied to such holdings for the purpose of computing regulatory 
capital requirements, regulation has actually implicitly encouraged 
such imprudent behavior. To be credible, the SSM should curb these 
concentrations of sovereign risk.  
Huertas (2013) has posed three examples that highlight how un-
likely such reforms are likely to be.  Appropriate prudential regula-
tions would: (1) require that banks hold government bonds in their 
trading books that must be marked to market; (2) subject holdings 
of government bonds to capital requirements for interest rate risk; 
and (3) impose exposure limits on a single borrower to holdings of 
government bonds. It seems unlikely that the SSM would consider 
adopting any of these sensible measures without an SRM and CDGS 
in place because of the possibility of further destabilizing banks in 
the peripheral countries. If they do not, however, banks in peripheral 
countries will continue to accumulate sovereign debt, exempt from 
limits on large exposures and subject to a zero risk weight in the com-
putation of regulatory capital requirements. And the damaging link 
between weak sovereign and weak banks will increase.   
When the plan was first announced in June 2012 many politicians 
seem to have adopted the optimistic view that the European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM) would recapitalize weak banks so that the 
SSM could be launched within a well-capitalized euro-area banking 
system. This may be an example of the achievement of an agreement 
through avoidance of the use of excessively clear language, but the 
idea had widespread appeal – except in the key creditor countries 
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that would need to fund the recapitalization.9 In retrospect, the key 
creditor countries appear to have believed that they were agreeing 
to mutualize the costs of bank resolution going forward, after banks 
had qualified for the new regime with an SSM, not to fund repairs 
to capital structures inherited from the past under different national 
regulatory regimes. In any event, terms of access to the ESM have 
not notably eased.
The European Central Bank has outlined an admissions process to 
ensure that banks are strong enough to enter the new regulatory re-
gime overseen by an SSM. Although the EBA has conducted stress 
tests, these have not allayed fears about the quality of assets on the 
balance sheets of many euro area banks. Indeed, weak capitalization 
rather than lack of liquidity may be the main constraint on the reviv-
al of bank lending. (This would certainly be consistent with evidence 
from Japan and several other countries.) The European Central Bank 
has announced comprehensive review of the balance sheets of the 
140 banks that are to be supervised by the SSM. To enhance the 
credibility of the balance sheet review, the work of national supervi-
sors will be checked by peers from other countries. Once balance 
sheets have been reviewed and appropriately adjusted, the EBA will 
conduct another stress test to identify banks that need to be recapi-
talized before they enter the new regime.    
This raises the awkward question of how banks that fall short of the 
capital standard will be recapitalized. It should be noted that the 
US was able to increase confidence through a stress test in which, 
paradoxically, 11 of 19 banks failed. This was a confidence boost-
ing measure only because the banks that failed were mandatorily re-
capitalized by the US government.  The comparable mechanism for 
recapitalization of European banks remains unclear.  The creditor 
9 The language of the document appears to envision the ESM facility working af-
ter the SSM is established.  On June 20, 2013, the President of the Eurogroup 
(ESM, 2013) clarified the contemplated role of the ESM in bank recapitalization. 
A subsidiary of the ESM, with €60 billion, will, under certain circumstances, stand 
ready to help recapitalize systemically important banks in member states, when the 
member state is unable to do so and when there are insufficient amounts of credit to 
be bailed in.  Although potential retroactive funding may be considered on a case-
by-case basis, this still leaves open how inadequately capitalized banks will be able to 
meet the entry requirements to join the SSM. 
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countries appear to believe that each national government should be 
responsible for recapitalizing its own banks before they can qualify 
for entry into the new system. Some of the weaker countries appear 
to believe that the ESM can be used for such purposes. Whether 
the ESM can or will supply sufficient funds – or, indeed, whether 
countries would want to borrow such funds under the conditions 
required from previous borrowers – remains unclear. But, if the bal-
ance sheet reviews and stress tests are honestly conducted, the ECB 
procedure is likely to expose capital deficits that cannot be ignored.
  
The European Central Bank has recognized the danger in proceeding 
with the SSM without having an SRM in place. Both Mario Draghi, 
President of the European Central Bank (ECB), and Benoît Coeuré, 
member of the Executive Board of the ECB, have stressed the impor-
tance of establishing an SRM promptly. Although the Bank Recov-
ery and Resolution Directive remains to be finalized by the European 
Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament, 
the ECB has stressed that timely resolution should minimize spill-
overs from one weak bank to others and safeguard the stability of the 
European financial system.10 The ECB fears that it will have the au-
thority to declare a bank in the eurozone insolvent, but no real power 
to prevent potential spillovers except to urge the national authority 
to deal with them.
Two contrasting views of the SRM
The European Commission (EC) has recently outlined its SRM 
proposal.11 The EC believes that it is the best placed institution to 
make all relevant decisions related to discretionary resolution. A 
newly created resolution body would prepare, propose and enforce 
decisions via an Executive Board (EB) that would have access to a 
single bank resolution fund that would be backed by the assets of 
euro area banks. The EB would be dominated by appointees from 
the EC and the ECB – not the member states. The EC would have 
10 The IMF has taken a similar view (Goyal et al, 2013). 
11 This summary relies on reports of the Commission discussion paper presented to 
EU Commissioners on May 29 that were published in the Financial Times (Spiegel 
and Carnegy, 2013) and the Wall Street Journal (Fairless, 2013).  The official docu-
ment has not yet been released and the details may change as a result of internal 
debate. 
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the power to overrule a bank’s home country and use funds from 
a central, euro-area single bank resolution fund (SBRF) to imple-
ment its decisions. The fund would have the power to borrow from 
markets, using the “assets of euro area banks” as a guarantee and 
backstop. Once the EC decides that a bank should be shut down, the 
policy can be implemented by the member state subject to oversight 
by the EB.  The intent is to ensure the ability of the SRM to take 
decisions without giving a veto power to individual member states. 
The proposed framework also circumvents the ECB.
This is the opening salvo in what looks to be a very tense debate as 
the euro area tries to agree on how to resolve banks by the end of 
June 2013.  After a Paris meeting between French President, François 
Hollande, and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, the two lead-
ers issued a “contribution” (Bundesregierung, 2013) that sketches 
a strikingly different vision for a European approach to resolution. 
They described their concept as “a single resolution board involving 
national resolution authorities.”
This cedes much less power to the EC.   The French won German 
agreement to a “Single Resolution Board” and to authorize the €500 
billion ESM to serve as a “public backstop” to fund bank recapital-
izations if individual countries cannot do it on their own.  In most 
other respects, however, this “contribution” reflected the German 
view of the new resolution authority, rather than the vision of the 
EC. 
Although both plans envision a resolution board, the composition 
and powers of the two boards are entirely different. The Franco-Ger-
man Single Resolution Board would be comprised of the individual 
national authorities and would be a coordinating body, not a new, 
independent EU agency with independent power to restructure and 
recapitalize banks. The German opposition to the more powerful, 
independent EU agency is based on its interpretation of existing Eu-
ropean treaties. They believe that the existing treaties, which provide 
for the involvement of the ECB in prudential supervision, do not 
give the EC the authority to close banks and seize assets. (One sus-
pects that the Germans may have an additional objection. As the 
likely main backstop for the proposed single bank resolution fund, 
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the Germans are not eager to cede control over expenditures from 
the fund to an independent authority that does not give Germany a 
role commensurate with its financial liability.)  
In addition, while the Franco-German agreement to permit the ESM 
to serve as a backstop for funding bank resolutions may seem like 
a move toward the EC concept of an SBRF, it has a very impor-
tant difference. Under the voting rules in the ESM, the three largest 
countries in the euro area – Germany, France and Italy – have a veto. 
Thus using this mechanism could limit Germany’s financial liability 
in a way that the SBRF controlled by an independent SRM would 
not.
A number of the large banks in the euro-area hold a higher pro-
portion of their assets outside than inside their home country. (See 
Figure 7.) This number of such institutions is much higher than in 
either the United States or Japan. Thus it is especially important that 
European bank regulators have clear, credible plans for resolving 
banks that have substantial cross-border holdings. Experience in the 
recent past – for example, the clumsily managed collapses of Fortis 
and Dexia during the crisis – suggests that they do not. Thus con-
tinued uncertainty about how bank resolution will be managed in 
the euro area could be very damaging if another crisis should occur.  
Figure 7: Large European Banks with >50% of Assets Outside Home Country
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Concluding comment
 
To return to the original naïve question posed earlier in this chapter: 
why start a single banking area with an SSM, rather than an SRM 
and CDGS? Presumably, the optimistic answer is that by establishing 
a roadmap to a new, workable euro-area banking union, officials will 
help stabilize the current situation. Forward-looking markets will 
price expectations of future stability in today’s asset prices and reduce 
pressures on weak member states. Perhaps, but this surely depends 
on whether shocks occur while the road is under construction and on 
whether construction is delayed.
A more pessimistic view is that the reason for this three-stage ap-
proach is one of expediency. It is much easier to agree on an SSM 
than on an SRM or CDGS that may involve potentially open-ended 
fiscal commitments or loss of sovereignty over decisions regarding 
key domestic institutions. Moreover, if one accepts the German in-
terpretation of existing treaties, it may be technically easier as well. 
Although members of the EU agree that an SSM, with the participa-
tion of the ECB, can be soundly based on existing treaties, an SRM 
or a CDGS may require treaty amendments or, indeed, a new treaty. 
The ratification process would require unanimous consent and might 
involve referenda in some countries. Thus stages two and three are 
technically more difficult to accomplish as well as requiring a greater 
willingness to cede sovereignty over bank resolution and fiscal trans-
fers to centralized, EU institutions. The ongoing dispute over how to 
deal with legacy losses before launching the SSM indicates that mov-
ing from the SSM to the SRM and CDGS will not be easy.
The analogy with the monetary union is obvious, but unsettling. 
Some of the early proponents of the European Monetary Union re-
alized that it was incomplete unless it was accompanied by a fis-
cal union and a much more cohesive political union. The second 
two measures seemed completely out of reach when the Maastricht 
Treaty was negotiated, but some of the more optimistic proponents 
argued that if a monetary union were achieved, market pressures and 
greater integration in the euro-area markets would make it easier to 
achieve a fiscal union and the shifting of greater political power to 
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euro- level institutions. Unfortunately, that has proven to be exces-
sively optimistic to date. Persistent disparities in growth rates and 
standards of living within the euro area have threatened instead to 
disintegrate the euro area rather than leading to greater harmoniza-
tion of fiscal policies and centralization of political power.  
The parallel risk is that achieving an SSM may not lead readily to 
an SRM or a CDGS. Instead it may lead to a supervisory regime 
that is likely to forbear because the costs of a bank resolution can-
not be efficiently managed. An SRM and the concept of allocating 
losses and implementing bail-ins would lead to a sharp break with 
past traditions in the euro area. In general there has been a strong 
predisposition to prevent any bank from being liquidated, no matter 
how small. In addition, the authorities have tended to guarantee all 
liabilities so that no depositor or lender loses money because of bank 
insolvency. And generally the authorities have dealt with troubled 
financial institutions by subsidizing a merger or acquisition or by 
making a direct capital infusion. The SRM is intended to implement 
a new approach that would bail-in at least some creditors and, if un-
insured liabilities are insufficient to cover the loss, advance a loan to 
facilitate the resolution that would be repaid by the banking indus-
try. Taxpayers would be protected from the heavy costs they suffered 
during the recent financial crisis.
This cannot be achieved by creating an SSM alone. Without a 
credible SRM and a trustworthy CDGS, these objectives cannot be 
accomplished. A stool with only one leg is certain to be unstable.
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Banking Union in the Eurozone?  
A panel contribution
Jan Pieter Krahnen1 
1. Introduction
The organizers have asked me to reflect on the post-Liikanen future 
of European banking. This is a good moment to carry out such a 
reflection, as the Liikanen report and its proposals have been out for 
almost six months, while the official response by the European Com-
mission, the addressee of the report, is not expected until later this 
year. It is thus a good time to speculate about the implementation of 
the main proposals contained in the Liikanen report and its possible 
impact on European banking. 
Several aspects of the bigger picture of an emerging Banking Union 
(BU) are still in limbo. Of the four elements defining the BU -- 
the resolution and recovery directive (RRD), the unified micropru-
dential supervision (SSM), the unified resolution agency-cum-fund 
(SRA), and the deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) -- only the first two 
are reasonably well defined and their implementation is reasonably 
1 Professor of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt (www.finance.uni-frankfurt.
de), and Center for Financial Studies (CFS), SAFE (www.safe-frankfurt.de), CEPR 
krahnen@finance.uni-frankfurt.de. In 2012, he has been a member of the High 
Level Expert Group (Liikanen Group). 
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likely. In both cases,  legal robustness raises some questions, relating 
to its significance for banks currently supervised by national agen-
cies. Officially, there are only vague plans for a European resolution 
agency, and no plans for a European deposit guarantee scheme. The 
reluctance to move forward on these two issues is largely due to the 
fear of losing national influence, shared by many. 
For example, in the case of Germany, the transfer of decision pow-
er and resolution discretion from the national to the European (or 
trans-national) level is seen by key players both in the political arena 
as well as in parts of the industry, as a threat to the existing structure 
of the so-called three-pillar banking system2. It is therefore likely that 
these agenda points, despite their high importance for a functional 
banking union, will not be pursued in the foreseeable future. One 
might label this financial protectionism:  it describes the tendency of 
national policies vis-à-vis the European BU project to push the inter-
est of national champions, irrespective of a possibly damaging effect 
on a European level playing field. 
Since the BU project will hardly advance further without support 
from its biggest stakeholders, notably Germany, a considerable de-
lay of a workable BU project is very likely now. A BU project is 
workable if all four institutional features mentioned above -- SSM, 
RRD, SRA and DGS -- are simultaneously in place. The four fea-
tures are complementary to each other and if several of them are not 
implemented, the market discipline that is expected to emerge from 
a BU project’s existence will not develop because the existence of 
proper resolution mechanisms without automatic and credible gov-
ernment bailout will be in doubt. 
At the time  that I am writing this essay, it seems unlikely that the 
Banking Union will be fully operative without a major “concilia-
tory moment.” Such a historical moment is unlikely to arise outside 
2 Private banks, two cooperative bank groups, and one state-owned/community-
owned savings bank group make up roughly 30%, 25% and 45% of the banking 
system. The question of whether the groups are to be seen as a consolidated entity 
or as a loose grouping of hundreds of independent institutions is a major controver-
sial issue. Traditionally, the Ministry of Finance has represented the interests of the 
incumbent associations. 
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a major financial crisis, since the coordination problem among 17 
contracting partners with significant “skin in the game,” i.e.  signifi-
cant own stakes, are excessive. A conciliatory moment, i.e., a widely 
shared willingness to compromise, might follow from a shock to the 
financial system, e.g., a significant rise of short term interest rates, or 
a shock to the political system, e.g., an unconditional rejection of the 
OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions of the ECB) by the German 
constitutional court3. 
In the remainder of this text, I will abstract from the implementation 
problems surrounding a banking union, focusing instead on two ad-
ditional elements in a future framework for a sustainable banking 
system in Europe, which is also the key content of the Liikanen pro-
posal. 
2. Explaining structural reform proposals for EU banking 
The proposals contained in the Liikanen Report have to be read 
against the background of the crisis narrative laid out in the first part 
of the report. It emphasizes the role of systemic risk in banking mar-
kets. The new quality of systemic risk in the financial system derives 
from a greatly increased level of interconnection between financial 
institutions, if compared to banking in earlier times. Over the past 
25 years, the growth of derivative markets and the increased role of 
secured and unsecured interbank lending has augmented the inter-
dependencies among financial institutions considerably. Additional 
contributors to inter-bank dependencies are indirect relationships, 
like correlations among marked-to-market assets on bank balance 
sheets, as well as liquidity-sensitive market prices in case of fire sales 
of these assets. Direct and indirect bank interdependencies, in turn, 
contribute to the risk of a joint breakdown (distress) of financial in-
stitutions, and thus a breakdown of basic financial services for the 
real economy.
The expectation of such a breakdown is called systemic risk, and its 
occurrence almost always requires government intervention to avoid 
significant costs to the real economy. Keeping the level of systemic 
3 A decision by the court is not expected before fall 2013. 
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risk at a low level is therefore a major task for regulators and supervi-
sors. This is because if the market expects government interventions, 
there will be anticipatory effects in bank funding markets. In partic-
ular, the anticipation of a possible bailout of junior and senior bank 
creditors will lower funding costs and distort risk pricing more gen-
erally. The underpricing of bank default risk has been documented 
by Schweikhard/Tsesmelidakis (2012),  among others. 
These underpricing effects feed back into risk taking decisions by 
individual banks, and thus may increase the level of systemic risk. 
The Liikanen proposal tries to break through this vicious circle by 
facilitating the resolvability of individual banking institutions and, 
at the same time, limiting the contagious effects caused by potential 
creditor bail-ins. If the resolution of banks without creditor bailout 
is credible, or so it is hoped, it will lead the bank to select less risky 
strategies and will therefore reduce systemic risk. The report sug-
gests two main measures4 in order to enhance the restructuring of 
distressed institutions with minimal recourse to taxpayers’ money: 
the separation of trading activities and the issuance of bonds with 
holding restrictions. 
Separation of trading from universal banking
The first proposal is to break up large complex financial institutions 
by forcing major trading activities into a legally separate broker-deal-
er unit. The broker-dealer unit may be put under the same hold-
ing. However, its capitalization and its funding must be separate. 
The main objective of this measure is not to reduce trading activities 
per se, but rather to limit a possible implicit subsidization of funding 
if carried out together with the traditional deposit taking business. 
Just as any other banking activity, trading should earn its risk ad-
justed cost of capital. 
Further details of the separation proposal specify a de-minimis rule 
relating to the absolute size of the bank (€100 billion) and the rela-
tive size of its trading assets (15-20% of balance sheet total). Most 
4 There is a small number of other recommendations, including increased capital 
buffers for trading activities, and several improvements of corporate governance in-
struments. 
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importantly, no distinction is made between proprietary trading and 
client business or market making. It is argued that proprietary and 
client-related trading activities will be hard to distinguish since mar-
ket making in less-than-perfectly-liquid markets consists essentially 
of a sequence of trades that end up on the bank’s own book.5  
The separation of market making and proprietary trading activities 
of large banks has raised considerable opposition from the industry. 
It is argued that trading activities have not been at the center of the 
crisis, nor were banks with large trading books any more affected 
by the crisis than other institutions. Why, then, should trading be 
singled out for separation rendering universal banking less attractive 
as a business model? In addition, competition on an international 
market is much more difficult, unless there is a level playing field. 
The reason for pushing for the separation of trading from universal 
banking is to increase the chances for resolution and creditor bail-in. 
International universal banks have become very complex internally, 
and trading activities have played a special role in this development. 
Any attempt to restructure a failing bank over a short weekend, the 
infamous Friday-to Sunday emergency events, will be hard to do if 
trading and banking are densely interrelated. 
Over the past two decades, large international banks have become 
specialists in risk management and hedging services. Due to large 
order flows and a strong position in many derivatives and securities 
markets, they are in a position to offer quick execution of customer 
orders, offering liquidity to their clients. By extensively using net-
ting possibilities, and innovative ways to internalize netted trans-
action flows, a bank is able to reduce the number and volume of 
hedging transactions with third parties. The embedded spreads and 
risk premiums translate into bank earnings. It is such an integrated 
commercial-cum-trading bank with its complex internal portfolio 
(of exposures) that renders a quick restructuring difficult.
 
A separation of trading from banking, in contrast, will create two dis-
tinct institutions: a trading house (or broker-dealer), and a remain-
5 In the US, the Volcker rule as part of the Dodd-Frank-Act requires a full sepa-
ration of the proprietary trading desk, while market making and client business 
remain unaffected. 
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ing (i.e., universal) bank. Both institutions will have their own equity 
capital, possibly provided by a mutual bank holding firm. While the 
universal bank will be refinanced as before by deposits, bonds and 
unsecured credit, the trading house will have its own funding, prob-
ably from bond or wholesale markets. It will not have access to the 
deposit market, and therefore will not enjoy an implicit government 
guarantee. 
Mandatory issue of bonds with holding restrictions
The second main proposal contained in the Liikanen report is, in my 
opinion, the main proposal of the entire report, as it addresses di-
rectly the reason for the ubiquity of systemic risk in today’s banking 
industry. It requires banks to issue a minimum amount of unsecured 
bonds with specific holding restrictions. Forcing banks to issue sub-
ordinate debt is by itself not unusual, as most financial institutions 
have already a host of junior or hybrid instruments outstanding. 
The main innovation of the Liikanen proposal concerns the embed-
ded holding restriction: the mandatory junior debt should not be 
held at any time by an institution inside the banking system, i.e., 
by an institution subject to bank systemic risk. By implication, the 
transfer the default risk of such junior debt into the banking system, 
e.g., via credit default swaps or other derivative contracts, will not 
be allowed. 
By allocating junior debt outside the banking system, losses exceed-
ing the equity of the affected institution will be borne by investors 
without a direct contagious feedback effect. A supervisor considering 
creditor bail-in will be confident that its bail-in decision will not 
trigger the next systemic banking crisis – and will thus be encour-
aged to carry out the bail-in. In anticipation, creditors will know that 
the threat of losing part of their capital in a default case is real and, 
therefore, market prices will reflect actual default risk. The disciplin-
ary effect of debt markets will be resurrected. 
The strict holding restriction may be replaced by a somewhat weaker 
formulation, giving banks the option to invest in such junior bank 
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debt, provided that it is fully backed by equity (i.e. risk weight is 
1250%). Both formulations lead to essentially the same thing: junior 
(“bail-in”) bank debt will be held outside the banking system, mini-
mizing systemic feedback effects of bail-in operations. 
3. What are the consequences for the banking industry? 
Much of the regulatory reform project of the past couple of years has 
been welcomed by the financial industry; e.g., there was a positive 
reception for the Basle III innovations relating to a strengthening of 
equity capital, and the introduction of a leverage ratio. The banking 
union project with its focus on a level playing field for supervision 
and resolution, within the European Union, has met broad support 
on a general level, combined with strong opposition on specific is-
sues of concern for national players and their business models. There 
is also some concern about the future role of the national supervisor. 
As a result, there is a general lack of willingness to transfer authority 
from the national to the supranational level.6
 
The Liikanen proposals, in contrast, have received a more negative 
reaction, at least concerning the separation proposal. In Germany, 
for example, the associations of all three (so-called) pillars of the 
banking system, the savings banks, the private banks, and the co-
operative banks, have argued that a separation of trading activities 
would endanger the time-proven model of universal banking.  The 
arguments presented by all three groups differ from each other since 
their organizational model differs as well. 
While a true impact study would be extremely helpful, I will com-
ment below on some of these arguments – with due restraint, since 
the arguments are based on theorizing rather than hard evidence. 
6 In the case of the SSM, it has remained unclear to date what the power of the 
ECB (as supervisor) for the largest banks will be, and which decision or veto rights 
will remain with the national authorities. This is particularly important for decisions 
that may have budgetary implications. In the case of an SRM, the single resolution 
agency, the transfer of decision power has not been determined yet. 
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Reduced profitability?
One commonly heard argument refers to the profitability of a stand-
alone broker-dealer. Some commentators have argued that stand-
alone funding, as it is implied in the separation concept, will lead to 
increased funding costs of the broker-dealer, lowering the profitabili-
ty of market making and, therefore, reducing the provision of liquid-
ity in markets dominated by market makers. An impact study carried 
out in the US, on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce, analyzes 
the consequences of implementing the Volcker Rule. It supports a 
negative conclusion concerning market liquidity (see Thakor 2012).
The latter study is not wholly convincing, as the general equilibrium 
repercussions of a general rule change, rather than an isolated cost 
increase for a single player, has not been considered.  In other words, 
separating trading (and more importantly, market making) for all 
players in the market is likely to change other prices as well, not 
just broker-dealer funding costs. In particular, one would expect that 
after such a rule change, the price of market making services may 
go up as well, thereby increasing the spread earned by the interme-
diary. The overall effect on profitability of the broker-dealer has to 
encompass three adjustments: funding costs (up), price for market 
making services (up), transaction volume (down, presumably). The 
resulting spread and, hence, the profitability of the broker-dealer is 
therefore difficult to predict. It is even conceivable that a new market 
environment defined by legislation separating market making and 
prop trading from universal banking may increase profitability from 
trading, while at the same time reducing the number of institutions 
offering these services.7 
Regulatory arbitrage?
Another argument raised against the separation rule challenges the 
Report’s de-minimis rule, according to which only banks with sig-
nificant trading books are subject to the separation. The Report has 
suggested drawing the line at an absolute size of the trading book of 
€ 100 billion (or a trading book exceeding 15-25% of total assets). 
7 E.g., due to positive scale economies for broker-dealers. 
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Wouldn’t such a generous de-minimis rule invite mid-sized banks to 
expand their trading activities to a level just under the critical level? 
And wouldn’t such a market development take away significant busi-
ness volume from the larger institutions, rendering their separated 
broker-dealer entity ineffective, and indeed unprofitable?
My take on this arbitrage-oriented argument is that while the above 
scenario cannot be ruled out, it is not likely to happen if there are in-
deed economies to scale in the broker-dealer industry. However, ab-
sent these economies, the resulting decentralized trading architecture 
will prevail anyway, and there is no (further) negative effect on bank 
resolvability – as the complexity of universal banks with relatively 
small trading business is believed to be manageable. 
Conversely, however, if a few large broker-dealer institutions pre-
vailed in the future, these institutions would represent a significant 
systemic risk, given their high degree of interconnection with many 
non-broker-dealer banking institutions across Europe. As a conse-
quence, the Liikanen report has recommended imposing additional 
capital charges on trading institutions. 
Reduced liquidity?
Major providers of market liquidity in today’s financial markets are 
large international universal banks with significant trading books 
(available for sale; held to maturity). To what extent is their business 
model dependent on unrestricted access to customer order flow? Put 
differently, is it possible to rebuild the current set of services to cli-
ents provided by such a bank even after the trading entity has been 
separated into a broker-dealer institution? 
It seems at least conceivable that a newly separated broker-dealer 
continues to advise the universal bank with respect to financial strat-
egy and risk management, leaving partly or entirely the execution 
to peer broker-dealers in the market. While this may lower overall 
profitability of broker-dealer services in the economy, the decrease 
of profitability is not assured. In principle, profits may also remain 
unchanged, for example if execution prices rise, or if the advisory ser-
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vices remaining with the “old” broker-dealer are paid for and com-
mand a reasonable price. These equilibrium price effects are difficult 
to forecast, however, as there may well be market entry in broker-
dealer markets, causing pressure on profitability. 
Reduced risk transfer?
The absence of true risk transfer outside the banking system was at 
the root of the early stage of the financial crisis, as was evidenced by 
the allocation of tranches from asset backed securities transactions 
(see for example Franke and Krahnen 2009). Rather than transfer-
ring risk to investors, risk was at least partly shifted between financial 
institutions, contributing to interconnection, contagion and system-
ic risk. 
The Liikanen proposal prohibits banks from holding junior debt of 
other banks, and at the same time forces banks to issue such debt 
-- this will indeed contribute to a significant transfer of risk. This 
is actually the main objective of the (inappropriately labeled) “bail-
in debt.” Creating a layer of subordinate bank debt that cannot 
cause contagion among banks represents by construction a form of 
non-systemic risk. The resulting risk transfer is therefore credible, as 
a rescue of the bondholder by government intervention is not to be 
expected.
Indeed, it will be the special duty of the markets supervisor to ensure 
the bail-in-ability of such designated subordinate bank debt. In this 
respect, the supervisor has to make note of the holders of such form 
of debt, its identity, and its loss-absorbing capacity. Furthermore, the 
supervisor has to ensure that risk is actually borne by the recorded 
holders – rather than being transferred back to an agent inside the 
banking system.8 
It should also be emphasized (emphasized!) that despite the term 
“bail-in debt,” which has been introduced in the Liikanen Report, 
the term does not imply that all other sources of (bank) debt will be 
8 Risk transfer back into the banking system could be due, e.g., to a swap transac-
tion where a bank sells credit protection to a bondholder for a fee.  
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in the form of bailout debt. The opposite is true. According to the 
Report, all bank debt is bail-in-able, in the order defined by seniority. 
Only the most junior tranche, which has been called bail-in debt, is 
required to have a minimum size (e.g., 5% of total assets) and is sub-
ject to the specific holding restriction explained in the last paragraph. 
4. Conclusion
The post-Liikanen future of European banking will to a large extent 
hinge upon the commitment of Europe’s policy makers to imple-
ment simple but strict structural rules aimed at a revival of market 
discipline. The Liikanen proposal of non-systemic, subordinate debt, 
characterized by clearly defined and constantly monitored holding 
restrictions, is not only simple but also likely to be effective in revital-
izing a sustainable financial intermediation system in Europe. 
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European Banking Union:  
A Lawyer’s Personal Perspective
Summary of address given by Professor Philip Wood QC (Hon) 
prepared by Joanna Gray (Newcastle Law School, Newcastle 
University)
Philip Wood QC (Hon) 
Why Law Matters.
My assessment of the current proposals to implement a European 
Banking Union which follows is guided by a strong belief in the 
universal human desire for survival in an uncertain world with scarce 
resources, which cuts across legal jurisdictions and political cultures 
and groups. Equally important is the nearly universal human belief 
in the idea of law. The following two lessons from history illustrate 
the strength of this belief.
147 people boarded the lifeboat of the ill-fated vessel Medusa in July 
1816 after it was wrecked off the coast of Senegal, West Africa. Only 
15 survived. Most of the others were killed while fighting for the 
brandy and biscuits. The captain left the raft to float around help-
lessly in the sea without navigation, without leadership.  He rowed 
to the shore in the ship’s boat. There is a rule that captains do not 
leave the ship, a custom of the High Seas that has assumed the sta-
tus of a universal rule of law. There is also a rule that if you are on 
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the lifeboat following a shipwreck, food and drink rations must be 
shared equally.  
Both of these rules were adhered to when some 30 or so Chilean 
miners were trapped in their mine in 2009. They elected a leader and 
the leader required an equal allocation of the available food every 
day. The miners were trapped for about the same period of time as 
the hapless people on the lifeboat of the Medusa but, unlike those 
castaways, they all survived. These examples provide a simple illustra-
tion of the superiority of law and rules over the unconstrained panic 
that reliance on immediate survival instincts causes. 
The law is, of course, far more than just a fundamental survival re-
quirement in cases of terrible emergencies. The rules of law also ap-
ply to the behaviour and nature of money, central banks, banking, 
financial affairs, and currencies.  
Money is a public utility. It is the product of our labour and work.  It 
connects us to our future. It connects the peoples of the world, one 
to another.
European Banking Union: the Good and the Bad.
The practical arguments in favour of a European banking union are 
powerful and ultimately credible and cogent. The functional reasons 
are (1) that combined sovereign resources are needed to deal with 
a systemic collapse since the assets of European banks are probably 
about three times the European GDP, (2) that it is necessary to de-
nationalise a rescue in order to avoid a paralysing struggle of one 
sovereign state against another and (3) that it is much more efficient 
to have a common set of rules and a common comprehensible set of 
bail-out principles.  
 
However, total mutualisation across national borders within the 
Banking Union, never mind the wider EU, is clearly unlikely in the 
near future. Now is not the time to assess the likelihood or otherwise 
of the realisation of the banking union. Rather it is useful to high-
light what I see to be some of be major defects in the way the bank-
ing union is being built.  
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Common Regulatory Rules
The first plank of the banking union is that there should be a com-
mon set of regulatory rules, i.e. single supervision via a European 
authority, supposedly with the European Central Bank at the apex. 
However, the regulatory rules which have been put in place or pro-
posed in response to the financial crisis are inappropriate for a num-
ber of reasons.  
There is nothing wrong with the proposal to increase the capital 
cushion substantially. Better liquidity is not a bad idea but the cur-
rent proposals are considered extreme. The in-built design flaw of 
maturity mismatch in a bank is a fact of life: much like many useful 
phenomena, energy, for example, which is sometimes dangerous but 
fundamental to the atom. Many of the new regulations and propos-
als represent an outdated view of banking and look backwards rather 
than forwards. They hark back to a simple 19th century world of 
narrow banking and are mainly designed to protect retail depositors, 
and are therefore populist in tone. This is true, for example, of the 
Volcker Rule and its European variants, ring-fencing according to 
Vickers and Liikanen, derivatives push-out, the demolition of secu-
ritisations, and resolution bail-in.  
In 1990, the GDP of the world was three football fields of $10 tril-
lion each. At the time of the crisis, it was five or six football fields. 
Absent some catastrophic event, by 2030 it could be ten or 12 or 15 
football fields in scale. No doubt this means more prosperity but the 
vast wall of money created has to find a home.  It will go into banks, 
capital markets, and funds, resulting in a financial landscape very 
different from what we have now. Thus, just as you can insure your 
car against a crash or your house against fire, you should be able to 
insure your financial assets against risks by derivatives.  Securitisa-
tions are no more than an extension of ancient factoring or discount-
ing of debts widely practiced at the time of the Medicis in the Italian 
Renaissance. A simpler transaction is hard to imagine.
The idea that banks’ securitisation activity should be prohibited or 
curtailed bears no examination. The idea, too, that it should all be 
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split up is doubtful. If you split a bank of 100 into ten separate pieces 
of ten each, you still have 100.  
Functionally, many of the current regulatory reforms and proposals 
around bank reform prioritise the protection of the state versus cru-
cial suppliers of private credit in the form of senior bondholders. It 
would be a simpler solution just to promote depositors in the bank-
ruptcy ladder of priorities. In addition, the moves override the idea 
of a bank. A bank collects the money of the people, as a lake collects 
water, with to the goal of irrigating the land.  It is the people’s money 
that builds the power stations and it is the people who are the credi-
tors and it is the people who are hurt if the productive use of their 
money is thwarted and frustrated.  
The sheer volume of regulation, too, is disproportionate, with the 
size and complexity of both the Dodd-Frank Act and the growing 
body of European Banking Union reforms, detracting from the value 
of simple and comprehensible law-making. For what went wrong 
was a breach of two very simple rules.  These rules were that central 
banks should not normally price money at nothing because this cre-
ates the risk of a bubble,  and that banks should not irresponsibly 
lend into what could easily become an asset bubble, in this case hous-
ing, the most basic of  assets.  
To this critique of complexity and obfuscation of the simple and 
obvious might be added the fact that some of the capital rules are 
written in a patois “pidgin” mathematics, an argotic “quantbabble” 
rather than generally accessible language. 
Common Bank Resolution
Coercive bank resolution statutes originated in the United States in 
1933, at the height of the resentment and rancour ignited by the 
Great Depression. These laws nationalise bankruptcy law in a very 
important sector of modern economies. They do away with the 
courts, creditor control and a proper legal framework and substitute 
regulatory discretion instead. Laws of this importance which confer 
arbitrary discretion to government agencies are suspect.  The Euro-
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peans have spent the last 2000 years or so discussing despotism and 
whether it is good or bad.  Clearly in some circumstances, emergency 
laws are sometimes needed, such as the lifeboat example, and they 
can be effective. However, whether or not these coercive bank resolu-
tion statutes will operate for the greater benefit of us all, is a major 
issue. The regulators often refer to having adequate “tools” - as if 
resolution statutes were like the honest humble artisan trying to fix a 
leaky tap, instead of what they really are, a sledge-hammer smashing 
a stained-glass window of settled and intricate patterns of risk alloca-
tion and pricing.  
There are two points, however, worth making, both with functional-
ity being the bedrock of the rule of law. The first is, how does any-
body assess counterparty risk or do a credit rating of a bank when 
regulators can split assets and liabilities, as they are permitted to do 
under the statutes? Counterparty risk becomes a matter of guess-
work.
Secondly, what of cross-border bankruptcy comity if each national 
regulator can do what it likes? In practice, it is highly likely that each 
national regulator will seek to protect local retail depositors, at the 
expense of foreign creditors. So the resolution of a large bank could 
risk becoming a nationalistic free- for- all. This is one area which 
unquestionably needs rules if cross-border risk is to be constrained.  
In Conclusion
The notion that a European banking order will solve the problems of 
the Eurozone and de-couple sovereign credit from bank risk seems 
unrealistic. Sovereign credit is inevitably bound up with the safety of 
banks and, if GDP does grow as forecast, this will become even more 
so the case.  
 
The solution is to adhere to some very simple common sense rules 
about risk, as explained.  These principles are so elementary that both 
political leaders and people have declined to recognise them for the 
reason that the simple rules are the toughest. Two examples bear this 
out.
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The first relates to 2001 or thereabouts when the Federal Reserve 
priced money at nothing. Maybe they did so because inflation did 
not seem to be a risk and therefore they chose to deliver cost-free 
money to prospective homeowners and the corporate sector and to 
lower the cost of borrowing from China and elsewhere? Sound eco-
nomic reasons. Nevertheless, what was not made explicit was that the 
Fed was pricing other people’s money, the money belonging to savers, 
an action comparable in substance to forcibly selling someone’s car at 
half-price, and therefore playing Robin Hood. The central bank was 
in effect adopting a policy of redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
While this may seem a legitimate policy choice, since all states re-
distribute resources, it was problematic in this case: the Fed did not 
seem to realise that they were creating a redistribution because it was 
not effected  through the tax system. The public also did not under-
stand that this was happening. As a result, this policy undermined 
the democratic legitimacy of political action. 
The second example relates to Greece. Here was a country, a devel-
oped country with a long and noble historical tradition, which paid 
a cash dividend to its bondholders of 15%, supplied by 16 other 
countries, and which extended to its private creditors a junior sub-
ordinated note payable after 30 years. This was not some destitute 
failed state with no resources and an uneducated population. So was 
this a situation where a developed country got in a fiscal muddle and 
simply suffered a temporary setback amenable to technocratic fix? 
Or else was this the first signal of a very fundamental problem in the 
approach to public finance, common to most of the sovereigns in the 
West and Japan?
One of the greatest achievements of Europe is that, of approximately 
320 jurisdictions in the world, about 270 of them have a legal system 
based on Western European models. In light of this great history, it is 
regrettable to see how little attention Western Europe is now paying 
to the need to preserve the role of some simple and eternal funda-
mental truths about law in response to our common predicament.  
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Establishing the Banking Union 
and repairing the Single Market
Andrea Enria 
1. Introduction
Discussions on the integration of banking supervision into the Eu-
ropean System of Central banks (ESCB) date back to the time of 
the Delors Committee, whose 1989 report gave shape to the project 
of a European Monetary Union. The decision to leave supervision 
at the national level has led to a unique institutional setup – what 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (1999) labelled a “double separation,” 
functional and geographical, between the jurisdiction of monetary 
policy and that of banking supervision. The underlying idea was that 
the Single Market mechanism, in particular the single passport and 
the cooperation between national authorities, would have provided a 
sufficiently integrated system, able to step up to the challenges of an 
integrated banking market and to provide unified policy responses 
whenever needed. The experience of the recent past has shattered 
the belief that minimum harmonisation and cooperation amongst 
national authorities would be effective in preventing and managing 
financial crises in an integrated market.
The establishment of the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 
2011 and the agreement to move to a Banking Union in 2012 have 
marked a major policy shift towards maximum harmonisation (the 
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so-called Single Rulebook) and centralisation of supervisory respon-
sibilities at the European Central Bank (ECB). The process of insti-
tutional repair is not complete, though. And it is important that as 
the pressure of the crisis weakens, policy makers do not lose momen-
tum and remain committed to completing an ambitious reform of 
our institutional architecture.
I will first focus my attention on the rationale for institutional repair, 
identifying two main drivers: (i) the need to counteract the adverse 
loop linking banks and their sovereign; and (ii) the trend towards 
balkanisation of the Single Market. Then, I will assess the important 
steps already accomplished in building up the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the challenges in achieving greater integra-
tion in other components of the safety net. Finally, I will argue that 
as the Banking Union will not cover all Member States, it is essential 
to devote efforts to strengthening the legal underpinnings for the 
functioning of the whole Single Market, in particular in the area of 
resolution.
2. The need for institutional repair
In building up the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), European policy makers gave a clear signal to the 
banks: they were invited to consider the EU as their domestic market 
and to create a dimensional and organisational structure reflecting 
the new institutional setup. The wave of mergers that characterised 
European banking in the early 2000s effectively brought European 
banks to a dimension commensurate with the new boundaries of 
their reference market. But when the crisis broke out, policy makers 
decided that bailing out banks was the exclusive responsibility of na-
tional governments – the option of joining up forces and providing 
an integrated support mechanism was briefly considered, but dis-
carded as incompatible with the national responsibility for supervi-
sion, and because of the political sensitivity involved in the issue of 
using taxpayers’ money in supporting banks, especially from other 
Member States. At that point, it became increasingly clear that while 
taking a European dimension, banks had also grown disproportion-
ately large with respect to the fiscal capacity of their home country. 
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Fig. 1, taken from the report of the High Level Group on Bank 
Structural Reform (the so-called Liikanen Group), shows this inher-
ent contradiction very clearly: the dimension of European banks, as 
measured by the assets to GDP ratio, is not dissimilar from that of 
their US peers, if we take the EU GDP (i.e., the dimension of the 
domestic market) as a benchmark; but it is extremely different, with 
10 banks having a ratio greater than 50% and 5 greater than 100%, 
if we consider instead the home country’s GDP (i.e. the fiscal capac-
ity of their sovereign).
Figure 1
The national origin of the banks was also visible in the composi-
tion of the sovereign portfolio on the assets side, which showed a 
significant bias towards securities issued by their home government. 
Hence, following the national approach to bail-outs, market partici-
pants started assessing banks on the basis of the credit standing of 
the sovereign providing them with the safety net, and of the quality 
and concentration of their sovereign exposures. This has generated 
an inextricable bond between the banks and their sovereigns: the 
deteriorating conditions of the banks generated extreme pressure on 
the fiscal position of their home countries, while raising spreads for 
highly indebted sovereigns had a severe adverse impact on funding 
conditions, and therefore on the ability to lend, of banks headquar-
tered in those countries. This increasing correlation is easily captured 
by the behaviour of sovereign and bank CDS spreads (Fig. 2).
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Figure 2
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The disappearance of a functioning area-wide money market had a 
major impact, in terms of funding conditions, on the functioning of 
the Single Market, which started fracturing along national lines. The 
alignment of banking business with the domestic safety net led to 
what has been labelled as the “balkanisation” of the Single Market. 
This characterisation is pretty harsh, as in its geo-political meaning 
“balkanisation” refers to a region that splits into a set of smaller enti-
ties often hostile or non-cooperative with each other. But it captures 
an element of truth, as the reduction in cross-border banking has 
also, to some extent, been accompanied by actions of national au-
thorities: home supervisors have pushed banks to de-risk in foreign 
jurisdictions and refocus on domestic markets, while host supervi-
sors have often adopted measures to increase the amount of capital 
and liquid assets that is expected to remain in the balance sheet of 
local subsidiaries.
The reduction in cross-border claims of European banks has been 
mainly driven by the sharp contraction in lending to foreign banks 
(Fig. 3). To a large extent, this reflects the collapse in the euro area 
interbank market, due to the lack of trust amongst banks, which was 
replaced by the extraordinary measures introduced by the ECB, es-
pecially the Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). As long as 
the policy measures taken to address the crisis restore a well function-
ing interbank market in the euro area, this trend should be reversible. 
But in some measure, the reduction of flows between banks could 
also be explained by a decrease in the cross-border lending within 
banking groups, from the parent company to the subsidiary and the 
other way round. But this is difficult to quantify due to the lack of 
empirical evidence. In addition, this development is driven not only 
by the pressure of national supervisors, but also by the willingness of 
bank managers to get to a closer matching of assets and liabilities in 
each jurisdiction, reflecting the fact that the sovereign-bank loop has 
made risks much more country specific than they used to be in the 
2000s. The internal compartmentalisation of cross-border groups, 
which de facto could be described as a “soft” break-up of the inte-
grated group model developed by some banks in the early years of 
the EMU, may be more difficult to return from, and has a significant 
impact on the functioning of the Single Market.
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Figure 3. Consolidated foreign claims by sector (ultimate risk basis) of 
reporting European banks vis-à-vis selected countries, 2010 Q4=100
Source: BIS, Consolidated Banking Data
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In fact, the internal capital market of cross-border groups has been 
an important driver in the integration of retail business, as the re-
mote provision of services or the expansion through branches have 
proven much less effective in a market that is dominated by informa-
tion asymmetries and where customers’ trust plays a major role. The 
breaking down of this mechanism implies that the Single Market is 
impaired in fulfilling its key function, that of recycling savings from 
countries in surplus to countries in deficits. The divergence of bank 
lending rates for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in what are 
commonly called “core” and “peripheral” countries – a terminology 
that by itself already signals the splitting up of the market – gives a 
very vivid representation of the damages being suffered by the Single 
Market (Fig. 4).
Figure 4
To restore trust between supervisory authorities and to restore an 
environment conducive to financial market integration, the EBA is 
carrying out a great amount of work, which needs to remain be-
hind the scenes to be effective and preserve confidentiality. We have 
deployed all the instruments in our armoury: we conducted inves-
tigations into possible breaches of European law, started mediation 
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processes, triggered dialogue between home and host authorities on 
specific measures giving rise to conflicting supervisory assessments, 
called for enhanced cooperation in colleges of supervisors. In several 
cases, restrictive measures were reviewed and relaxed, conditional on 
enhancements in the functioning of mechanisms for cooperation 
and information exchange. But this is a lengthy and difficult process, 
which could always be put in reverse gear if market conditions were 
to sharply deteriorate. It is clear that the only way to permanently 
address the issue is a change in the institutional set up.
3. The Banking Union: a good start, and remaining challenges
The decision of the Council in June 2012 to establish a Banking 
Union amongst the Member States in the euro area, and to open it 
to other Member States willing to participate, has been a major step 
forward in repairing the institutional set up and breaking the link 
between banks and their sovereign.
The first building block of the new architecture is the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism (SSM), i.e., the framework for banking supervision, 
entrusted to the ECB. In this area, European policy makers deliv-
ered a positive surprise to market participants accustomed to lengthy 
decision-making processes leading to half-baked, partial solutions. 
The legislative package which is in the final stages of approval is a 
very ambitious one and it has been agreed upon in an extremely 
compressed time frame.
The ECB is given full responsibility for the prudential supervision 
of banks. There is no ambiguity here: the ECB will be able to use all 
the tools any supervisor has at its disposal, from licensing to sanc-
tioning and triggering resolution. Also the scope of responsibilities 
is wide, as it covers directly all the major banking institutions but is 
also coupled with a right to receive information on all banks and take 
them under the ECB’s responsibility in case of risks transcending 
the local markets. This is particularly important, as recent experience 
has shown that European markets may well be rocked by adverse 
developments in small and mid-size local banks, such as the Spanish 
Cajas; moreover, a split regime would have risked triggering volatil-
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ity in deposits in periods of stress, as savers could have an incentive 
to move to the banks under the more reliable supervisory scheme, 
within the same country.
The legislation also requires the ECB to conduct a balance-sheet as-
sessment before taking up its responsibilities. This entails an in-depth 
asset quality review, which is essential to complete the process of 
cleaning up banks’ balance-sheets to ensure that asset valuations are 
sufficiently conservative and comparable across banks. The process 
is already being designed, with a close coordination with the EBA, 
which has prepared an EU-wide recommendation for asset quality 
reviews. The EBA stress test, also to be conducted in close coopera-
tion with the ECB, will complete the process, by making sure that 
banks are in a position to converge towards full compliance with the 
Basel 3 requirements also under stressed conditions. The completion 
of the process of bank balance-sheet repair is a pre-condition to kick-
start lending again, as shown in most past crises.
The positive assessment of the reform being implemented should not 
make us blind to the enormous organisational and technical chal-
lenge of integrating supervision. Notwithstanding the progress made 
in convergence of supervisory practices, national authorities are still 
relying on different approaches – for instance, a different emphasis 
on off-site surveillance, on-site examinations, external audits, etc. – 
enshrined in rather diverse administrative frameworks and entailing 
different ways of interacting with the industry. Unfortunately, and 
differently from the process that led to the monetary union, the crisis 
has not helped in identifying a clear blueprint for effective supervi-
sion: there is no model that has emerged as the clear benchmark, and 
all authorities are engaged in a difficult process of reviewing their ap-
proaches. At the same time, this also represents a unique opportunity 
to establish together a sounder and stronger supervisory culture. The 
EBA will contribute to this process, as the changes to its founding 
regulation introduced to reflect the establishment of the SSM envis-
age that we will have to develop a Single Supervisory Handbook, 
which should ensure that the methodologies for assessing risks and 
determining the supervisory reactions are integrated at an EU-wide 
level.
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The second building block of the new institutional framework is the 
establishment of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). This en-
tails different steps, each fraught with a number of technical com-
plexities and political sensitivities.
First, it is necessary to complete the design of a legislative frame-
work for bank recovery and resolution at the EU level. The Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) currently under discus-
sion pursues the ambitious goal of defining a fully harmonised set of 
tools for resolution authorities, including the possibility to “bail-in” 
creditors according to a well defined waterfall and thus avoid the 
need to disburse taxpayers’ money in bail-out operations. While this 
piece of legislation is extremely ambitious, the strong willingness of 
governments and parliaments to prevent future crises from having 
a disruptive impact on government finances has created a positive 
momentum for a quick finalisation of the BRRD. However, in cer-
tain areas, there are worrisome calls for leaving certain key aspects to 
national discretion, a point to which I will come back later.
Second, an effective SRM requires the establishment of a Single Reso-
lution Authority (SRA) and a Single Resolution Fund (SRF). A truly 
European resolution mechanism cannot be based on a loose network 
of national authorities. Effective resolution requires clear powers to 
intervene in property rights of individuals, attributing losses through 
bail-in, transferring assets to bridge entities, attributing assets to the 
“good bank” or the “bad bank.” The competent authority needs to 
operate on the basis of a clear and strong legal framework; otherwise 
the fear of lawsuits would paralyse action and prevent the prompt 
and decisive intervention which is essential to protect the public in-
terest. Such powers cannot be legally attributed to a committee of 
independent national bodies. There need to be clear and effective 
decision making mechanisms able to deliver quick and neat solutions 
at the European level. I understand the concerns raised by those who 
argue that a Treaty change would be needed to empower a European 
Resolution Authority. But this is still based on a rather narrow inter-
pretation of the so-called Meroni jurisprudence, which in my view 
should be overcome in light of the completely different institutional 
set up which has been developed since such interpretation was first 
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elaborated, and of the clear real life subsidiarity test that we have 
experienced in the last phase of the crisis.
Third, effective resolution needs funding and liquidity provision, to 
ensure continuation of business while resolution measures are put 
into place and stabilised. A European resolution fund, financed by 
(possibly risk-based) fees paid by the banking industry, would pro-
vide a necessary source of liquidity to temporarily support the ailing 
bank. This step could meet the resistance of the industry, especially 
if the fees for the European fund are cumulative to other taxes and 
fees paid at the national level. But there will also be a need for a 
public backstop, a facility providing liquidity in case the resolution 
fund falls short of the resources needed to tackle a systemic crisis. 
As shown in the case of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) in the US, which has access to a special credit line with 
the Treasury, these loans only provide a temporary support and are 
normally paid back when resolution proceeds to the next stage. The 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could fulfil this purpose.
Timing is of essence here. Delaying the deployment of ESM resourc-
es to directly support bank restructuring could adversely affect the ef-
fectiveness of the Balance Sheet Review to be conducted by the ECB, 
as national authorities would have all the incentives to minimise the 
restructuring efforts that would exclusively impact already depleted 
national safety nets. Having effective mechanisms for restructuring 
and resolution is essential to decisively dealing with the excess capac-
ity that still remains in the banking sector, thus restoring sustainable 
profitability and releasing the constraints to bank lending.
Does the new institutional set up also require a centralised deposit 
guarantee scheme? I would argue that as long as the resolution fund 
is established at the European level and the deposit guarantee scheme 
is asked to fulfil only a pay-box function, the responsibilities could 
be left at the national level. This arrangement would be neither opti-
mal nor sustainable in the long term, as it still is susceptible to reac-
tivating the adverse loop between banks and their sovereign, in case 
a Member State is not considered strong enough to support the local 
guarantee scheme. However, as long as a credible ESM backstop is in 
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place and there is a credible commitment to bail-in senior creditors 
in a crisis, the system could be sufficiently strong. In the longer term, 
one should put in place mechanisms that envisage the creation of an 
effective European system of deposit guarantees, which respects the 
willingness of certain categories of predominantly local intermediar-
ies (cooperative and savings banks, in particular) to maintain their 
mutual insurance mechanisms as it is. For instance, one could build 
upon the proposal raised by Daniel Gros to have a European de-
posit guarantee fund, with reinsurance mechanisms for local, mutual 
schemes.
4. Repairing the Single Market: the interface between the SSM 
and the EBA
The Banking Union will include all the euro area countries and may 
well extend to other Member States that decide to participate, but 
will not embrace the whole EU. Hence, the important measures dis-
cussed in the previous sections will not go all the way to restoring 
the proper functioning of the Single Market. In other words, there 
is a possibility that some segmentation will remain among Member 
States in and outside the Banking Union. At the same time, the cen-
tralisation of supervision in a core component of the EU banking 
sector will create pressure for the further strengthening of certain 
pillars of the Single Market.
This second, potentially more benign force should be visible, first 
and foremost, in the area of rule-making. It is very difficult to con-
ceive of the ECB conducting its supervisory tasks in a truly uni-
fied fashion in the absence of common rules, adopted through EU 
regulations – including the technical standards prepared by the EBA. 
Extending the Single Rulebook is a necessary condition for the suc-
cess of the Banking Union. 
We have made a lot of progress towards establishing a Single Rule-
book for banking, but differences in national positions have played 
a major role in the finalisation of important regulatory reforms: sig-
nificant elements of national discretions have been introduced in the 
texts of the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD4-
CRR), and the same is very likely to happen in the BRRD.
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The EBA has sent opinions to the Commission, Council and Parlia-
ment pointing out several areas in which further efforts were needed 
to ensure the necessary regulatory consistency. In particular, our at-
tention focused on the definition of capital and on the calculation 
of Basel 1 floors, pointing out the relevant differences in national 
approaches and the detrimental impact this has on the Single Rule-
book. We quantified the potential impact of a few discretions still 
remaining in the regulatory framework at 300 basis points for the 
Core Tier 1 capital ratio of the banks included in our recapitalization 
exercise. Also some remaining ambiguity in the (very large) margins 
of flexibility granted to national authorities to set macroprudential 
requirements could in principle impair the functioning of the Single 
Market. It is absolutely true that authorities have the power to raise 
the regulatory requirements in order to pre-emptively deal with a 
build-up of risks in a specific country or region within the EU. Cer-
tainly, we would be in a different place if these instruments were 
activated when a real estate bubble was building up in Ireland and 
Spain. At the same time, such discretion needs to be exercised within 
the boundaries set by clear European guidance, to avoid an abusive 
use of the instrument to ring fence domestic markets and trap bank 
capital and liquid assets of subsidiaries of foreign banks.
Similarly, as already mentioned, the negotiations on the BRRD are 
introducing a number of national discretions on the financial instru-
ments subject to bail-in, on the amount of loss absorbency capacity 
(i.e. instruments that would be subject to write down or conversion 
into equity in case of non viability) that banks will need to build 
up, and on the thresholds for proportionality, which would lead to 
lighter requirements or outright exemptions of smaller local banks. 
This would hamper the ability to effectively interconnect resolution 
procedures for cross-border banks and would also imply that inves-
tors buying the same instrument in two different Member States 
could be subject to a different treatment in a crisis.
The SSM will require a further push in harmonisation of the rules, 
and could also function as a catalyst for greater convergence in su-
pervisory practices in the whole EU. The EBA’s Single Supervisory 
Handbook will provide a unique window of opportunity to focus 
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on a few core chapters of the manual for examiners and define truly 
consistent methodologies. This convergence process will have to be 
accompanied by an expansion of common supervisory definitions, 
which would also support truly comparable disclosure of informa-
tion by the banks. The EBA has recently made significant process, by 
preparing common definitions for non-performing loan, loan for-
bearance and asset encumbrance.
The likely push for greater harmonisation might lead to a stronger 
and more extensive Single Rulebook, which would also provide an 
important safeguard for a level playing field, with banks headquar-
tered in Member States not participating in the Banking Union. 
However, if the SSM and the authorities of non-participating coun-
tries disagree on key issues, there is a potential risk that a greater de-
gree of flexibility will be maintained at the EU level, while the SSM 
will move to more homogeneous rules and supervisory practices. 
This could potentially generate a rift within the Single Market. The 
EBA role in bridging between “ins” and “outs” will be particularly 
relevant in the coming years.
A potentially trickier issue arises in the area of recovery and resolu-
tion. As discussed above, the balkanisation of the Single Market has 
been driven mainly by the market assessment on the reliability of 
national safety nets. The integration of supervision and resolution 
functions at the European level for the Member States joining the 
SSM would, to a large extent, fix this problem, provided that an 
ambitious approach is followed in implementing the SRM. But as 
long as the SRM will cover only a subset of Member States, there is 
a serious risk that some degree of fragmentation will remain within 
the Single Market.
Key Single Market principles have already stopped working: the 
single passport and the application of the home country principle 
in resolution and in deposit guarantees have been significantly 
stretched in recent crises. In most cases, foreign establishments have 
been hurriedly sold in order to deploy the traditional restructuring 
and resolution instruments at a country level and prevent cross-bor-
der spillovers.
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How can we repair the functioning of the Single Market?
I believe the Single Market principles need to be strengthened based 
on experience, possibly distinguishing more clearly between retail 
and wholesale business. In particular, efforts should be focused 
on workable recovery and resolution plans for cross-border banks, 
which would identify an appropriate balance between (i) the need to 
allow the free flow of resources within banking groups in the Single 
Market, with a firm-wide view on risks, capital adequacy and liquid-
ity position, and (ii) the reasonable request of host authorities to 
have sufficient safeguards for local savers in case of a crisis. Hence, it 
is necessary to think about liabilities structures of the various compo-
nents of the banking groups, to be discussed, agreed and monitored 
between home and host authorities. But we also have to consider 
that agreements between national authorities have not been effective 
during the crisis and an enhancement of their quality is not likely to 
dramatically improve their credibility. As a matter of fact, recovery 
and resolution plans and cooperation agreements are, at best, sort of 
“incomplete contracts,” which will require interpretations and adap-
tations when faced with a real crisis. It is therefore essential to develop 
robust legal underpinnings that could make resolution agreements 
de facto enforceable. A necessary condition for this to happen is that 
a European authority is entrusted with the responsibility to conduct 
binding mediation between home and host authorities, thus ensur-
ing the smooth application of the plan and the agreements against 
the specific features of the crisis. But it would be very helpful also to 
reconsider the need for a European statute for banking groups, simi-
lar to the idea behind the European company statute. This would 
allow banking groups to ensure a strong responsibility of the parent 
company for the fulfilment of regulatory requirements, coupled with 
safeguards for minority shareholders and creditors of the foreign sub-
sidiaries and the possibility for a much more integrated approach in 
resolution.
5. Conclusions
Great progress is being made in repairing the features of our institu-
tional setup that have generated the adverse feedback loop between 
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banks and their sovereigns, leading to a balkanisation of the Single 
Market. The establishment of the SSM is proceeding according to 
plans and will generate a major overhaul in the current system, for 
the better. However, I believe that we should continue to pay great 
attention to completing all the elements of the puzzles, to ensure a 
successful Banking Union and repair the functioning of the Single 
Market.
In my view, the main challenges ahead of us are:
• avoiding half-baked solutions for the establishment of the 
SRM: there is a need for a single authority, coupled with a 
fund generated with pooled resources provided by the indus-
try and a public backstop by the ESM;
• unlocking the direct support of the ESM to banks, so that 
the forthcoming balance sheet review to be conducted by 
the SSM can lead to swift progress in cleaning bank balance 
sheets and in bank restructuring if and where needed;
• working on the development of a multi-tiered deposit guar-
antee system, which, in the longer run, could complete the 
architecture – although in the short term the framework 
would remain sustainable without Europeanisation of de-
posit guarantees;
• developing a greater commitment to the Single Rulebook, 
reviewing where necessary national flexibility and discretions 
that could generate a major impact on the functioning of the 
Single Market – the EBA could be asked to develop into a 
guardian of the Single Rulebook, flagging to the lawmakers 
areas where legislative initiatives are warranted;
• rethinking key Single Market principles, with a view to en-
hancing them, especially via an effective and enforceable 
framework for recovery and resolution, based on solid legal 
underpinnings at the EU-wide level.
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I remember clearly that in the years before the crisis those sceptical 
about the need for greater integration frequently invoked the subsid-
iarity principle. The burden of proof was always on the side of those 
advocating the need for a more integrated system at the EU level, 
and the bar was usually set very high – you had to actually prove that 
the system was broken (“if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” was the leading 
principle). But we paid a high price for having waited for concrete 
proof that the system would not have worked in a crisis. Now that 
there is political awareness of the need for reforms, we should go all 
the way in repairing the Single Market.
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Banking Union instead of  
Fiscal Union? 
 
Daniel Gros 
In September of 2012, close to the peak of the euro crisis, the four 
Presidents of the European Union (the Presidents of the European 
Commission, the European Council, the Euro Group and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank) issued a joint report entitled “Genuine Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union.”
The report was drafted after the European Council of June 2012 had 
already decided that, in order to break the negative feedback loop 
between sovereign debt and bank debt, a single supervisory mecha-
nism (SSM) should be established for large systemic banks – and 
that moving towards federal supervision would also require addi-
tional steps towards a federal resolution mechanism. These elements 
together came to be called ‘Banking Union.’
The four Presidents argued in essence that the establishment of a 
Banking Union should also be seen as a first step towards further 
integration. According to their report, a Fiscal Union would be the 
next logical step. Moreover, a Fiscal Union was held to imply the 
need for a political union.
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There is surprisingly little analytical argument for the nexus between 
a banking union and a fiscal union. The key argument is most often 
simply the observation that the euro area has only a very limited cen-
tral budget (at least compared with other monetary unions), and that 
therefore there are almost no fiscal transfers to smooth asymmetric 
shocks. By contrast, the US, which is of a similar size as the euro area, 
does have a substantial federal fiscal budget. The US experience is 
thus usually taken as an example of what is needed for a sustainable 
monetary union.
It is indeed very true that most existing monetary unions have a 
much larger federal budget (and constitute federal states, not loose 
confederations). But this was known when the architecture for EMU 
was drawn up in the early 1990s. It is often forgotten that there was 
a wide-ranging debate about this issue during the preparation for 
Maastricht (and it is surprising that the report of the four Presidents 
does not contain any reference to this debate). The conclusion then 
was that the case of a fiscal shock absorber was not very strong even if 
one looked to the US as a model, and that even if it might be useful 
in theory, it would be exceedingly difficult to implement in practice. 
Instead of revisiting the debate of the 1990s that led to the decision 
to start EMU with only a minimum degree of fiscal integration, in 
this contribution we would just like draw attention to two aspects of 
the US experience that are widely misunderstood – but are crucial to 
the debate about the link between monetary union, banking union 
and fiscal union. 
• First, the federal budget in the US provides very little insur-
ance against shocks although it is an important income redis-
tribution instrument. 
• Second, the ‘Banking Union’ of the US provides a very tan-
gible insurance against local financial shocks. 
That said, I take it that the current discussion is about the alleged 
need to have a separate and additional fiscal shock absorber, where 
fiscal is understood in a narrow sense (taxes and benefits not related 
to financial markets). 
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The Great Recession provides a very important episode with which 
to assess the importance of shock absorbers. One reason is that the 
housing boom was very concentrated in the US (as it also was in 
Europe). The increase in housing prices varied enormously from 
state to state and only a few states accounted for most of the over-
building and thus the subsequent economic distress and losses from 
delinquent mortgages. Moreover, in normal times, it should be pos-
sible for most economic actors to use financial markets to smooth 
consumption in the face of temporary shocks. However, the Great 
Recession coincided with a profound financial crisis, which froze fi-
nancial markets for some time and excluded entire groups from ac-
cess to lending. This implies that fiscal shock absorbers would have 
been even more important during the Great Recession than during 
more normal business cycles.
1. What lessons from the US ‘fiscal union’?1 
 
The argument for the need of fiscal shock absorbers at the euro area 
level has often been made with reference to the US experience. One 
mechanism to provide such a shock absorber that is often mentioned 
is a common (European) unemployment insurance scheme. How-
ever, any reference to the US would be misleading in this case.
In the US, the unemployment insurance is financed mainly at the 
level of states. While there is some de facto reinsurance at the federal 
level, in practice the federal reinsurance is not used most of the time. 
It springs into action only in the case of large shocks. The great Re-
cession constituted one of those large shocks; indeed there has been a 
considerable federal involvement in unemployment benefits over the 
last few years. But this support was given to all states and thus does 
not provide those states most affected by the downturn with much 
more support than the others. 
Moreover, unemployment benefits are not as important as often as-
sumed. In most countries they amount to only about 2-3% of GDP, 
even during a major recession. In the US the supplementary federal 
1 The first part of the following is based on chapter 8 of Gros and Thygesen 
(1992), European Monetary Integration, Longman, London. 
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expenditure amounted to only about 1% of GDP in recent years. It 
is thus clear that a euro area unemployment insurance system would 
never be able to offset major shocks like the ones hitting Ireland or 
Greece where GDP has fallen by over 10%.
 
Moreover, one has to take into account the fact that unemployment 
differences across states in the US tend to be temporary, which is 
not the case in the EU (or euro area). Any common unemployment 
insurance system in the EU would thus risk leading to permanent 
transfers. This persistence in national unemployment rates (and thus 
the difference between the EU and the US) is understandable given 
that most of the factors that determine the unemployment rate in the 
long run are social norms and regulations, which remain national in 
the EU.
Unemployment insurance is of course not the only way to provide 
a shock absorber. A ‘fiscal capacity’ for the eurozone has thus been 
proposed. The key question is: Against what type of shocks would 
such a system be intended to insure?
If business cycle shocks were really the key problem, individual 
member states could first of all ‘self-insure’ by running a prudent 
fiscal policy and lower their debt level so that they have the freedom 
to run temporary deficits in case they face temporary shocks. The 
‘Fiscal Compact’ with its target of approximate balance in cyclically 
adjusted terms is implicitly based on this idea. 
However, the euro crisis has shown that the really important shocks 
result not from normal business cycle fluctuations, but from financial 
boom-bust cycles which can put the entire financial system in jeop-
ardy. Such shocks are less frequent than business cycles, but when 
they arrive, they have a much larger impact. Before the outbreak of 
the financial crisis of 2007-08, normal business-cycle shocks led to 
fluctuations in GDP of at most 1-2 percentage points. However, the 
2008 crisis led to a fall in GDP several times larger and in the wake 
of the euro crisis some countries have experienced double-digit falls 
in GDP and have seen their entire financial system close to collapse.
What kind of fiscal system could provide insurance against this type 
of shock?
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Most proposals for a euro area fiscal shock-absorber mechanism are 
grounded in the perception that in most existing federations, the 
federal budget redistributes income across regions and thus offsets at 
least part of the interregional differences in income. While this has 
been repeatedly documented for the US (for some older references, 
see MacDougall (Commission of the EC, 1977) and Sachs and Sala-
i-Martín (1992)), the inference that redistribution is equivalent to a 
shock absorber mechanism is wrong.
 
The research cited above concluded that the US federal budget off-
sets about 30–40% of the differences in the level of income per cap-
ita across states because poorer states contribute on average lower 
income taxes and receive higher social security payments. However, 
this does not automatically imply that these mechanisms also pro-
vide an insurance against shocks (i.e. changes in income).
My own work (see Gros and Jones, 1995) suggests that evidence of 
a high degree of stabilisation of income is in reality the result of the 
joint effect of the (automatic) stabilisation across states at any given 
point in time and the (at least partly discretionary) changes in the 
federal fiscal stance, which stabilise income over time for all states 
together. The automatic stabilisation across states or regions accounts 
for less than one-half of the overall stabilisation, reducing the vari-
ability of personal income by about 15%. The federal fiscal stance 
turns out to have a stronger stabilising impact, and this has been the 
case even during the Great Recession.
The degree to which the US federal fiscal system absorbs shocks at 
the state level cannot be very large for the simple reason that the 
main federal source of revenues which does react to the business cy-
cle (i.e. the federal income tax) accounts for less than 10% of GDP 
(as remarked above, unemployment benefits remain in normal times 
at the state level). This implies that on average only about one-tenth 
of any shock to state income is automatically absorbed at the federal 
level.
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2. What lessons from the US II: Evidence from the ‘Great 
Recession’
More recently I have looked at the distribution of federal expendi-
ture and taxes by state within the US. To my surprise I found that 
there was very little relation between the severity of the recession at 
the level of individual states, measured by the fall in GSP (gross state 
product) or increase in local unemployment rates, and the amount 
of net federal transfers received (by residents of the state). (As men-
tioned above the differences in the shocks to GSP are as large as the 
difference among EU member states, given the regional concentra-
tion of the housing boom in the US.)
The federal deficit has of course increased by several percentage 
points of GDP, which implies that on average (residents in) most 
states have received more federal fiscal expenditure than they (or 
rather their residents) have paid in federal taxes. Yet, it is striking in 
particular that (the residents of ) those states hardest hit by the real 
estate boom/bust cycle (like Arizona or Nevada, which thus suffered 
the highest increase in unemployment and large falls in GSP) did not 
receive more net federal transfers than other states. 
These findings reinforce the conclusion that, all in all, it is difficult to 
rest the case for some euro area shock absorber on the US experience. 
I would add that the distinction between transitory and permanent 
shocks becomes crucial in this area because any permanent shock 
requires adjustments in real wages and/or migration, rather than 
permanent financing. Moreover, it is difficult to see how one could 
provide insurance against permanent country-specific shocks with-
out addressing directly the issue of income redistribution among 
member states.
3. What lessons from the US ‘banking union’?
It is generally agreed that a fully-fledged Banking Union (BU) has 
three elements:
i. Common supervision (this is now agreed in principle in 
Europe, with the ECB under the SSM (Single Supervisory 
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Mechanism) soon ready to take over supervision for most 
larger banks).
ii. A common mechanism to resolve banks. In Europe agreement 
on the so-called Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has 
been reached in principle once SSM is working effectively.
iii. Common deposit insurance. No agreement yet in Europe, but 
at least some reinsurance of national deposit insurers against 
catastrophic risks will be needed. 
The US has had all three elements at least since 1933. The US thus 
qualifies as a BU – and the consequences could be seen during the fi-
nancial crisis. A simple comparison of the fate of two different mem-
bers of a large monetary union when they are hit by a financial crisis 
provides a powerful illustration of the importance of an integrated 
banking system. Ireland and Nevada, in fact, provide an almost ideal 
test case. These two entities share several important characteristics. 
For example, they both have similar populations as well as GDP and 
they both experienced an exceptionally strong housing boom. But 
when the boom turned to bust, the US state did not experience any 
local financial crisis (nor did the state government have to be bailed 
out).
The key difference between Nevada and Ireland is that banking prob-
lems are taken care of in the US at the federal level (effectively a 
banking union), whereas in the euro area, responsibility for banking 
losses remains national.
Local banks in Nevada experienced huge losses and many of them 
became insolvent, but this did not lead to any disruption of the local 
banking system as these banks were seized by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which covered the losses and trans-
ferred the operations to other, stronger banks. In 2008-09, the FDIC 
thus closed 11 banks headquartered in the state, with assets of over 
$40 billion, or about 30% of state GDP. The losses for the FDIC in 
these rescue/restructuring operations amounted to about $4 billion. 
Other losses were borne at the federal level when residents of Nevada 
defaulted in large numbers on their home mortgages. The two fed-
eral institutions that re-finance mortgages have lost between them 
about $8 billion since 2008. 
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The US Banking Union thus provided Nevada with a ‘shock’ ab-
sorber of about 10% of GDP, not in the form of loans, but in the 
form of an (ex-post) transfer because losses of this magnitude were 
borne at the federal level. 
Moreover, a lot of the banking business in Nevada was (and still is) 
done by ‘foreign’ banks, i.e. by out-of-state banks, which just took 
the losses from their Nevada operations on their books and could set 
them against profits made elsewhere. This is another way in which 
an integrated banking market can provide insurance against local 
financial shocks. Given that the large banks had a market share of 
about 50% in Nevada, one can estimate that they provided another 
loss absorption of 10% of GDP. 
The experience of Washington Mutual (WaMu) illustrates this gen-
eral point. The biggest bank to have failed in US history, a mortgage 
specialist, WaMu had its headquarters in Nevada (although the name 
suggests otherwise) and some small operations there. However, its 
failure did not lead to any local losses as Washington Mutual was 
seized by the FDIC and its banking operations were sold for a very 
low sum to another large US bank (JP Morgan Chase) – but with-
out any loss for the FDIC. Moreover, Washington Mutual received 
about $80 billion in low-cost financing from the US Federal Home 
Loan Bank. If a bank like WAMU had been headquartered in Ire-
land, the Irish government might have been held responsible for its 
losses as well.
In Europe, only the Baltic countries, whose banks are to a large ex-
tent in foreign hands, benefited from a similar loss-absorption pro-
tection provided by the Scandinavian headquarters of their local 
banks. Conversely, most of the real estate lending in Ireland had been 
extended by local banks and the government had to assume their 
losses. Irish banks received massive amounts of low-cost emergency 
liquidity assistance from the European Central Bank, but the Central 
Bank of Ireland had to guarantee these loans, which was not the case 
for any bank in Nevada.
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All in all, it thus appears that losses in Nevada on the order of 20% 
of the GSP were absorbed at the federal level.2 If the plans for a euro 
area Banking Union are completed, the euro area could acquire an 
extremely effective shock-absorber system. 
4. Concluding remarks
The really important and costly shocks are financial boom-bust cy-
cles, followed by a financial crisis. These financial crises are rare and 
regionally concentrated (even within a ‘genuine’ monetary union 
like the US). What arrangement provides the best protection against 
these shocks?
The US experience seems clear: the shock-absorbing power of ex-
plicit federal transfers is rather small, but the US Banking Union 
provides important support in the case of large shocks to the local 
financial system.
This has one simple implication: To insure its stability, the euro area 
needs a strong Banking Union, but not a Fiscal Union. The usual 
argument that the former needs to be followed by the latter should 
thus be turned on its head: an area with a well-functioning Banking 
Union does not need fiscal shock absorbers and thus does not need 
a Fiscal Union. From the latter observation, it follows that there is 
also no need for a Political Union. As long as the banking system is 
stabilised, member states can thus remain responsible for their own 
fiscal policy. Excessive spending by individual member states could 
no longer destabilise the entire banking system. This implies that 
political responsibility for fiscal policy could remain at the national 
level. 
2 See my note on the Nevada Ireland comparison (http://www.ceps.eu/book/
banking-union-ireland-vs-nevada-illustration-importance-integrated-banking-sys-
tem). 
74 Banking Union instead of Fiscal Union
References:
Gros, D. (2012), “Banking Union: Ireland vs. Nevada, an illustra-
tion of the importance of an integrated banking system”, CEPS 
Commentary, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Octo-
ber (http://www.ceps.eu/book/banking-union-ireland-vs-nevada-
illustration-importance-integrated-banking-system).
Gros, D. and N. Thygesen (1995), European Monetary Integration, 
Longman, London.
Gros, D. and E. Jones (1995), “External shocks and unemployment: 
Revisiting the Mundellian story”, unpublished manuscript, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, Brussels, February.
MacDougall, D. et al. (1977), “Equity, Efficiency and Stabilization”, 
Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finances in Euro-
pean Integration, Commission of the European Communities, Vol-
ume 1: General Report, Brussels, April.
Sachs, J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1992), “Fiscal Federalism and Opti-
mum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States”, 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 632, Centre for Economic Policy Re-
search, London.
Schoenmaker, D. and D. Gros (2012), “A European Deposit Insur-
ance and Resolution Fund”, CEPS, Working Document No. 364, 
Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels, May.
 
75Daniel Gros
Annex: Federal transfers in the US during the Great Recession.
Federal transfers are defined here as the difference between total 
federal expenditure (for payments to individuals, including wages 
and salaries, procurement, etc.) and federal taxes paid by residents of 
the state considered. For more detail of the revenue and expenditure 
items, see below. The overall difference between federal expenditure 
and taxes summed over all 50 states corresponds to the US federal 
primary deficit.
The first point is that there is indeed a strong relationship between 
the level of GSP (Gross State Product) and the level of federal trans-
fers.  The correlation coefficient between the levels of the two vari-
ables in the year 2010 is about 30 % as shown in the scatter plot 
below.
The high correlation of the levels is due mainly to the fact that federal 
tax receipts are highly correlated with GSP, but this is not the case 
with federal expenditure as the following two charts shows:
76 Banking Union instead of Fiscal Union
Federal tax and expenditure reaction to shocks
If federal transfers (as defined here) are to be shock absorbing, there 
would need to be a strong correlation between the initial differences, 
i.e. changes in unemployment rates by state and the change in the 
federal transfers received by residents of the states over the same pe-
riod.  However, this is not the case.  The correlation between the 
two is rather low if we take into account the post crisis data, i.e. the 
change between 2007 and 2010. 
77Daniel Gros
The result does not change if we use changes in unemployment by 
state as the variable indicating state specific shocks as the scatter plot 
below shows.  The correlation between these two variables is only 
about 10 %.
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Managing Country Debts in 
the European Monetary Union: 
Stronger Rules or Stronger Union?
Robert P. Inman 
With the decision to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
beginning in 1999, seventeen European countries took a bold step 
towards a more complete economic union for their once indepen-
dent state economies. The promises of the Union are the benefits 
of more integrated capital, labor, and product markets and, with a 
common currency, lower currency risk and hopefully increased trade 
and investment across country borders. While the newly created 
Monetary Union centralized monetary policy under the direction 
of the new European Central Bank, union members retained, under 
the founding principle of subsidiarity, full control over country fiscal 
policies. From the perspective of economic theory, this institutional 
arrangement has much to recommend it. Economic institutions 
should assign the control over a policy to a governing institution that 
represents the interests of those most affected by the policy, and each 
level of governance will need the fiscal and regulatory tools necessary 
to provide its assigned services.1 These tools include spending and 
taxing powers and the power to issue public debt.  
 
When assigning spending powers we should seek to match policy 
control as closely as possible to the economic interests of affected 
1 The classic text on theory of assignment for fiscal policies is Oates (1972).  A 
valuable text for the implementation of this theory is Boadway and Shah (2009).  
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citizens. Services that benefit only local residents should be decided 
and provided by local governments, but services that display signifi-
cant economies of scale in production or that involve significant ben-
efit spillovers between communities – services such as higher educa-
tion, construction and maintenance of public highways, prisons and 
courts, and the protection of water and air quality – should be funded 
and provided by a provincial or national government.  Assigning tax-
ing powers should be done to most accurately match tax payments 
to the benefits they finance. Resident, or destination, based taxation 
will typically be needed to ensure residents pay the full marginal cost 
of the public services they consume. Resident taxation taxes factors 
of production by where the factors live, not where they work, and 
taxes consumption by the location of the consumer. The alternative, 
known as source-based taxation, allows a share of the tax burden 
to be shifted onto non-residents. Source-based taxation discourages 
the efficient location of economic inputs, and because non-residents 
pay a share of the taxes used to finance the marginal costs of public 
services, residents or their elected officials may find it advantageous 
to over-provide the subsidized state services.2  
 
Finally, borrowing powers should be used to prevent large increases 
in taxation when governments are faced with the necessity of large, 
one-time increases in government spending. Such expenditures 
might be planned, as for public investment, or unexpected, as in 
the case of natural disaster relief, war spending, or relief from deep 
recessions. Without access to public debt, states will be forced to 
raise taxes significantly resulting in negative effects on investment, 
savings, and work. The use of government debt to finance such ex-
penditures allows the government to increase tax rates only slightly 
and to then hold tax rates stable over the period of debt repayment. 
This fiscal strategy is called “tax-smoothing” and helps to minimize 
the efficiency losses from the financing of large increases in govern-
ment expenditures.3 
 
These guidelines tell us how public finance should work in principle 
to achieve the full economic benefits of an economic union. With 
one important exception, the European Monetary Union has fol-
lowed these prescriptions with resulting economic success.  That one 
2 See Gordon (1983) and Inman and Rubinfeld (1996).  
3 See Barro (1979).    
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exception is the management of public debt by its member coun-
tries, and this failure has the potential to undo the union.4 
II. The Problem: Eurozone Public Debts 
 
Governments borrow for two reasons: one is economically valid, 
one is not. The valid reason is to “smooth” out tax financing for 
large, lumpy government expenditures. The invalid reason is to bor-
row money for consumption today in expectation that the country 
might declare default when that debt falls due, thus shifting the final 
burden onto resident and non-resident bondholders or, in the case of 
debt bailout, onto taxpayers outside the debtor country. Valid debt 
is repaid by the country’s citizens and will only be undertaken when 
the present value of social benefits of current spending exceed the 
present value social costs of debt repayment. Invalid debt is repaid 
(or absorbed as a loss) by non-residents outside the borrowing coun-
try and will be undertaken even when the social benefits of current 
spending are less than the, now shared, social costs of debt repay-
ment. When the burden of debt can be so shifted, too much debt 
and associated government spending will result.  
 
While the majority of the Eurozone countries have borrowed only 
for valid reasons, three countries – Greece, Portugal, and Italy – have 
arguably succumbed to the temptation of invalid deficit financing. 
Two other countries – Ireland and Spain – may have tolerated ex-
cessive private sector borrowing for private (housing) consumption 
with the expectation that public debt and a subsequent public bail-
out might be forthcoming.5 Figures 1a and 1b provide background 
evidence. Figure 1a shows the time path of country interest rates 
from 1992, the date of the Maastricht Treaty sanctioning a European 
Monetary Union, to 2012 for all Eurozone members (the solid line) 
and for each of the five “at-risk” countries tempted by the invalid rea-
son for public borrowing. Figure 1b shows the time path of country 
deficits as share of GDP over the same period, again averaged for all 
Eurozone countries (the solid line) and for the five high debt coun-
tries. Four conclusions seem evident.  
4 See Inman and Rubinfeld (1994) and Lane (2012). 
5 See Panetta, et. al.  (2009).  
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First, prior to joining the monetary union, each country faced pri-
vate market interest rates for their long-term debts that reflected the 
likely risks of debt repayment. Higher interest rates for riskier coun-
try debts, coupled with the incentives to meet Maastricht debt and 
deficit guidelines required for Union membership, led to moderated 
and then declining country deficits from 1995 to 1999.  
 
Second, once within the monetary union, the financial markets 
treated long-term public debt from all Eurozone countries as equal-
ly risky loans. This equivalence remained in place until the Great 
Recession of 2007-2010, when the threat of default by each of the 
five at-risk countries became an economic reality. Prior to the Great 
Recession, however, the financial markets either thought the five at-
risk countries would manage their public finances like the more pru-
dent union members (e.g., Germany) or that there would be a good 
chance of a union bailout if these countries threatened to default on 
their public debts.  
 
Third, the five at-risk countries did not assume the German mantle 
of fiscal prudence but rather took advantage of the lower interest 
costs to increase public borrowing above the Eurozone average and 
above the Maastricht Treaty’s 3 percent guideline for acceptable defi-
cits.  
 
Fourth, once the assumed full bailout by the EMU appeared less 
certain, interest rates for long-term debt issued by the five at-risk 
countries rose sharply, reflecting again the underlying probabilities of 
country repayment, perhaps net of any partial union bailouts.     
 
To understand why there emerged invalid borrowing by the at-risk 
members of the monetary union, we need to understand why those 
members, and the financial markets which facilitated excessive bor-
rowing, thought there would be a union bailout if debts could not 
be repaid. Why did the other members of the monetary union not 
just say: NO?  The answer lies in the incentive for fiscal bailouts in 
monetary unions. Figure 2 shows when fiscal bailouts are likely to 
occur, and then what must be true to hold this temptation, and thus 
invalid borrowing, in check.6 
6 The analysis presented in Figure 2 motivating central government bailout behavior 
is from Inman (2003).  Conditional upon the likelihood of a central government 
bailout, states will then over borrow; see Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010).  
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Bailouts emerge when the debtor country can impose significant 
economic hardships on other members of the monetary union if the 
debtor country were to default. If this is the case, the debtor country 
can count on a bailout, shift the burden of these local deficits onto 
citizens of the other union member countries, and finance its own 
public services at a subsidized rate equal to true costs less the bailout. 
The incentive is to over-consume deficit financed public services. 
That the citizens of the at-risk countries understood this (invalid) 
motivation for public borrowing was made clear at a recent soccer 
“friendly” between Greece and Germany. Germany easily won the 
match, but the Greek fans held up a sign saying: “You may beat us 
in football, but you’ll never get your money.” To control inefficient 
public borrowing in a monetary union requires controlling the in-
centive for union bailouts of country deficits. From the analysis in 
Figure 2, this means controlling the economic (E), financial (F), and 
empathy (S) spillover costs that might be imposed on other, fiscally 
sound union members by a debtor country.7    
 
7 The U.S. historical experience is instructive on the importance of each cost for 
the bailout decision; see Inman (2003). The possibility that the federal government 
might bail out the debts of U.S. states was established by the Hamilton Compro-
mise. Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, argued that it was 
essential that the new United States assume the revolutionary war debts of the many 
states as a signal to European credit markets that the new union would be a worthy 
credit risk going forward.  Virginia, which had already repaid its debts, resisted. The 
compromise had the federal government assume state debts and in return have the 
U.S. capitol moved from New York City to the border of Virginia, now Washing-
ton, D.C.  States assumed that this precedent for bailouts might continue, and it 
did until 1843. In 1843, Congress rejected requests for the bailout of state bonds 
issued by eight border states to fund railway construction and state banks. State 
economic development did not generate sufficient profits to repay those loans. The 
costs of the bailout would have been $200 million or approximately $6.2 billion in 
today’s dollars. By the analysis in Figure 2, the decision by Congress to not provide 
a bailout was an easy one. The states at risk were a minority of the population, rural, 
and as frontier states not connected to the export economies of the Eastern sea-
board. Thus the economic (E) and empathy (S) costs of a no bailout decision were 
low.  Since most of the debt had been issued by European banks, the financial costs 
(F) to the U.S. economy were also low. Finally, Congress appreciated the incen-
tive consequences of a bailout.  In the words of one commentator at the time: “To 
establish the policy of federal assumption of State debts would undoubtedly encour-
age recklessness and extravagance in the States.” As the responses to Detroit’s fiscal 
problems and to state pension underfundings make clear, the federal government 
has continued to today its commitment to a no bailout pledge. 
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The initial economic costs from a public default arise from two con-
sequences of default within the economy of the defaulting govern-
ment. First, resident bondholders see their wealth decline leading to 
less private consumption and private investment. Second, the de-
faulting government will be denied access to the international capital 
markets for new government debt. The inability to borrow means 
higher taxes and less government spending – that is, an austerity 
budget. Both effects result in lower aggregate demand and less short-
term economic growth and lower public and private investment 
and thus less long-term economic growth. Importantly for the non-
debtor countries, these negative effects can spillover to impact their 
economies to the extent they are a trading partner with the default-
ing nation. These are the economic spillover costs (E) of a country 
default.8 New evidence on the macro-economic interdependencies 
among Eurozone members suggests such spillovers can be signifi-
cant.  A 1 percent decline in GDP in the originally affected economy 
can lead to a 3/10’s of 1 percent indirect decline in the economies of 
important trading partners; see Beetsma, et. al. (2005), Beetsma and 
Giuliodori (2011), and Hebous and Zimmerman (2013).9 
   
As important as these economic spillovers may be, the financial costs 
(F) of default may be greater and more far reaching. The fall in the 
value of bank assets following a government default reduces the abil-
ity of affected banks to both borrow and lend. If the fall in value is 
large enough, it may even raise the specter of bank collapse leading 
to a run on bank demand deposits. Further, if one bank’s observed 
decline is taken as a signal of other banks’ possible exposure and 
decline, there may be a contagion effect constraining the ability of 
other banks to borrow and perhaps even encouraging runs on other 
8 There is a direct economic cost of a default I am ignoring here.  Non-residents 
holding defaulted debt would suffer a decline in wealth, meaning potentially less 
consumption, less future investment, and less growth for their economies. However, 
were we to adopt a bailout, then non-residents who pay the bailout will suffer a 
comparable loss of wealth, consumption, and country growth at the time of the bail-
out.  These non-resident wealth effects occur on both sides of the cost comparison of 
“bailout” and “no bailout” policies and are therefore ignored for this analysis.      
9 Carlino and Inman (2013a) find similar results for the U.S. federal system, where 
a 1 percent decline in job growth in the largest state within each of the eight “eco-
nomic regions” implies a 6/10’s of 1 percent decline in the aggregate job growth in 
the other, surrounding states of the region.   
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banks’ demand deposits. The end result of the original public debt 
default can be significantly reduced liquidity in, and even trust of, 
the original creditor’s banking sector. The costs to the real economy 
of such a financial market contraction will be lower investment, low-
er aggregate demand, and lower short-run and long-run economic 
growth.  The impacts will be felt within the defaulting country and 
may spill over to other Eurozone countries holding significant posi-
tions of the defaulting country’s debt. Together, the short and long-
run declines in growth within neighboring economies define the fi-
nancial spillover costs of one country’s default. 
 
Table 1 shows the exposure of the banking sector in the Eurozone 
countries not at risk for a public debt default to the book value in 
euros of their public, bank, and total debt holdings in the five “at-
risk” economies:  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain; see Table 
1, cols. (1)-(5). Table 1, col. (6) shows the country’s total exposure by 
type of debt summed over the five at-risk countries. Table 1, col. (7) 
provides an estimate of how important these debts are to the overall 
risk-weighted value of all bank assets in each of the Eurozone credi-
tor countries.  
 
Though it is likely that the default of sovereign debt in any one of the 
at-risk countries could be separately managed by banks in the credi-
tor countries, were one default taken as a signal of multiple defaults, 
the impact on creditor banks could be significant. In Belgium, for 
example, all at-risk sovereign debt as a share of the country’s banks’ 
risk-weighted assets is 3.1 percent, in France 2.7 percent, and in Ger-
many 4.7 percent.  Further, a sovereign debt default may also im-
pact banks within the defaulting country, and other Eurozone banks 
have positions in the defaulting country’s banks. This is an additional 
risk exposure for creditor countries. For example, the share of risk-
weighted assets of Belgium banks held as loans to banks in all the 
at-risk countries is 6.5 percent, of French banks 2.8 percent, and of 
German banks 7.0 percent. Finally a network of default-induced re-
cessions or reductions in bank lending in the at-risk countries threat-
ens the repayment prospects and thus the market value of all loans, 
whether public, bank, or private. Table 1, col. (7) shows the total 
exposure of banks in creditor countries to defaults and recessions in 
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the five at-risk countries. If one suspects one country’s default can 
trigger a sequence of loan devaluations within and across all at-risk 
countries, then it is easy to see why the financial costs of that default 
will be significant for the other, creditor countries of the Eurozone. 
By this logic, German, French, and Belgian support for the ECB 
bailouts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain is understandable.       
 
Finally, and though more difficult to measure but important politi-
cally, are the empathy costs (S) following defaults without bailouts. 
Facing the Samaritan’s dilemma, no one country may be able to ig-
nore a neighbor in trouble. To exploit such sympathies, the govern-
ment in arrears may cut services to its most vulnerable citizens.  For 
example in its current fiscal crisis, Greece allowed international news 
services to distribute photographs of disabled citizens picketing the 
Finance Ministry after cuts in the social service budget. Similar strat-
egies have earned fiscal bailouts for poor U.S. cities (Camden, New 
Jersey) and poor South African provinces (Eastern Cape). 
 
Facing potentially significant economic, financial, and empathy costs 
of a no bailout decision, it is perhaps not surprising that the fiscally 
healthy members of the Eurozone have chosen the bailout alternative 
for Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain. Italy’s fiscal future remains 
to be decided but, when necessary, a bailout here seems likely too. 
A bailout policy, however, cannot be a long-run equilibrium for an 
economically successful monetary union. Bailouts inevitably lead to 
inefficient levels of public debt for all member countries, or alter-
natively, the withdrawal from the union of the fiscally responsible 
nations being asked to pay for the bad debts of their irresponsible 
neighbors.10 
 
The long-run future of the European Union may therefore turn on 
its ability to control member country fiscal bailouts. There are only 
two approaches: regulate country borrowing with stronger balanced 
budget rules or get the deficit incentives right through a strength-
ened monetary and fiscal union.  
10 Though a recent Pew Foundation study of attitudes of EU residents towards 
the fiscal decisions of EU leaders suggest we are not there yet.  Support for the EU 
generally is down from its levels in the spring of 2007 but still at 60 percent in 
Germany, the main guarantor of bailout funding.  See Pew Research Center (2013), 
Table Q9f. 
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III. The Regulatory Approach: Stronger Balanced Budget Rules 
 
Balanced budget requirements (BBRs) are commonly imposed in 
most developed economies and at all levels of government.11 At a 
minimum, they are a guideline to state budgets; at a maximum, they 
are meant as a binding constraint on government fiscal behaviors. Ap-
propriately, most rules allow governments to run deficits to smooth 
tax payments for large, lumpy expenditures such as capital outlays or 
disaster relief. What is required to be in balance are current accounts 
revenues and expenditures for current services and transfers includ-
ing capital maintenance. Borrowing within a fiscal year is allowed to 
manage the flow of expenditures and revenues, like households use 
a credit card. Rolling over short-term debts into the next fiscal year 
may or may not be allowed. Ideally, each year’s non-debt revenues 
must equal current accounts spending at the end of each fiscal year.12 
 
Writing a rule and its enforcement are separate matters, however. 
Table 2 summarizes the attributes of weak (i.e., unenforceable) and 
strong (i.e., enforceable) BBR’s and then compares the European 
Union’s original (Maastricht) and new (“Fiscal Compact”) Stability 
and Growth Pact BBR’s to the two standards.13 First, enforceable 
rules require the date of review to be during and at the end of the 
fiscal year, that is ex post, and not just at the beginning (or ex ante) 
of the fiscal year only. If a deficit is discovered during a fiscal year, 
it must be resolved during that fiscal year, either by raising revenues 
or reducing expenditures. There can be no carryover of deficits from 
one fiscal year to the next. Second, enforceable rules are difficult to 
amend, and certainly not open to amendment during the fiscal year 
11 Schaechter, et. al. (2012) provide a detailed database of fiscal rules for 81 coun-
tries for the years 1985-2012.  
12 There remains a good deal of flexibility in how a balanced budget rule defines 
current revenues and spending.  Ideally the BBR would prohibit dissavings except 
for well-specified emergencies.  This would mean the sale of government assets could 
not be counted as revenues, except perhaps for a plausible estimate of interest earned 
on the proceeds of the sale.  Pension spending could be paid in part from interest 
earned on prior accumulation of fund assets but the market value of pension assets 
should not be depleted.  And maintenance expenditures to cover depreciation in 
physical assets must be counted as a current period expense.   Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) should apply.  All accounting should be done on a 
per capita basis. 
13 This summary table is based on the analysis in Inman (1997) and the empirical 
work in Bohn and Inman (1996).
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when there is a deficit. Strong BBR’s are grounded in a constitution 
or formal treaty requiring super-majority approval to be changed. 
BBRs needing only legislative approval can be overturned by the leg-
islature voting for a deficit. Third, a binding rule must define a clear 
constraint and not allow overrides via multiple or vague exceptions. 
Fourth, the rule must be enforced. To ensure enforcement, those af-
fected by a violation must have open access to the enforcement pro-
cess, the adjudicator must be independent of majority-rule politics, 
and large penalties are required to impose sufficient harm to deter 
deficit financing. Only when all four requirements are met will a 
BBR successfully constrain invalid deficit financing.
 
The specification of the European Union’s BBRs shows its deficit rule 
to be deficient on two of the four dimensions, most importantly, on 
the dimension of enforcement. The Maastricht Treaty’s Stability and 
Growth Pact, implemented on January 1, 1999, required that all 
members of the European Union maintain an annual budget with 
deficits no greater than 3 percent of GDP and an aggregate ratio 
of government debt to GDP no greater than 60 percent.14 Member 
country budgets were to be reviewed at the end of each fiscal year, 
but there was no ability to intervene during the fiscal year to force 
adjustments in spending or revenues if a country appeared likely to 
violate either the 3 percent or 60 percent rules. For this reason, the 
original Maastricht rule is viewed as an ex ante requirement enforc-
ing only the promise of a balanced budget with deficit carryovers 
allowed from one budget to the next. In its favor, the Maastricht 
BBR was treaty-based and therefore cannot be easily changed; thus 
“amendment” was difficult. Nor did the original specification of the 
BBR allow for vaguely specified exceptions to the 3 percent deficit 
or the 60 percent debt rules. Thus as stated, the Maastricht rule did 
not allow overrides. 
It was on the dimension of enforcement that the original Maastricht 
BBR was most lacking. Only the European Commission could bring 
a formal complaint; in effect, the enforcement process was closed. 
14 Historically, public infrastructure investment by Union governments had aver-
aged about 3 percent of GDP, so the 3 percent deficit rule was seen as valid ap-
proximation to a rule requiring a balanced current accounts budget; see Buiter, et. 
al. (1993).  The enforcement of the 3 percent rule allows for exceptions when there 
are large public sector investments during a fiscal year; Maastricht Treaty, Article 
104.c.3. 
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The adjudicator of any complaint was to be the Council of Finance 
Ministers with decisions made by weighted majority rule of Union 
members (excluding the violating country). Since possible future 
violators were to sit in judgment of current violators, such decisions 
were likely to be partisan. Finally, the penalty for a violation was 
small. A deposit of no more than 1/4 of one percent of GDP for each 
percentage point in excess of the 3 percent rule was required, and the 
funds would be returned when the country returned to compliance. 
As specified by Maastricht, enforcement of the Union’s BBR must 
therefore be considered weak.
This proved to be the case just two years after the implementation of 
the Maastricht BBR. Both Germany and France violated the 3 per-
cent deficit guideline. The European Commission brought a com-
plaint, but in November 2003, the Council of Ministers decided 
not to follow the recommendation of the European Commission to 
impose the required penalties on Germany and France. An appeal by 
the Commission to the European Court of Justice led to the deci-
sion not to intervene in such matters, confirming the importance of 
the partisan Council as the enforcer of the Union’s fiscal rules. The 
observed explosion of deficit financing in Greece, Italy, and Portugal 
confirms the analysis in Table 2, that the Maastricht specified BBR 
was indeed a weak regulator of Union member deficits. 
In response to the poor performance of the Maastricht specification 
for an EU BBR, members adopted the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance in the European and Monetary Union now com-
monly known as the “Fiscal Compact.” The new treaty was signed by 
all members of the European Union on March 2, 2012, except for 
the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom.  The treaty entered 
into force on January 1, 2013 for the sixteen countries which have 
ratified the treaty. Importantly, this includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. The new treaty seeks to strengthen the Union’s 
BBR on each of the four dimensions in Table 2. It is unlikely to suc-
ceed. 
First, and to its credit, the new treaty and associated guidelines for 
enforcement do improve the details of budget review by specifying 
a precise five year budget planning and oversight process called the 
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Medium Term Budgetary Objective (MTO).15 For countries in vio-
lation of the 3 percent deficit and/or the 60 percent debt guidelines, 
the European Commission may hold the violating country responsi-
ble for a five year budgetary plan designed to hold deficit spending to 
no greater than ½ of one percent of GDP and to bring the aggregate 
debt to GDP ratio to 60 percent or lower over time. Unfortunate-
ly, monitoring the planned budget depends upon data provided by 
member countries. There is evidence that Eurozone countries often 
use favorable revenue forecasts and creative accounting to bring their 
budgets into line with proposed guidelines.16 Further, even with ac-
curate fiscal accounts, any deficits incurred in a fiscal year may still 
be carried over into the next year’s budget. The fact remains that the 
new BBR will remain an ex ante/carryover review. 
 
Also to its credit, the Fiscal Compact’s BBR remains a treaty based 
rule and will therefore remain difficult to amend. Regarding over-
rides, however, the unambiguous 3 percent, 60 percent requirements 
of the original, Maastricht BBR are now relaxed to allow a variety 
of exceptions. The required ½ of one percent deficit target can be 
dropped if there is (i) a period of significant economic hardship for 
the Eurozone as a whole; or (ii) an unusual event outside the control 
of the member state affecting the state’s deficit; or (iii) any other fac-
tors that in the opinion of the member state and the supervising Eu-
ropean Commission and Council of Finance Ministers requires the 
deficit target to be relaxed.  In the Guidelines for enforcing the new 
BBR, these “other factors” may include a within-country financial 
crisis or contributions “fostering international solidarity and (work-
ing towards) achieving Union policy goals” (European Commission 
(2013, p. 10). The intent for allowing rule overrides is to give the 
rule more flexibility in times of deep recessions or within country 
crises or to pursue other EU wide objectives. While laudable, the fact 
remains that allowing overrides weakens deficit enforcement.
Finally, while the new BBR sought to strengthen enforcement, the 
treaty’s changes are likely to have little effect. The Fiscal Compact’s 
15 See European Commission (2012b).  
16 See Frankel and Schreger (2012).  Historically, the favorable forecast errors have 
been largest for Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, while those for Spain and Italy are 
better but still significantly above average errors. 
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Article 8 now allows not just the Commission to bring a deficit or 
debt complaint against an EU member country but for any other 
country signer to the treaty to bring a complaint. As before, that 
complaint would then be reviewed by the Commission. If the Com-
mission did not act on the complaint, the complainant could then go 
directly to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Court of 
Justice, however, has been reluctant to review matters of fiscal policy. 
True open access to enforcement allows, as in the United States, pri-
vate parties potentially harmed by excessive state deficits to bring a 
complaint directly to the Court. That is not permitted here. Enforce-
ment must still be considered closed. In addition, the initial adjudi-
cator of any complaint remains the partisan Council of Ministers, 
but now with the possibility of appealing to the Court of Justice if 
Council does not enforce the rule.17 It is hard to see the members 
of the Court as politically independent appointees, however.  Each 
is appointed to represent one of the twenty-seven EU members. In 
2011, one of the principal candidates to be Prime Minister of Greece 
was the then President of the Court.  Enforcement remains partisan. 
Third, penalties for continued deficit violations remain small, either 
non-interest bearing “loans” returned when the violation is corrected 
or a fine not to exceed 1/10 of 1 percent of GDP (which might be 
paid by the deficit in excess of ½ of 1 percent of GDP!).18    
17 The Fiscal Compact introduces the novel idea of changing the status quo point 
for Council voting in hopes of controlling the tendency for a qualified majority of 
Council members to defer to deficits in hopes of comparable treatment if they were 
ever to violate the 3 percent rule. Under Maastricht, the status quo was the deficit 
violation and the Council needed to vote to discipline the violating country.  Under 
the Fiscal Compact, the status quo point becomes the discipline outcome with the 
Council needing to vote to allow deficit behavior. As a strict matter of voting theory, 
however, this will make no difference.  There are only two outcomes along a single 
dimension – allow a deficit or not – and the qualified majority will choose its pre-
ferred option independent of the status quo.  
18 It is hoped by some European fiscal scholars that the Fiscal Compact’s require-
ment for a five year budget plan will provide an independent metric against which 
a country’s fiscal performance can be evaluated and monitored.  Enforcement of 
the five year budget guidelines would turn on the quality and independence of the 
analysis and on moral suasion of the general electorate within member countries; 
see, for example, Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2009), Chapter 7.  From 
the U.S. experience, only those oversight authorities that impose significant fiscal 
penalties when there is a violation of the budget target seem to succeed, however. 
For example, the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority (PICA), 
charged with ensuring balanced budgets over five year horizons for the city of Phila-
delphia, has the power to withhold all or a portion of state aid to the city, where such 
assistance accounts for 40 percent of city revenues. 
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It seems safe to conclude that the Fiscal Compact’s BBR is no stron-
ger than the original Maastricht BBR, and is arguably slightly weaker 
because of efforts to make the rule more flexible in the face of special 
circumstances. Maastricht’s BBR’s failure to control excessive coun-
try borrowing does not bode well for the Fiscal Compact’s ability to 
constrain such excesses. The EU needs to consider a second strategy 
therefore, one directed at getting the borrowing incentives right.  
IV. The Incentive Approach: A Stronger Union    
 
The central weakness of the current fiscal union is its inability to 
control excessive country borrowing for current public spending in 
anticipation of a full or partial bailout.  The incentive to overborrow 
comes from the willingness of other Eurozone countries to offer bail-
outs rather than bear the economic, financial, or empathy costs of 
the deficit country’s default; see Figure 2. Controlling these spillover 
costs is the key to controlling inefficient country borrowing. To do so 
will require a stronger banking union to control financial spillovers 
and a stronger fiscal union to control economic and empathy spill-
overs following a country’s default.                
 
Control of financial spillovers will require a banking union with the 
ability to regulate major banks’ holdings of any one country’s debt 
to a small fraction of a diversified portfolio of bank assets.19 The as-
set constraint for government debt can be specified by individual 
country, or for a group of countries if there is thought to be a risk 
of contagion among country risks.  The objective of the regulation 
is to ensure that a country’s default of its debt will not threaten the 
long-run economic viability of another country’s banks or the banks’ 
short-run ability to offer credit to the private sector.   
19 At the time (1975) of New York City’s fiscal crisis, the book value of New York’s 
short and long-term debt outstanding was $13.5 billion; the value of all bank assets 
was $705 billion. In contrast to the sovereign debt exposures in Table 1, New York 
City debt equaled only 1.9 percent of all U.S. bank assets. Further, there was a clear 
appreciation at the time for the uniqueness of the New York City fiscal crisis by the 
financial markets. There was no concern that a New York City default signaled a 
wider risk of default by other public credits; see Gramlich (1976). Thus the financial 
spillover costs of a New York City default were seen as small and manageable.  By 
the logic outlined in Figure 2, it was no surprise that President Gerald Ford denied 
the bailout request from city officials.    
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The same institutional requirements needed for an effective BBR 
must apply as well for an effective bank asset requirement.  A regula-
tion limiting bank holdings of a country debt’s must be monitored 
on a regular, say quarterly, basis, must be clear and without override 
provisions, not easily amended by EU legislation, and enforced by an 
independent agent with open access to the bank’s balance sheet and 
with ability to impose significant penalties for violations.  
The proposal by the EU Finance Ministers agreed to on December 
14, 2012 is sensitive to these requirements; see Goyal, et. al. (2013). 
First, the proposal places the major banks (assets greater than €30 
billion or 20 percent of the country’s GDP) of each Eurozone mem-
ber state under the direct regulation of the politically independent 
European Central Bank managing a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). Regulation of a country’s smaller banks will remain the re-
sponsibility of current national banking authorities, but the ECB 
may take over the supervision of any Eurozone bank at any time; 
see Huertas (2013). Second, clear and transparent portfolio require-
ments are to be developed by the (again, independent) European 
Banking Authority, perhaps along the lines of the Basel III recom-
mendations. Third, proposed penalties for violating bank regulations 
will include the possibility of temporary or permanent supervision 
of bank activities by the ECB. Temporary supervision may be cou-
pled with temporary financial assistance to ease liquidity constraints 
on bank activities. In the case of permanent supervision, the bank 
would fall under the governance of a Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM). In either case, and as required for the effective enforcement 
of any regulation, the affected bank’s management will suffer signifi-
cant penalties either in lost discretion or termination. Finally, the EU 
proposal also includes a recommendation for deposit insurance for 
small creditors. Though not essential for effective regulation of bank 
borrowing, separately financed bank deposit insurance has a poten-
tially important role to play in controlling country or bank bailouts. 
Specifically, it reduces one important source of the empathy costs of 
sovereign defaults. By controlling the adverse financial and empa-
thy spillover costs from sovereign debt, a successful banking union 
becomes a first, and necessary, step towards an efficient economic 
union.  
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To effectively control the economic and empathy costs of a country’s 
default, a fiscal union will be required to ease the adverse economic 
consequences of default for the citizens of the defaulting country. To 
the extent a fiscal default precipitates a country recession, a transfer 
from the fiscally stable, economically growing countries should be 
paid to the newly unemployed residents of the defaulting country.20 
Transfers should be paid directly to affected households, not to the 
government in default (that would be a bailout). Eligible households 
will be those with a family member unemployed because of the de-
fault induced recession. Importantly, the transfer should be for tem-
porary unemployment lasting perhaps no longer than one year and 
paid to workers residing and working within the depressed economy. 
Benefits should be indexed to country-specific rates of inflation. To 
avoid discouraging structural reforms of country labor markets, it 
is essential that the policy be triggered by a temporary downturn in 
the country’s economy and that it have a clear limit for eligibility. 
Recent research shows such household specific transfers can have a 
strong stimulus effect on the aggregate economy and facilitate an 
economic recovery.21     
 
The proposed EU social insurance program would be approved 
and administered by existing EU institutions, though each country 
would be free to supplement the EU transfers at their own expense 
without penalty. The EU-wide insurance policy would set a floor 
for temporary household assistance. The initial design of the policy 
might come from the European Commission in consultation with 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and then sub-
ject to final approval by a qualified majority of the Council.  The 
policy would be limited to contributions and transfers clearly stated 
in the enabling legislation. The policy would be supervised as a trust 
fund by the politically independent European Commission. A new 
administrative division of the EU would be needed to collect rev-
enues and disburse checks to qualified households. To avoid prob-
lems of moral hazard, contributions to the EU fund would (i) be 
collected directly from firms and employees within each country, (ii) 
20 The logic for such transfer policies to control adverse economic spillovers is de-
veloped formally in Farhi and Werning (2012).  
21 For European economies, see Gali and Perotti (2003), and for the U.S. economy, 
see Romer and Romer (2009) and Carlino and Inman (2013b). 
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be experience rated by industry and country, and (iii) be held in a 
clearly earmarked “country account.” Any additional payments to 
support a country’s supplemental insurance fund could be collected 
by the country and locally administered, or perhaps for administra-
tive efficiency, by the EU itself.    
 
Such a constrained income insurance policy is all EMU members 
need to contain the temptation for fiscal bailouts for country debt. 
There is no need to expand EU fiscal powers to include general taxa-
tion and spending. A fully empowered fiscal union managed by the 
Council of Ministers, and inevitably the European Parliament, is 
likely to create more problems than solutions. Central government 
legislatures requiring agreement among coalitions of local interests, 
as is likely for the European Parliament, have shown a propensity 
to tap the collective tax base for spending on projects with only lo-
cal benefits; see Inman (2003). The result is an incentive to use the 
common tax base to overspend on country-specific public goods. To 
ensure efficient debt policies by EMU member countries then, one 
need go no further than a treaty specified and Commission adminis-
tered policy of temporary income insurance. 
V. Conclusion 
 
At its core, the European Economic Union is not about economics 
but rather, as the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize recognized, ensuring the 
long-run peace for central Europe. The Union’s prime movers, Ger-
man Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mit-
terrand, realized shared economic fortunes created the strongest in-
centives for peaceful co-existence. To this end, the Monetary Union 
was an important first step. The current economic crisis has made it 
clear it cannot be the last. The fiscal incentives within a Monetary 
Union led to excessive borrowing and fiscal bailouts. As now de-
signed and enforced, EU fiscal rules – an appeal for sinners to heal 
themselves – will not work. Rather than a regulatory strategy, the 
preferred alternative is to get the incentives right.  
 
For that, additional EU institutions will be needed to control the 
propensity to offer fiscal bailouts when a member country borrows 
96 Managing Country Debts in the European Monetary Union: Stronger Rules or Stronger Union
excessively for current consumption. That means controlling the fi-
nancial, economic, and empathy costs that a country’s default can 
impose upon its neighbors. To control financial spillovers, a banking 
union managed by the European Central Bank and capable of cred-
ibly regulating large banks’ holdings of sovereign debt is required. 
To control economic and empathy spillovers, an expanded, but lim-
ited by treaty, fiscal union to provide income insurance to residents 
of member countries facing a temporary economic downturn will be 
needed.  
 
While expanding EU economic powers, both the proposed bank-
ing and fiscal unions are prudent extensions of the EU institutional 
architecture. They will be treaty-based with clear responsibilities 
administered by existing EU institutions.  Both find their intellec-
tual foundation within the guiding principle of subsidiarity.  Since 
country, and thus citizen, approval is required for the new institu-
tions to have force, there is no adding to the “democratic deficit.” 
As specified here, neither union creates new, open-ended powers 
centralized in the hands of EU political institutions. Together with 
the current monetary union, they offer the best hope for a stable 
economic union and its original promise of a peaceful, economically 
integrated Europe.   
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Figure 1
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Figure 2:  Union Bailouts and Inefficient Public Debt
The decision by a higher tier of government (here the EMU) to offer a bailout for debt incurred by a lower tier of 
government (here, an EMU member) is the result of a sequential policy game played between the upper and lower 
tiers of government.  The first move in the policy game belongs to the member country.  They can either deficit 
finance current service expenditures (policy, D) or tax finance those services (policy, T).  If the member country 
sees a chance to successfully repudiate their debt, thereby shifting the costs for current services onto non-resident 
bondholders if they default or onto non-resident taxpayers if there is a bailout, then deficit financed current services 
will be subsidized by non-residents.  In this case, inefficiently excessive public services will be purchased by the 
member country.  If the member country tax finances its current services, then there will be no subsidy from non-
residents and current services will be efficiently provided.  Whether the member country adopts inefficient D or 
efficient T will depend on how the upper tier government, the monetary union, responds to the threat of a default by 
a member country.  This response is the second move in the policy game.  
 
 When facing a default on D, the monetary union can either provide a bailout of B (= D) or choose to not 
provide a bailout.   Choosing to not make a bailout may not be costless, however.  There are three possible costs on 
other union members if the union does not bail out the debts of its defaulting member.  
 
1.  Economic Spillover Costs (E): If the deficit country were to default and there was no bailout, 
two negative shocks would impact the deficit country’s own economy.  First, the resulting 
depreciation in value of country debt held by country banks could trigger a financial crisis within 
the deficit country.  Second, the deficit country would be denied access to the international bond 
market until those original debts were repaid.  The first shock limits private investment; the 
second discourages public investment.  The result may be a significant decline in the deficit 
country’s near-term and long-run economic growth, both of which may adversely affect the 
economies of the deficit country’s trading neighbors.  These adverse spillovers define the 
economic costs (E) of the union’s no bailout decision.       
 
2. Financial Spillover Costs (F): The defaulting member’s debts may be in the portfolios of 
financial institutions of other union members.  Default will weaken the financial position of these 
institutions, leading to fewer loans and investments (in the best case) or financial collapse (in the 
worst case).  These lost economic activities and lost wealth borne by residents of the other 
member countries will define the financial costs (F) of the union’s no bailout decision.       
 
3. Empathy Spillover Costs (S): Default with no bailout denies the deficit country access to debt 
for valid public investments and deficit financing for current period services and transfers.  Both 
lead to lower economic growth and lower incomes for residents of the deficit country.  The burden 
of low growth and/or recession is likely to fall disproportionally on the less well educated, on 
minorities, and on the very young and elderly.  Residents of other union countries may wish to 
reduce these burdens as they engender empathy:  But for the grace of God, go I.   Failure to offer a 
bailout means citizens in other countries bear an empathy, or good Samaritan, cost (S).    
 
 The bailout decision by the monetary union reduces to a comparison of the costs of the bailout choice (B = 
D) to the spillover costs of the no bailout choice (= E + F + S).  If B > [F + E + S], then bailouts are more expensive 
than no bailouts, and the union will not offer a bailout.   Conversely, if B < [F + E + S], then the no bailout 
alternative is more expensive to union members, and the bailout will be forthcoming.  We conclude:  
 
If B < [F + E + S] and a bailout is forthcoming, then the at-risk member countries have an 
incentive to borrow for the invalid reason of funding current consumption.   However, if B > [F + 
E + S] and no bailout is offered, then at-risk member countries have an incentive to only borrow 
for valid, tax smoothing reasons.   
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Table 1: Eurozone Bank Exposure*
December 2011
Millions of Euros
Table 2: Specification of Balanced Budget Rules
Millions of Euros 
 
Reporting Country Type of Exposure 
At-Risk Countries 
Total 
Exposure 
(6) 
Total Exposure as Percent of 
Bank Risk-Weighted Assets 
(7) 
Greece 
(1) 
Ireland 
(2) 
Italy 
(3) 
Portugal 
(4) 
Spain 
(5) 
Austria 
Public Debt 18.9 38.0 613.9 4.3 144.2 819.4 0.4 % 
Bank Debt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Total Debt 3,391.8 1,763.9 1,491.1 14,092.5 788.1 21527.4 10.0 % 
Belgium 
Public Debt 175.2 357.3 1,333.6 65.8 1,328.2 3260.2 3.1 % 
Bank Debt 10.6 620.2 2,750.4 510.0 2,965.5 6856.6 6.5 % 
Total Debt 9,973.3 548.7 16,614.1 9,414.7 2,101.4 38652.3 36.4 % 
Finland 
Public Debt 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 48.5 49.0 0.1 % 
Bank Debt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Total Debt 913.5 19.8 391.4 400.5 186.2 1911.4 5.6 % 
France 
Public Debt 6,879.3 1,313.7 32,455.7 2,983.3 6,194.4 49826.3 2.7 % 
Bank Debt 169.5 6,057.9 23,846.2 3,390.3 19,735.4 53199.2 2.8 % 
Total Debt 87,176.8 33,707.8 20,870.8 252,578.5 16,537.4 410871.3 21.9 % 
Germany 
Public Debt 5,586.6 802.0 30,236.4 3,638.0 18,089.3 58352.3 4.7 % 
Bank Debt 576.8 13,590.9 24,144.9 8,009.5 40,377.5 86699.5 7.0 % 
Total Debt 111,031.4 10,149.7 72,449.0 101,803.6 22,957.7 318391.3 25.9 % 
Netherlands 
Public Debt 810.9 225.7 3,019.1 562.5 941.6 5559.8 0.8 % 
Bank Debt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Total Debt 51,500.7 2,648.6 9,932.3 26,153.5 3,689.7 93924.8 13.6 % 
Other Public Debt 5,347.7 382.5 1,255.9 139.5 178.3 7,303.8 8.6 % 
*Columns (1) to (5) list the holdings of select Eurozone banks (“Other” includes Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia) in Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish debt. Debt is measured at 
face value. “Public debt” includes sovereign debt exposure, while “bank debt” refers to bank-to-bank lending where the counterparties’ banks are incorporated in the at-risk countries. “Total” 
includes all public and private claims in the at-risk countries. Source: Bank debt and total exposure are from the Bank for International Settlements, Consolidated Banking Statistics, Table 9E. Public 
debt holdings are from the European Banking Authority, 2011 EU Capital Exercise. Column (6) lists total holdings as the sum of cols. (1)-(5).  Column (7) estimates the percent of risk weighted bank 
assets that are held as at-risk debt, where total risk-weighted bank assets are from the European Banking Authority. N/A indicates data were not available. 
SPECIFICATION WEAK BBR STRONG BBR MAASTRICHT BBR “FISCAL COMPACT” BBR 
Date of Review Ex Ante/Carryover Ex Post/No Carryover  Ex Ante/Carryover Ex Ante/Carryover 
Ease of Amendment Easy Difficult  Difficult  Difficult 
Overrides Allowed  Not Allowed  Not Allowed   Allowed 
Enforcement      
Access Closed  Open  Closed  Closed 
Adjudicator Partisan  Independent Partisan  Partisan 
Penalty Small  Large Small Small 
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No to a Transfer Union, yes to an 
Economic Justice Union
Mattias Kumm 
One thing that economists agree on is that in order to move out of 
the crisis rather than have it continue indefinitely, losses have to be 
allocated sooner rather than later. Only once this politically painful 
step has been taken, can Europe move on. But who should pay for 
the mess? If the crisis were the result of profligate spending of some 
states, then it seems logical that these states should bear the burden 
of their actions before they can count on European support, and 
that this support should come with strict conditions. This, in effect, 
is what the ESM and Fiscal Compact are meant to ensure. But if, as 
is considerably more plausible, the sovereign debt crisis is, to a large 
extent, the result of a banking crisis, the answer may turn out to 
be very different. There is something arbitrary about burdening the 
states in whose jurisdictions the banks requiring bail-outs happen to 
be domiciled. The banking crisis would not have had the same inten-
sity and structure if it were not for the European common currency 
and European freedom of capital guarantees. The EU has exercised 
its concurrent competencies over the area of banking and financial 
markets and is in the process of deepening its involvement in the 
sector by the establishment of a Banking Union. Furthermore the 
bank-bailouts themselves have considerable cross-border positive ex-
ternalities. Given the interdependence of the banking sector, the fail-
ure of major banks in one state would have had difficult-to-control 
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contagion effects across Europe. Under such circumstances, it seems 
more plausible to allocate financial public sector risks resulting from 
financial sector failings at the European level. The costs of bank-
bailouts are, to a significant extent, the result of genuinely European 
risks, for which it would be appropriate to hold the European Union, 
as a whole, accountable. 
But if the European Union as a whole, rather than individual states 
like Spain, Ireland or Slovenia, is to be held accountable for the costs 
of the bank-bailouts, inter-state transfer mechanisms, such as those 
foreseen by the ESM, should not be used. These costs should be 
paid for by genuinely European funds, raised by European taxes or 
levies. The way money is raised and spent comes with its own po-
litical presumptions and burdens of justification. It should not be 
seen as just a neutral technical device. There is something deeply 
incongruous and misleading in first having individual states bail out 
banks, and then transferring money from one state to another, so 
that stronger states end up supporting weaker states. This mecha-
nism misguidedly creates the impression that stronger states have to 
bail out weaker ones because the weaker ones cannot handle their 
responsibilities, even when the original responsibility belongs to the 
European Union. Inter-state transfer mechanisms corrode solidarity 
in Europe, because they give the misleading impression that one state 
has to ultimately pay for the failures of another.
Note how interstate transfers harm solidarity even in established fed-
eral systems, while in other contexts policies can rely on national 
solidarity.  Take the example of Germany’s Länderfinanzausgleich, 
which can be roughly described as follows1: Rules of fiscal federalism 
in Germany allocate most federal taxes to the federal government, 
which spends its money in accordance with federal policies. Here 
the question of how much money has flown from one state to an-
other is generally not a high profile political issue: federal taxes for 
federal policies help create and sustain a federal political commu-
nity and its policies. A portion of the taxes, however, is allocated to 
states according to the amount that was generated locally (örtliches 
Aufkommen). A small portion of these taxes allocated to states is 
1 For details see Art. 107 German Basic Law. 
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again redistributed between states according to certain legislatively 
established need-based criteria. As of last year, the Bavarians had to 
pay 3 billion Euros of the money originally allocated to them in the 
distributive pot, while the happy-go-lucky “poor but sexy” city-state 
of Berlin received 3 billion. The nifty Baden-Württembergers sup-
port the socially generous and undisciplined Bremeners, etc. There 
is a lot of political theatre and a great deal of animosity on parade 
in the annual process of re-allocation. This inter-state reallocation 
creates significant resentment and effectively undermines solidarity. 
The reason for this is, at least in part, that Bavarians assume that the 
money originally allocated to them is what is rightly theirs, and they 
don’t want to to help other states who cannot seem to get their act 
together.
Whether or not the Bavarians and Baden-Württembergers have a 
point is not the issue here. The point here is that the way money is 
distributed is linked with assumptions about whose money is dis-
tributed. Once money originally allocated to A flows from A to B, 
A assumes the money transferred is its money and what needs to be 
justified is B’s need for it. If money is distributed to all those liv-
ing in A and B following criteria that were jointly decided and then 
followed by C, and money is raised using general criteria related to 
policy benefits  then the question of how much money flows from A 
to B becomes moot or at least secondary. Then the question changes: 
is this a policy that C (rather than A and B) should decide upon, does 
C have competencies in this area and should those competencies be 
exercised? If so, is it a good policy, worth the money that is spent on 
it? And is the money raised according to appropriate criteria? The 
way flows of money are channelled determines the nature of the de-
bate.
Moreover, it is not a good argument to insist that a sufficiently strong 
identity – an identity that Europeans may be argued to lack - is a pre-
requisite to allowing the EU to raise its own resources. Identity may 
well be relevant for the allocation of competencies and the definition 
of policies. But once it is decided and accepted that competencies 
should be allocated and policies defined on a European level with 
regard to a particular set of issues, then it is unlikely that funding 
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these policies in line with criteria that are meaningfully connected to 
the economic benefits bestowed would be considered unacceptable. 
Genuinely European resources, best raised from taxes or levies that 
burden actors and transactions that are profiting financially from the 
internal market (e.g. shareholders, corporations, transactions with 
strong cross-border dimensions like certain financial transactions), 
appropriately connect regulatory responsibility with financial ac-
countability. Furthermore, taxing actors and transactions that have 
profited from regulatory competition  would be in line with the Eu-
ropean Union’s promise to fairly distribute burdens in the global-
ization context. The European Union should not become a Trans-
fer Union (this is not about transfers from one state to another), it 
should become an Economic Justice Union, in which the European 
Union accepts financial liability for the consequences of its regula-
tory responsibilities and is able to raise its own resources to do so. 
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Fiscal Union in the Eurozone?
Hélène Rey1 
1. Optimum currency areas 
Since the creation of the euro was contemplated in the Werner report 
of 1970, its desirability was assessed from an economic point of view 
through the lenses of the optimum currency area theory (OCA) - de-
veloped by Mundell in 1961 and later refined and extended by McK-
innon (1963) and Kenen (1969). The 1961 Mundell paper laid out 
the tradeoffs between the benefits, chiefly the reduction in transac-
tion costs following the adoption of a common medium of exchange, 
and the costs of losing the exchange rate as an adjustment mecha-
nism. The loss of monetary independence was rightly diagnosed as 
being particularly problematic in the presence of large asymmetric 
real shocks, whether on the demand or on the supply side. When 
asymmetric shocks hit, in the absence of a nominal exchange rate, 
adjustment is eased if there is high labour mobility (Mundell) or fis-
cal transfers (Kenen).
  
Subsequently, Frankel and Rose (1998) pointed out that part of 
the divergence between countries’ business cycles was endogenous 
and due to the prevailing exchange rate regime. Monetary union by 
boosting intra-industry trade in response to lower transaction costs 
would deepen financial and trade integration and therefore reduce 
1 I am grateful to Richard Portes for comments. 
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regional cyclical asymmetry and increase income convergence. Thus 
asymmetries were bound to decline with the birth of the euro so that 
countries which would join EMU would satisfy OCA properties ex-
post even if they did not ex-ante:  the “endogeneity of OCA” para-
digm was born. On the other side of the debate, Krugman (1993) 
had discussed the possibility that increased regional specialization 
(due to increasing returns to scale and integration) could lead to 
more divergence across country cycles. 
As far as the gains of a common currency were concerned, Rose 
(2000) estimated huge potential increases in international trade 
coming from the adoption of a single currency. But his analysis re-
lied on the rather special sample of countries that historically had 
adopted a currency union – i.e., mainly small territories. The po-
tential for the euro to rival the dollar as an important international 
currency was also seen as a positive factor, as it would go in parallel 
with an enhancement of the liquidity in financial markets for all euro 
assets and a decrease in the cost of capital in the area (Portes and 
Rey 1998). Financial integration would be a partial substitute for 
fiscal integration. On the other hand, there were concerns that the 
institutional design of monetary union left it vulnerable to financial 
instability (Begg et al. 1998).
On balance, the assessment was that the euro project was viable, 
though more political and fiscal integration would be desirable. But 
they were thought likely to come down the road.  The European 
project had always progressed by leaps of faith, subsequently consoli-
dated by economic necessities and political pragmatism. The discus-
sion at the time was sensible. 
2. Banking crises as asymmetric shocks
 a) Unbridled financial sector growth
What was not envisaged was the threat to the common currency 
that would arise from the unchecked growth of bank balance sheets 
within the euro area in the context of a global financial crisis. The 
idea that a financial meltdown and large banking failures could lead 
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to the bankruptcy of sovereigns and loss of market access had not 
been contemplated. Yet, this was potentially the biggest of all pos-
sible asymmetric shocks that could hit the euro area. 
Financial integration did proceed rapidly, in some dimensions. Fed 
by massive cross-border financial flows in the euro area, the banking 
sector assets in many euro area countries swelled to being a multiple 
of countries’ GDPs, as banks took on unprecedented leverage. In 
2012 Q2, Ireland’s bank assets were still 8 times the Irish GDP, for 
example, and the Spanish bank assets about 3 and a half times Span-
ish GDP.  Credit growth to the private sector was particularly rapid 
during the 2003–07 period. The fall of interest rates in most coun-
tries of the euro area, as currency risk disappeared in 1999 (in 2001 
for Greece), led to increases in borrowing for consumption and pur-
chases of real estate. The decrease in risk aversion in global markets 
from 2003 onwards, as well as the securitization boom, sustained 
credit growth in the period immediately before the crisis. In Ireland 
and Spain, cross-border credit flows interacting with domestic dis-
tortions helped fuel real estate investment booms. Neither monetary 
policy nor fiscal policy were used to offset private credit growth, nor 
“macroprudential” measures. In Ireland, property prices increased by 
about 30 percent between March 2005 and March 2007. As Figure 1 
shows, net claims of German and French banks on Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain amounted to large fractions of GDP in the bor-
rowing countries. For example, in 2008, net claims of German banks 
were about 50 percent of Spanish GDP, while those of French banks 
amounted to about 40 percent, helping fuel real estate bubbles (see 
Rey 2012).  
As the returns to real estate–related activities increased while the 
bubbles were inflating, more resources shifted into the nontraded 
sectors at the expense of the manufacturing sector. Thus resources 
were drawn away from industries that may have more scope for pro-
ductivity growth and human capital development, endangering the 
future potential of the economy. Unit labour costs in the periphery 
increased relative to those of Germany, eroding competitiveness and 
widening intra-European imbalances. As shown in Figure 2, in 2007 
Q4, Spain had a current account deficit of about €28 billion (about 
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11 percent of GDP), while Germany had a current account surplus 
of about €54 billion (about 9 percent of its GDP).
Figure 1a,b: Net Consolidated Claims of German and French Banks on 
Countries in the Euro-Area Periphery, March 1999–September 2011. 
(Percent of peripheral-country GDP)
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Figure 2
 b) The policy responses: more asymmetry!
The Lehman failure in the fall of 2008 led to a major reassessment of 
risks, asset prices, and growth forecasts worldwide. For the periph-
ery countries, the shock was brutal. The bursting of the real estate 
bubbles led to major failures in their banking sectors and to a massive 
downturn in real economic activity. Given the large size of the banks’ 
balance sheets, the insolvency of the banks threatened the solvency 
of the sovereigns themselves. The shock, which had already hit the 
euro area countries asymmetrically depending on their exposures to 
toxic assets, the size of their banks and the severity of their real estate 
bubbles, was made even more asymmetric by the policy responses. 
In the Irish crisis case, for example, Irish taxpayers ended up bailing 
out foreign banks for the most part.  This was not only detrimen-
tal from a moral hazard point of view, as reckless investors did not 
have to bear the consequences of their excess lending, but this also 
meant that most of the adjustment to the shock was shouldered by 
the debtor countries. There was effectively very little burden sharing. 
Similarly, as restrictive fiscal policies were adopted everywhere at the 
same time, including in the countries with market access, this meant 
that debtor countries were forced into a deflationary adjustment pro-
cess with high unemployment.  Hence the euro area was faced by 
a very large financial shock which hit countries’ financial systems 
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asymmetrically and whose asymmetric effect was reinforced by the 
policy responses adopted. Such large asymmetric shocks are precisely 
of the sort that a currency union cannot cope with in the absence of 
more fiscal integration. 
3. Banking Union as a substitute for a Fiscal Union
When in 1989, the Report on economic and monetary union in the 
European Community was presented to the European Council, it 
was judged that a fiscal union was politically beyond reach despite 
multiple mentions of the necessity of more fiscal integration in pre-
vious reports, including the Werner report of 1970 (Vallée 2013). 
Thus, the Delors consensus was built around the establishment of 
a minimalist monetary union with no fiscal backbone. There are no 
reasons to believe that the political willingness to establish a fiscal 
union is any greater now than it was then. In fact, due to aversion to 
loss sharing after a crisis, it is likely to be even weaker. The current 
crisis has, however, established beyond doubt that existing euro area 
institutions were not strong enough to weather banking meltdowns. 
A legitimate question to ask is therefore what would be the minimal 
institutional reforms that would help ensure the survival of the com-
mon currency?
A fully fledged banking union might provide such a necessary step. 
Such a banking union would rest on three pillars: a common resolu-
tion fund (to close or restructure any euro area bank), a single su-
pervisory mechanism, and a common deposit guarantee. This would 
fall short of a full fiscal union but would require some pooling of 
resources. It would take off the table the most destabilizing asym-
metric shocks for the euro (the banking shocks). To work, however, 
a banking union does need some common fiscal backing ready to be 
used in the case, for example, where ultimately the emergency recapi-
talisation of large banks by the official sector is needed. It is indeed 
clear that the current constraint of raising recapitalisation funds from 
individual national budgets, some of them already overstretched, se-
riously hinders the process of restructuring of the euro area econo-
mies and economic growth. As the GDP costs of banking crises are 
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high (Laeven and Valencia 2012) and the European banking sector 
oversized, the magnitude of a reasonable fiscal backing for the bank-
ing union is likely to be larger than the current European Stability 
Mechanism (5% of euro area GDP). A banking union without a 
common resolution fund would be useless, as the power of a super-
visor is mostly linked to its ability to put banks, even large ones, in 
resolution. The ability of supervisors to perform credible stress tests 
is also intimately linked to the availability of a fiscal backstop. 
A well designed banking union would therefore be a partial substitute 
for fiscal integration. It would deal with the most serious asymmetric 
shocks (banking crises) which can engulf the currency area as a whole 
in a deadly crisis.  It is the minimum additional set of institutions to 
keep the euro area together. At the same time, it would not deal with 
more standard asymmetric real shocks to the cycle (demand, supply) 
and would therefore fall far short of a full fiscal union.  It remains 
an open question whether even this minimalist reform, however, is 
politically feasible.
4. Gradualist approach to fiscal integration
While a meaningful banking union is essential for the survival of the 
euro, this does not mean that deeper fiscal ties in the euro area would 
not be desirable. They could substantially improve the workings of 
the currency union by facilitating risk sharing. The key issue is to de-
sign them in a way that a) keeps moral hazard under control and, b) 
if possible, uses the process of fiscal integration to improve existing 
institutions at the euro area level.  
a) On the issue of moral hazard, there is a choice to be made be-
tween having ever more external monitoring by the European 
Commission and/or by other member states, or going down the 
American route and increasing gradually the euro area budget, 
while having credible no-bail-out rules for national budgets. The 
external monitoring can be made ex ante with veto powers on 
national budgets, for example, strict budgetary rules endorsed at 
the euro area level, or ex post via sanctions. The ex post approach 
has clearly demonstrated its limits with the serial violation of 
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budgetary rules by Germany and France in particular, and no 
corresponding sanctions. It is important to note that the very 
fact of centralizing more budget capacity and providing more 
smoothing devices at the euro area level increases the credibil-
ity of no-bail-out rules at the national level.  As usual, if really 
catastrophic events are insured at the federal levels, it becomes 
doable, and therefore credible, to let nations default under the 
strain of smaller shocks or mismanagement.
 
b) On the issue of euro area institutions, it would be a missed op-
portunity not to link any enlargement of the euro area fiscal 
capacity to reforms in member states.  One possibility would 
be to give flesh to the idea of “contracts for reforms,” whereby 
loans would be made conditional on the realization of certain 
reforms by member states.   Another concrete and more ambi-
tious example of how this could be done is provided by the April 
2013 Report of the French Conseil d’Analyse Economique. It 
proposes linking a new European unemployment insurance top-
ping the national one to voluntary adoption of a European em-
ployment contract. Workers would be given the choice between 
the national contract or the European one.  The unemployment 
insurance would take into account structural unemployment 
levels and differences in compensation (reflected in different 
levels of contributions), so that countries with low unemploy-
ment would not be penalised. The new European employment 
contract would be designed to have better properties than the 
prevailing employment contracts in several euro area countries 
(in which dual labour markets effectively deny jobs to young 
and long-term unemployed workers). Linking fiscal deepening 
at the euro area level to desirable euro wide structural reforms 
would also stand a chance to reconcile euro area citizens with the 
purpose of European integration.  After all, since its origins, the 
goal of European integration has been to maintain peace and to 
increase prosperity for all. 
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The Evolution of Euro Area 
Sovereign Debt Contracts:  
A Preliminary Inquiry 
Mitu Gulati* 
I. Introduction
The euro area sovereign debt crisis is now over three years old and 
reforms are being instituted in an attempt to correct some of the 
problems that caused the crisis. In this essay, we investigate a key 
assumption that underlies one of the major policy reforms that has 
been put in place as a result of the crisis:  the mandate that all euro 
area sovereign bonds, starting on January 1, 2013, begin using a set 
of contract terms aimed at solving collective action problems (CACs) 
among bondholders. That reform is supposed to make bailouts less 
likely and make private sector involvement (PSI) in future restruc-
turings more likely. The hope is that the result of the reform will be 
that the weaker members of the Eurozone will no longer be tempted 
* Duke University (Law). This paper is based on ongoing research with Frank Smets 
of the European Central Bank.  He bears no responsibility for the conclusions drawn 
in this essay (and may not even agree with some of them).  For comments, thanks 
to Franklin Allen, Fridrik Baldursson, Lee Buchheit, Elena Carletti, Anna Gelpern, 
Ugo Panizza, Christoph Trebesch, Jeromin Zettelmeyer and participants at the Sov-
ereign Debt Restructuring Conference at the University of Reykjavik in 2012 and at 
the Conference on Banking, Fiscal, and Political Union in the Eurozone at the EUI-
Florence in 2013.  Thanks to Keegan Drake, Carlos Garcia-de-Andoain-Hidalgo, 
Guangya Liu and Tori Simmons for their assistance in putting the results together. 
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to over-borrow (and their creditors will no longer be tempted to 
over-lend) by the expectation of a bailout. 
The important question here is: Why are these contract terms, the 
CACs, being mandated? Contract theory tells us that, as a rule, when 
a state mandates contract terms, this tends to reduce welfare. So-
phisticated parties are thought to be better able to decide on the 
terms that best suit them than is the state. The exception is where 
the parties to the contract have the ability, through their contracts, 
to impose externalities on third parties. Hence, to understand why it 
made sense for the euro area governments to mandate contract terms 
for the debt contracts issued by all of their members, there has to be a 
story about how, in the absence of this mandate, these parties have an 
incentive to enter into contracts that produce negative externalities 
on their fellow EMU members.  
What is that externality? There has been little explicit discussion of 
this question in the recent policy debates. The answer, we believe, 
has to do with a frequently articulated narrative regarding the causes 
of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. According to this narrative, 
certain entrants to the monetary union, recognizing that the markets 
perceived them differently upon their gaining entry to the union, 
began to behave irresponsibly with respect to their borrowing. Given 
the strong economic interdependencies that the monetary union was 
sure to create, if an economic crisis hit one member of the euro area, 
its effects would necessarily be felt strongly by other members of the 
union as well. That meant that any nation that got into financial 
trouble would have a higher likelihood of receiving external assis-
tance from its fellow nations in the euro area, than it would have had 
prior to joining the monetary union. Understanding the increase in 
likelihood of a bailout that arose out of the formation of a monetary 
union, certain members of the union might have been tempted to go 
on a borrowing spree.1  
1 For an articulation of this dynamic, see Thushyanthan Baskaran & Zohal Hes-
sami, A Tale of Five PIIGS: Soft Budget Constraints and the EU Sovereign Debt Crises, 
University of Konstanz Working Paper # 2011-45 (available at http://www.uni-
konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_45-Baskaran-Hessami-11.pdf ); see 
also Paul De Grauwe, The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone, CEPS Working Paper 
Number 346 (2011) (referring to the views of 189 German economists opposing 
the ESM). 
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A monetary union and the resulting close economic ties do not, 
however, make bailouts inevitable. The richer nations in the union 
are typically going to be reluctant to provide bailouts to their weaker 
brethren, especially if the latter have acted irresponsibly in getting 
themselves into trouble in the first place. More practically, history 
teaches us that the use of public funds to provide bailouts to private 
creditors tends to generate taxpayer ire. Politicians in the richer na-
tions will therefore prefer that weaker nations settle their debt prob-
lems by asking for “bail ins” from private creditors rather than asking 
for taxpayer subsidies from the citizens of the richer countries in the 
union. Recognizing this, however, the weaker sovereigns and their 
creditors have an incentive to use the types of contract provisions 
in their debt instruments that make it difficult for PSI to occur. The 
classic example of such a contract provision is a requirement in a 
multi-creditor sovereign bond (with thousands of dispersed bond-
holders) that does not allow for the payment terms of the bond to be 
modified unless every single bondholder agrees to the modification.2 
The particular form of the moral hazard we have articulated above, 
where countries choose to utilize harder-to-restructure provisions so 
as to raise the likelihood of a bailout, may strike some as so implau-
sible as to not be worth even testing. But a version of this argument 
is likely the basis for CACs having been mandated for the euro area. 
To see why that is so, it helps to go back to a prior incarnation of 
CAC initiatives, from roughly a decade earlier and on a different 
continent.  
During the period 1995-2002, a number of emerging market na-
tions suffered debt crises and received bailouts from the Official Sec-
tor (primarily the IMF).  Policy makers perceived there to be a prob-
lem of excessive bailouts.3 The dominant narrative was one of moral 
hazard; that emerging market debtors were able to borrow excessively 
because their creditors were confident that there would be bailouts 
2 See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, The Wonder-Clause, 41 J. Comp. Econ. 311 
(2013) (reporting on interviews with officials and market participants regarding the 
perceived reasons for the Euro CAC initiative). 
3 E.g., John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors 100 (2007); Ross P. Buckley, 
Sovereign Bankruptcy, 15 Bond L. Rev. 95-110 (2003). 
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in the event of a crisis.4 And part of the reason for the confidence 
regarding bailouts was that the debt contracts underlying the debt 
were such that forcing restructurings would have been extremely dif-
ficult.5  Inevitably, the bailouts of the mid 1990s upset taxpayers who 
demanded a solution -- one that would replace bailouts with PSI. 
Policy makers decided that one of the key barriers to PSI was the 
unanimity provision that was standard fare in sovereign bonds issued 
under New York law.  After much debate, the solution that emerged 
was for the Official Sector to persuade emerging market sovereign 
debtors and their creditors to shift from using unanimity provisions 
to what are now known as collective action clauses or CACs.6 These 
CACs, in key part, are clauses that allow for modification of a bond’s 
payment terms with significantly less than unanimity among the 
bondholders (typically 75%).
The proposals for CACs to be adopted were not initially received 
with enthusiasm by emerging market issuers, and particularly not 
so by the large issuers like Brazil and Mexico. And for a number of 
years after the CAC proposals first emerged (roughly in 1995), the 
major emerging market issuers showed little willingness to experi-
ment with using CACs. Policy makers and academics, therefore, had 
4 A number of scholars have attempted to test, with ambiguous results, the extent 
to which moral hazard resulted from IMF lending.  See e.g., Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, 
Isabel Schnabel, & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, How do Official Bailouts Affect the Risk of 
Investing in Emerging Markets, 38 J. Money Credit & Banking 1689 (2006); An-
drew Haldane & Ashley Taylor, Moral Hazard: How Does IMF Lending Affect Debtor 
and Creditor Incentives?, Financial Stability Review, June (2003); Prasanna Gai 
& Ashley Taylor, International Financial Rescues and Debtor Moral Hazard, 7 Int’l 
Fin. 391 (2004). 
5 For models of these dynamics, see Michael P. Dooley, Can Output Losses Following 
International Crises be Avoided?, NBER Working Paper 7531 (2000); Michael P. 
Dooley & Sujata Verma, Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises, Chapter 
5, in Managing Currency Crises In Emerging Markets (Jacob Frankel & Mi-
chael P. Dooley eds. 2003). For further discussion of the bailout dynamics as related 
to contract clauses, see Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Bail-Ins, Bailouts, and 
Borrowing Costs, 47 Imf Staff Papers 155 (2001); Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka 
Mody, Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?, 114 Econ. J. 247 (2004).
6 See e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Crisis? What Crisis: Orderly 
Workouts For Sovereign Debtors (1995).  For a description of the events lead-
ing up to the adoption of CACs in New York law sovereign bonds in 2003, see Anna 
Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract, 84 Wash U. L. Q.  1627 
(2007).  
121Mitu Gulati
to wrestle with the question of why nations were not shifting to these 
new clauses and what needed to be done to push them in that direc-
tion. Among the answers that were given was that nations simply 
did not have the individual incentives to move to CACs because 
they and their creditors preferred a regime in which bailouts would 
be provided.7 In essence, this is a moral hazard story.  That is, that 
countries seeking bailouts have an incentive to utilize tougher-to-re-
structure contract provisions than they would otherwise. Given this 
assumption, there was discussion of the need to mandate a CAC-
like solution, since nations did not look like they would choose one 
voluntarily.   
The effort to urge the big emerging market issuers to move (many of 
whom issued bonds under New York law) finally got off the ground 
in early 2003 when Mexico and Brazil finally began using CACs. 
This only happened, though, in the shadow of the threat of mandate 
via the IMF’s proposal for a sovereign debt bankruptcy mechanism. 
By 2004, close to 90% of all new sovereign bonds issued under New 
York law contained CACs.8 That there were few bailouts of emerg-
ing market sovereign debtors in subsequent years is seen by some as 
evidence of the success of the New York CACs.9     
Fast forward roughly a decade, and we have the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis.  This crisis hit sovereign issuers who were primarily issu-
ing their debt in the European market and who were members of 
EMU.  Greece was hit first and the hardest.  Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Italy and Cyprus followed.  The reaction of the euro area policy mak-
ers during the first few years of the crisis was much the same as it had 
been in the mid 1990s with respect to emerging market debtors such 
as Mexico and Argentina – bailouts were given to Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, and Cyprus. Italy and Spain sat in the hot seat.  Taxpayer 
7 See Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 75 
(2003); see also Sonke Haseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign 
Bond Contracts – Whence the Opposition, 23 J. Econ.  Surveys 882 (2009). 
8 Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An 
Empirical Analysis (2013 draft, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948534 ). 
9 See e.g., John B. Taylor, Why Did Macro Policy in Emerging Market Countries 
Improve?, Economics One, March 2, 2010, available at  http://johnbtaylorsblog.
blogspot.com.ar/2010/03/why-did-macro-policy-in-emerging-market.html 
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anger followed, rising in decibel level with every bailout-type action, 
especially among citizens of nations who believed that their countries 
were providing the bailouts. In reaction to the anger over perceived 
subsidies and the “moral hazard” concerns, policy makers chose the 
solution that had worked a decade earlier with respect to emerg-
ing market sovereign issuers, CACs.10 Starting on January 1, 2013, 
all new sovereign bonds issued by members of the Eurozone were 
to have a standard set of CACs resembling the ones that had been 
prescribed in New York a decade prior (albeit, with some enhance-
ments).  Policy makers were clear about the message of this Euro 
CAC initiative: In the future, there would be no automatic bailouts; 
PSI would be part of the package.11 
To reiterate, what interests us in the foregoing is the assumption in 
both the New York initiative of the previous decade and in the cur-
rent euro area initiative, that the weaker sovereign issuers need to be 
constrained in terms of the contract terms they utilize. As noted, as 
an economic matter, mandatory contract terms rarely make sense.12 
The exception is where the terms being chosen produce negative ex-
ternalities impacting third parties. In this case, the externality story 
– had it been explicitly articulated, as it often was in the emerging 
market context a decade prior – was that the weaker issuers in the 
euro area had an incentive to use tough-to-restructure provisions so 
as to increase the likelihood of bailouts from the richer nations.
A decade ago, when there was heated debate over the need to im-
pose CACs on emerging market issuers issuing under New York law, 
there had been no straightforward way to test the foregoing story. 
Was it really plausible to think that weaker nations, recognizing that 
their rich brethren were worried about contagion and would pay a 
high price to avoid it, would move to using tougher-to-restructure 
10 See Gelpern & Gulati, Wonder Clause, supra note 2; see also Arturo C. Porzecan-
ski, Behind the Greek Default and Restructuring of 2012, in Sovereign Debt And 
Debt Restructuring: Legal, Financial And Regulatory Aspects (Eugenio A. 
Bruno ed. 2013) (describing the concern with moral hazard that led to the Merkel-
Sarkozy pronouncement in Deauville in October 2010 that then led directly to the 
CAC initiative in November 2010). 
11 See Gelpern & Gulati, Wonder Clause, supra note 2. 
12 See Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 
Northwestern U. L. Rev. 566 (1995). 
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provisions? The formation of the EMU provides us with a natural 
experiment that should enable testing of this contract version of the 
debtor moral hazard story (“DMH”). If the DMH story holds, we 
should find that member nations – and particularly the weaker ones 
– reacted to their admission to the union by using contract terms 
that made restructurings more difficult and bailouts more likely.
There is a twist in the story here, that makes it different from the New 
York story from the previous decade: the euro area had an explicit 
“no bailout clause” under the Lisbon Treaty.13 This clause had been 
put in place as a constraint, because the architects of the monetary 
union had been worried about precisely the problem of individual 
nations failing to act in a fiscally responsible fashion and then seek-
ing bailouts.14 For the DMH story to hold, therefore, the assumption 
also has to be that the relevant euro area debtors and their creditors 
did not take the “no bailout” seriously, knowing that when push 
came to shove politicians would not stick to it. A counter-narrative 
is that nations in fact took the “no bailout” condition prohibition on 
bailouts seriously. If they had taken it seriously, one would not expect 
new members of the EMU to have reacted to their entry by using 
tougher-to-restructure contract terms in their bonds.    
Using a dataset of sovereign bonds issued in the decades both before 
and after the formation of EMU, we test the assumption that the 
weaker entrants to the EMU disbelieved the Lisbon Treaty and en-
tered into tougher-to-negotiate contracts so as to increase the likeli-
hood of bailouts. Our test does reveal clear differences in the types of 
contract terms used by EMU members and their creditors before and 
after their entry to the EMU. However, the differences do not move 
in the direction that the DMH story predicts; they move in the op-
posite direction.  Entrance into the EMU corresponds to an increased 
use of easy-to-restructure provisions, not a reduced use. Rejecting 
13 The relevant provision is Article 125 of the Treaty governing the formation of 
the European Union or T/FEU.  The original provision comes from the Maastricht 
Treaty and was subsequently incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty. 
14 In addition to the prohibition on bailouts, the Stability and Growth Pact, by set-
ting limits on budget deficits and debt/GDP rations, was also supposed to help deter 
overborrowing by EMU member states. See Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis, 26 J. Econ. Persp. 49 (2012).  In hindsight, we know that that didn’t 
work either.    
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the version of the DMH theory we test does not necessarily show 
that EMU members and their creditors took the “no bailout” clause 
seriously. It may simply mean that the DMH was operating through 
some other channel.  The rejection does, however, raise the question 
of why the mandatory CACs were thought necessary.  
II. Predictions
Assuming that EMU members, and particularly the weaker among 
them, did not believe the dictates of the Lisbon treaty and realized 
that tougher-to-restructure provisions would help induce bailouts, 
we should see the following two patterns in the data: 
Prediction One: Entry to the EMU will result in a move to tougher-
to-restructure contract provisions in their bonds.
Prediction Two: Prediction One is more likely to hold for the 
economically weaker EMU entrants (the ones likely to be receiv-
ing bailouts) than the stronger ones (the ones likely to be providing 
bailouts).
III. The Contract Terms
Sovereign bond contracts tend to be heavily documented and con-
tain a wide array of terms. A full contract can run, on occasion, to 
between fifty and a hundred pages.  Our interest is in a subset of 
contract terms.  Specifically, the terms whose presence makes it more 
or less likely that the sovereign debtor in question will immediately 
face a crisis unless a bailout is provided.  A simple example is the 
contract term specifying the grace period.  Sovereign debtors, when 
issuing their bonds, can negotiate for shorter or longer grace periods 
from their creditors.  What the grace period does is give the debtor 
a certain amount of time (that can range between 0 and 90 days) to 
cure any inability it might have had to make payments on the pre-
specified dates of payment.  The longer the grace period, the more 
time that the sovereign has to try a obtain new funding or negotiate 
new terms with the existing creditors without an “event of default” 
being declared, all of its debt being accelerated, credit default swaps 
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being triggered, and litigation against it beginning. We are interested 
in whether nations are contracting for terms that make bailouts more 
or less likely. To that end, sovereigns with longer grace periods have 
more time to work out their debt problems on their own and are 
less likely to need bailouts to stave off a full blown crisis that might 
impact their partner nations in the union.  The DMH model would 
predict, other things being equal, a reduction in grace periods as a 
function of entry to the EMU.
Along the lines described above, we report results on seven key con-
tract terms that impact whether a sovereign in crisis is likely to have 
the space to work its way out of that crisis or not (less space = bailout 
more likely). As a general matter, the contract terms in a sovereign 
bond divide into three groups that map roughly onto the three stages 
of a sovereign debt crisis.
Stage One is when the crisis hits. At this stage, creditors have not 
pulled the plug yet and the sovereign might be able to find interim 
financing from private sources to stave off the need for the default. 
Whether the sovereign is able to find interim financing, though, de-
pends on what kinds of contract terms it has agreed to. We call the 
terms that either give or take away the sovereign’s flexibility in the 
pre-default stage the Flexibility Terms. 
Stage Two is where the sovereign has failed to find bridge financing 
and has to request that its creditors renegotiate the terms of its debt. 
Certain contract terms, particularly as a function of their ability to 
solve the collective action problem across a large number of dispersed 
creditors, help determine whether a debt restructuring can occur eas-
ily. We call these the Restructuring Terms.
Stage Three is where the sovereign has been unable to persuade all of 
its creditors to restructure and faces litigation from unhappy credi-
tors. Such litigation can hold up the restructuring process and make 
it difficult for the sovereign to access the capital markets for fresh 
financing.  A third subset of contract terms determines how difficult 
litigating against a sovereign is. These are the Litigation Terms.
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The combination of these three types of terms will determine how 
easy it will be for a sovereign debtor to maneuver its way out of a 
crisis without needing a bailout.
In this version of the article, we report only (a) on a subset of con-
tract terms (the flexibility provisions) and (b) on simple before-and-
after entry to the EMU comparisons.  In the fuller version of the 
article, we report on restructuring and litigation terms as well.15 The 
basic story does not, however, change.   Before getting to the results, 
we describe the flexibility terms.
Flexibility Terms
i. Grace Period. The grace period is the time that a debtor has to cure 
what are called “technical defaults.”  If the technical default – which 
range from a failure to pay coupon amounts on time (serious) to a 
failure to fulfill a promise to list the bonds on a particular exchange 
(not as serious) – occurs, the debtor has the grace period to remedy 
the breach.  Sovereigns with longer grace periods are better able to 
weather problems because they have a longer period of time before 
the creditors initiate litigation or accelerate the other obligations un-
der the bond. Sovereigns with longer grace periods are less likely to 
need bailouts; and particularly so in the event of short-term liquidity 
crises.  We code two grace period variables; one for principal and the 
other for interest.16  
ii. Negative Pledge. Debtors in trouble find it difficult to get credi-
tors to lend to them. One way for a troubled debtor to buy time is to 
grant security interests in its key assets to creditors. In other words, 
the ability to grant security interests helps debtors to weather sudden 
storms (just like a longer grace period does). A negative pledge clause 
is a promise by the sovereign not to borrow on a secured basis unless 
15 Some of the basic results on these other contract terms (albeit from a signifi-
cantly smaller dataset) are also reported in Stephen J. Choi et al., The Evolution of 
Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, J. Legal Anal. (forthcoming 2012), available 
at http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/05/31/jla.las004.full.pdf+html. 
16 Most contracts have a third grace period variable as well; the grace period for 
violation of other contract provisions than the interest and principal payment obli-
gations.  The grace periods for this third variable tend to be highly correlated with 
those for the two we report (in terms of whether they are high or low). 
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the security interest being granted to the new creditor has the same 
rank as the debt with the negative pledge.  Effectively, though, if ev-
eryone has a negative pledge clause, it ceases to have value.  After all, 
no one wants a security interest if everyone else is going to be given 
the same one – that would be the same as having no security interest. 
In sum, the negative pledge clause constrains debtors from bailing 
themselves out during times of distress. We code the negative pledge 
clause in terms of its presence or absence. 
   
iii. Pari Passu. The pari passu clause is similar to the negative pledge 
clause. The traditional meaning of the clause was that it protected 
creditors against debtors showing preferential treatment to creditors 
by granting them informal preferences (quasi security interests in a 
sovereign’s tax revenues, for example). The more modern interpreta-
tion of the clause that certain courts have given it is to bar prefer-
ential payments to one creditor over another in the event that the 
sovereign is in default.17 This second meaning of the clause would 
impose a significant constraint on a debtor in crisis who wishes to 
preferentially pay certain important creditors crucial to its function-
ing and delay payments to others who might be less crucial. We code 
the pari passu clause for whether the version used is one vulnerable to 
the second interpretation or not. 
iv. Cross Default. The cross-default clause also constrains troubled 
debtors in terms of the options they have when faced with a cri-
sis.  As noted above, a debtor in financial difficulties seeking to keep 
afloat typically wants to be able to choose which creditors to default 
on and which ones to keep paying. The cross-default clause con-
strains this ability in that it links the various debts instruments of 
the debtor together by saying that a default on one instrument will 
constitute a default on the others.   We code the contracts for the 
presence or absence of a cross-default clause.
17 As of this writing, there is uncertainty regarding the meaning of the pari passu 
clause.  The second meaning of the clause that we describe in the text, however, has 
been adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York.  For discus-
sion of this case, NML v. Republic of Argentina, see Theresa Monteleone, A Vulture’s 
Gamble: High Stakes Interpretation of Sovereign Debt Contracts in NML Capital, Ltd. 
v. Republic of Argentina, Cap. Mkts. L. J. (forthcoming 2013).  
128 The Evolution of Euro Area Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Preliminary Inquiry
At bottom, a sovereign debtor who agrees to a small grace period 
and concedes to having negative pledge, pari passu and cross default-
clauses in its contracts, gives itself less leeway in the event of a fi-
nancial crisis.  Assuming that these contract provisions cannot be 
easily bargained around in the typical sovereign bond context with 
thousands of dispersed bondholders, a sovereign with the foregoing 
contract provisions is more likely to need a bailout from external 
sources.  Under the predictions of the DMH model, the weaker 
entrants to the Eurozone, other things equal, should have adopted 
shorter grace periods and more negative pledge, pari passu and cross-
default clauses.  
v. Acceleration. An acceleration provision works in a similar fashion 
to the cross-default provision; it speeds up a debt crisis and con-
strains the debtor’s ability to work its way out of problems.  The 
provision gives the creditor, under certain conditions (for example, 
where the debtor has not paid its required coupon payments), the 
right to declare that all of the future payments it is due be acceler-
ated to the current date. That means that the debtor’s bill that is due 
at the current date suddenly becomes much larger.  As a result, the 
debtor’s ability to get out of the crisis diminishes. Sovereign bonds 
vary in terms of their acceleration provisions.  At one extreme, some 
lack them altogether, which puts the debtor in a strong position. At 
the other extreme, individual creditors have the right to accelerate. 
In between these two extremes, acceleration typically requires a vote 
of something between 10 and 25 percent of the bonds.  Creditors 
have the most power and debtors the least where each creditor has 
the individual right to accelerate the debt.  We code the acceleration 
provision in terms of whether it gives creditors the individual right 
to accelerate or not.
vi. Reverse Acceleration. The power that an acceleration provision 
puts in the hands of a minority of holdout creditors can be limited 
somewhat by a feature that allows the effects of the acceleration to 
be reversed.  Typically, if a reverse acceleration provision is present, it 
specifies that the initial acceleration can be reversed if a majority of 
creditors agrees.  We code reverse acceleration in terms of its presence 
or absence. 
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vii. Tax Gross Up. Sovereigns, by definition, have the power to tax. 
That, in theory, includes the power to tax bond payments that the 
sovereign makes to bondholders.  For a sovereign in a debt crisis, tax-
ing payments owed to bondholders would be an easy way to reduce 
its obligations. A tax gross-up clause, however, promises that the sov-
ereign debtor will make the creditors holding a tax gross-up clause 
whole by reimbursing them the amount of the tax. We code the tax 
gross-up in terms of absence or presence. 
IV. Data
Our dataset covers contract terms in sovereign bonds over the period 
January 1, 1990 - January 1, 2011.  We chose that period of time 
because it captures the era of the modern sovereign bond market. 
There was a robust sovereign bond market at various points during 
the 1800s and then particularly in the early 1900s.  However, things 
went awry during the depression in the 1930s and 1940s, with near-
ly half of the issuers in the market defaulting. The bond market did 
not get resuscitated until the end of the Latin American debt crisis 
of the 1980s. For the period 1990 - 2011, we have over 1,300 bonds 
issued by over 75 sovereign issuers.  Of these, there are roughly 600 
bonds for the euro area sovereigns specifically.
Our dataset contains information on all of the bonds that were avail-
able from the three primary commercial sources of prospectuses and 
offering circulars for sovereign issuances:  Thomson One Banker, 
Perfect Information and Dealogic. There is considerable overlap 
among these data sources. Our coding focused on the documents 
available from Thomson One Banker. We then supplemented gaps 
in this data with what was available from Perfect Information and 
Dealogic.18 A key aspect of this data we have put together is that it 
represents information about bond contracts that international in-
vestors are willing to pay for.  All three of the companies producing 
the data earn fees as a function of the contracts that their customers 
18 We used Dealogic only to supplement our collection of EMU bonds, the primary 
focus of our analysis.  There is a fourth commercial source, Bloomberg, that also has 
bond documents available.  However, we were unable to find any on Bloomberg that 
we had not already obtained from the other data sources. 
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download. Our understanding is that the presence of contracts on 
these databases is demand driven; contracts show up in the database 
if customers ask for them.  That means that our dataset is weak-
est for those nations for whom investors are so confident that they 
are not interested in the details of the contracts – countries like the 
United States and Germany.  The dataset also undersamples locally 
issued bonds.  Presumably, the local population either has easy access 
to the information or the contract terms are largely irrelevant when 
one is contracting with one’s own sovereign.  Hence, what we have 
is a dataset largely comprised of the bonds that foreign investors are 
interested in purchasing or have purchased. 
In constructing the database, we downloaded every prospectus, pro-
spectus supplement or offering circular that was available on the 
databases mentioned. From those documents, we hand-coded the 
contract terms.  The documents are not the contracts themselves but 
the sales documents that provide investors with descriptions of the 
key terms of the contracts.  
In what follows, we report a set of before-and-after comparisons of 
the incidence of key contract terms that relate to the ability of a 
sovereign to extricate itself from financial crisis. To map onto our 
two predictions, we report our comparisons in three separate tables. 
First, we examine all of the original entrants to the EMU, plus 
Greece (that joined shortly thereafter).  Second, to focus in on the 
effects on the weaker EMU members, we eliminate the AAA rated 
nations from the analysis.  Third, to guard against the possibility that 
our results are being driven by a couple of larger issuers, we eliminate 
the two largest issuers.  Finally, so as to be able to control for global 
trends in contract drafting practices in all three tables, we report in 
each case a comparison table for the rest of the world (excluding the 
AAA issuers). We are unable to report data for the very strongest is-
suers though – nations like France, the Netherlands and Germany 
– because their contracts do not appear in our databases.  That said, 
our information from market actors is that there were no changes in 
the contracts for these types of issuers over the period we examine.19 
19  There is a second set of EMU members whom we also exclude and this is the 
set of more recent entrants (nations like Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Cyprus). 
These nations entered the EMU too recently for us to have a meaningful set of data 
to analyze for them. 
131Mitu Gulati
We use 1999 as the breakpoint in our analysis even though the EMU 
was officially formed in 2000 because, as of 1999, it was fairly certain 
that the EMU would be formed and practices and expectations were 
likely already changing.  
V. Results and Analysis
a. Flexibility Terms
We examine seven different contract terms that can impact the 
amount of flexibility the sovereign has to maneuver its way out of 
a crisis (one of the contract terms, the grace period, has two aspects 
– so we have eight variables that we measure).  Sovereigns who, by 
contract, have restricted their own ability to do things like grant pre-
ferred status to new lenders or to tax bond payments that they owe, 
have necessarily restricted the amount of flexibility they have to deal 
with a financial crisis. The prediction, under the DMH story, would 
be for the weaker and systemically important nations to respond to 
their entry to the EMU by utilizing tighter (less flexible) terms. By 
contrast, we should expect to see less of this effect for the richer na-
tions.
Tables 1A, B, and C report the results for the eight flexibility terms 
for different groupings of countries in accordance with our hypoth-
eses.  Table 1A begins with the eight original EMU entrants plus 
Greece.
Column two in each table reports the direction of the shift one would 
expect under the DMH model for each variable.  As an example, take 
the grace period that sovereigns have for making delayed payments 
of principal (Table 1A).  Under the DMH model, one would expect 
nations and their creditors to seek reduced grace periods.  Hence, the 
prediction in column two is “Decrease.”  Then, moving to columns 
three and four, we can see whether entry to the EMU correlated with 
downward shifts in the grace period.  What we see is an upwards shift 
in the grace period instead of the predicted decrease.  Columns five 
and six report the shift that occurred over the same period for the rest 
of the sovereign debt market for which we have data (excluding the 
132 The Evolution of Euro Area Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Preliminary Inquiry
EMU members). For the grace period variable, we see that there was 
a significant increase in grace periods there as well. That is, for the 
grace period for principal payments, the shift for the EMU members 
looks very similar to the shift in the global market.
Table 1A. Flexibility Provisions: Original Members Plus Greece
Going down the rows of Table 1A, we see the same pattern for the 
next three variables. Those are, grace period for interest payments, 
the acceleration rights of creditors (whether individual or collective), 
and the reverse acceleration rights of creditors (whether collective). 
For all three variables, column two has the DMH model’s predic-
tions and columns three and four have the actual shift that took 
place. We see significant shifts in the opposite direction predicted by 
the DMH model.  From columns five and six we also see that these 
shifts mirror the general shifts in the market. In sum, for the first 
four provisions, the DMH model fares abysmally. Not only do its 
predictions not hold up, but the shifts are in the opposite direction. 
While we find little evidence of any DMH effect as a result of entry 
to the EMU though, we cannot reject the presence of a DMH effect 
altogether because there appears to have been, at the same time, a 
general market shift. In other words, what we may be seeing is that 
the strength of that general market shift overwhelms the DMH ef-
fect. We know from other research that the global market was hit 
by significant shocks over the same period of time (the Asian crisis 
of 1997-98 and the Argentine crisis of 2000-01) that did produce 
general shifts towards more flexible contract terms for sovereign debt 
instruments.20 From the results on the first four variables then, all we 
can say is that the DMH effect, if it was there, was not strong enough 
to counter the general trends in the market. 
20 See e.g., Choi et al., supra note 15.  
Table 1A. Flexibility Provisions: Original Members Plus Greece
DMH Predictions
1988-1998 1999-2011 1988-1998 1999-2011
(n=307) (n=329) (n=185) (n=565)
Grace Period for Principal Decrease 15 19*** 17 21**     ǂǂǂ
Grace Period for Interest Decrease 18 22*** 19 22**
Acceleration (individual right or not)I crease 94% 69%*** 51% 33%*** ǂǂǂ
Reverse Acceleration Clause Decrease 0% 16%*** 19% 46%*** ǂǂǂ
Negative Pledge Clause Increase 84% 66%*** 95% 95%       ǂǂǂ
Strong Pari Passu  Clause Increase 2% 11%*** 46% 61%*** ǂǂǂ
Cross Default Clause Increase 60% 45%*** 78% 88%**   ǂǂǂ
Tax Gross-Up Clause Increase 65% 64% 100% 99%       ǂǂǂ 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05, two-tailed tests for bonds issued during 1988–1998 and 1999-2011
Eight Original Plus Greece
General Market Practice
(Excluding the super-safe issuers)
 ǂǂǂp<0.001  ǂǂp<0.01  ǂp<0.05, two-tailed tests for 9 Eurozone Member Countries and the “general market"
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The next four variables are the negative pledge, pari passu, cross de-
fault, and tax gross-up clauses. These are arguably the four most im-
portant flexibility provisions in the contract.21 At first cut, we see a 
similar picture to what we saw with the first four provisions. First, 
we see from columns three, four and five, that for three of the four 
variables, we have shifts in directions different from the DMH pre-
dictions. For two of the variables (negative pledge and cross-default) 
the shifts are significant and in the opposite direction from predict-
ed. And for the third (tax gross-up) there is no change, whereas the 
DMH prediction is for a downward shift. For only one variable of 
all eight of the variables examined so far (whether there is a strong 
pari passu clause), is the shift in the predicted direction of flexibility 
reduction. It is even clearer now that there is little support for the 
DMH story, at least in terms of the flexibility terms.
When we look at the last two columns in Table 1A for these last four 
variables though, we get a more interesting story than we had for the 
first four (and less important) variables. Here, for three of the four 
variables (negative pledge, cross-default and tax gross-up) there is 
no change in the general market patterns.22 However, when we look 
back at the EMU entrants, we see significant changes, towards flexi-
bility, for two of the four variables, negative pledge and cross-default. 
The relevance of this is that the shift cannot be explained by a general 
market trend towards more flexible contract terms. The general mar-
ket, over this period, had no trend. The shift towards greater flexibil-
ity for these two important terms was only for EMU entrants. Now, 
therefore, we have a stronger rejection of the DMH model because 
we see that, absent any general market trend, the EMU entrants are 
still moving towards greater flexibility. 
Table 1A reported numbers for the nine original members of the 
EMU. The predictions of the DMH story though, should work dif-
ferently for countries of different size and strength. We consider first, 
therefore, the case of the strongest credits – the AAA credits. These 
nations are the ones who, if there is a crisis, are likely to be in the po-
21 For a discussion of the key provisions in a sovereign debt instrument, including 
a sense of their relative importance, see Lee C. Buchheit, How To Negotiate 
Eurocurrency Loan Agreements (2d ed. 2002). 
22  For the fourth variable, pari passu, we see that the EMU trend is in the same 
direction as the market trend. 
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sition of having to provide a bailout rather than receiving it. In other 
words, their contract terms are unlikely to be affected by EMU entry. 
So, in Table 1B, we report results after having excluded the AAA 
nations among the first nine. Luxembourg, Austria and Finland are 
the three that get excluded, leaving us with the nations that were at 
the center of the Eurozone crisis in 2011-12 – Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal and Belgium.
Table 1B. Flexibility Provisions: Excluding the AAA Countries
The patterns observed in Table 1A in terms of rejecting the DMH 
model get stronger once we take out the AAA rated nations. For 
seven of the eight variables in Table 1B, the direction of the shift 
is in the opposite direction, as predicted.  If we then eliminate the 
variables for which the direction of the shift is the same as that for 
the general market, we are left with three contract provisions – the 
negative pledge, the tax gross-up and the cross-default clauses.  With 
all three, the size of the shift is now bigger than in Table 1A (and 
toward flexibility; instead of toward constraint as DMH would pre-
dict). Further, whereas the tax gross-up clause did not show a signifi-
cant shift towards greater flexibility in Table 1A, the removal of the 
AAA countries in Table 1B now shows a significant shift. In effect, 
the rejection of the DMH story is stronger when we move towards 
the nations that are supposed to be at the heart of that DMH story. 
Table 1B. Flexibility Provisions: Excluding the AAA Countries
DMH Predictions
1988-1998 1999-2011 1988-1998 1999-2011
(n=209) (n=248) (n=185) (n=565)
Grace Period for Principal Decrease 13 19*** 17 21**      ǂǂǂ
Grace Period for Interest Decrease 17 22*** 19 22**
Acceleration (individual right or not)I crease 96% 68%*** 51% 33%*** ǂǂǂ
Reverse Acceleration Clause Decrease 0% 16%*** 19% 46%*** ǂǂǂ
Negative Pledge Clause Increase 94% 67%*** 95% 95%       ǂǂǂ
Strong Pari Passu  Clause Increase 2% 15%*** 46% 61%*** ǂǂǂ
Cross Default Clause Increase 93% 61%*** 78% 88%**   ǂǂǂ
Tax Gross-Up Clause Increase 98% 85%*** 100% 99%       ǂǂǂ 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05, two-tailed tests for bonds issued during 1988–1998 and 1999-2011
 ǂǂǂp<0.001  ǂǂp<0.01  ǂp<0.05, two-tailed tests for Euro Periphery and the “general market"
Minus the AAA
General Market Practice
(Excluding the super-safe issuers)
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Table 1C. Flexibility Creating Provisions: Excluding Spain and Italy
Finally, in Table 1C, we remove the two nations that formed the big-
gest part of our initial set, Italy and Spain. We remove them because 
of their sheer size; the data on them has the potential to dwarf the 
rest of the data. The conclusions from Table 1A and 1B remain; if 
anything, they get stronger. The strongest members, the AAA coun-
tries, were already using highly flexible terms. So, nothing changed 
for them. But the weaker members that had earlier been borrowing 
from external investors under contracts resembling the wider market 
(and particularly, the emerging markets), now began to borrow un-
der more flexible contracts. In other words, EMU entry correlated 
with a convergence in the types of borrowing terms towards the prac-
tices of the strongest credits.
VI. Implications
One understanding of the Euro CAC initiative is that it was aimed 
at solving the debtor moral hazard problem. That is, its goal was to 
push the system toward making sovereign restructurings easier and, 
therefore, reducing the need for Official Sector bailouts.23 Indeed, 
the foregoing (and reasonable) understanding has led at least some 
to conclude that the announcement of the PSI/CAC initiative in late 
23 E.g., Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 2 (reporting on interviews with policy makers 
who blamed the Deauville announcement and the subsequent CAC initiative for 
the widening of spread in the euro area); Jean Tirole, The Euro Crisis: Some Reflex-
ions on Institutional Reform, 16 Financial Stability Review (Banque de France) 
225, 234 (“[CACs] definitely improve the countries’ ability to restructure”); Elena 
Carletti, Euro Defaults Need to be Carried Out Quickly, Bloomberg.net, December 
10, 2010 (“[CACs] make debt restructuring faster by forcing minority bondholders 
to accept the terms agreed to by a majority of creditors”), available at http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-17/euro-defaults-need-to-be-carried-out-quickly-
commentary-by-elena-carletti.html 
Table 1C. Flexibility Creating Provisions: Excluding Spain and Italy
DMH Predictions
1988-1998 1999-2011 1988-1998 1999-2011
(n=143) (n=126) (n=185) (n=565)
Grace Period for Principal Decrease 14 17 17 21**      ǂǂǂ
Grace Period for Interest Decrease 18 21 19 22**      ǂ
Acceleration (individual right or not)I crease 95% 72%*** 51% 33%*** ǂǂǂ
Reverse Acceleration Clause Decrease 0% 15%*** 19% 46%*** ǂǂǂ
Negative Pledge Clause Increase 96% 41%*** 95% 95%       ǂǂǂ
Strong Pari Passu  Clause Increase 0% 0% 46% 61%*** ǂǂǂ
Cross Default Clause Increase 91% 38%*** 78% 88%**   ǂǂǂ
Tax Gross-Up Clause Increase 97% 79%*** 100% 99%       ǂǂǂ 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05, two-tailed tests for bonds issued during 1988–1998 and 1999-2011
 ǂǂǂp<0.001  ǂǂp<0.01  ǂp<0.05, two-tailed tests for Poorer Europe and the “general market"
Minus Spain and Italy
General Market Practice
(Excluding the super-safe issuers)
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2010 was responsible for the widening in spreads for many euro area 
sovereigns.24 The data, however, reveal scant support for the DMH 
story, at least not the version of it that might justify the Euro CAC 
initiative. Reality is that many of the most vulnerable euro area sov-
ereigns had shifted a long time ago to bond contracts that were re-
markably easy to restructure. The ease with which the Greek 2012 re-
structuring occurred illustrates this. By mandating CACs in all euro 
area sovereign bonds, these sovereigns are going to find it harder to 
conduct PSI operations in the future, not easier.  And, to extend that 
logic, CACs may have made bailouts more, not less, likely.  At this 
point though, it is worth reminding readers that the data used here is 
likely but a subset of the overall debt stock of the nations in question. 
It is the data that was available from the public databases (in other 
words, the contracts that someone was willing to pay for). We see no 
obvious reason why our results should not generalize.  However, we 
are working with only a subset of the overall data. 
Assuming that our findings are generalizable though, one implica-
tion is that the effort that has been exerted over the past few years in 
designing and executing the Euro CAC initiative has been a waste of 
effort in terms of solving a problem that did not exist. Further, this 
initiative, by making restructurings more difficult and bailouts more 
likely, might help create the very problem that it was supposed to 
solve. Even worse, if one believes that it was the announcement of 
24 For example, Barry Eichengreen has explained: 
The extension of EFSF and ECB [to Greece in mid 2010] support occurred against the 
backdrop of objections . . . about how far and under what conditions stronger European 
countries would be prepared to aid their weaker brethren.  
The answer to this last question came into focus at the end of October, when German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s governing coalition . . . endorsed the idea that bondholders 
should be forced to take losses in any future rescue of a European sovereign.  The position 
may have been expedient politically and admirable economically  . . .  [b]ut coming at this 
point in the crisis it was destabilizing.  Bondholders fearing that they would be first to be 
sacrificed in the event of additional difficulties rushed to dump the bonds of other potential 
crisis countries.
Ireland, already in the throes of a property market collapse and incipient banking crisis, was 
affected most immediately, with Irish spreads rising to a 600 point premium over German 
bunds.  No longer able to tap the markets, Dublin was forced into talks with the EU, the 
ECB and the IMF (the so-called Troika).
Barry Eichengreen, Euro Area (Mis)Management, Working Paper (2013).
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the PSI/CAC in late 2010 that caused the dramatic spike in euro area 
yields for the economically weaker nations and subsequently necessi-
tated the bailout for Ireland, then the irony of what our results show 
is particularly cruel.  It means that the worsening of the crisis that 
occurred in late 2010 resulted from politicians misunderstanding the 
import of the policy reforms they were advocating and markets be-
lieving that misunderstanding.
There is a more optimistic narrative that one might tell though. 
euro area policy makers were under public pressure in 2010, after 
the first Greek bailout, to do something to protect against future 
bailouts of the type. So, they reached for what, at the time, seemed 
a simple solution. That was to borrow the technique from the U.S. 
context (CACs) that had worked to tackle what must have seemed 
to be precisely the same problem a decade earlier.  Perhaps what Eu-
ropean policy makers did not realize in late 2010, when the CAC 
initiative was announced, was how easy the local law aspect of most 
euro area debt made it to restructure. Or perhaps they did realize it, 
but they did not want the markets to realize that they were contem-
plating using the local law advantage that they had.  After all, most 
investors had purchased euro area government debt assuming it was 
inviolable. Realizing that certain euro area nations were contemplat-
ing passing domestic legislation to eliminate large portions of the 
debt could well have caused a much worse panic than the one that 
did occur in late 2010.  Take the following statement by former ECB 
board member, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi:
The only way to protect taxpayers in ‘virtuous’ countries is to 
avoid over-indebted countries from easily getting away with not 
paying their debts; the payment of debts should be enforced, 
through sanctions if need be.25 
By late 2011 though, with the Greek debt situation having spiraled 
out of control, policy makers had no option but to recognize that us-
ing the local law aspect of the Greek bonds might become necessary 
(and it did in March 2012).  Under this alternative narrative then, 
25 Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Private Sector Involvement, From Good (Theory) to Bad 
(Practice), 6 June, 2011 Speech, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110606.en.html 
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the problem faced by euro area policy makers was not one of forcing 
individual members of the euro area to restructure their debts, but 
rather one of constraining them from rushing towards a restructur-
ing via legislative fiat. Under this alternative story, mandatory CACs 
for the euro area make sense because the real fear of policy makers is 
that issuers, tempted by the example of Greece, will reach too easily 
for the solution of restructuring. The mandatory CACs force na-
tions needing to do a restructuring to do it in consultation with their 
creditors.26  
VII. Conclusion
   
Our rejection of one channel through which the DMH problem 
may have worked does not mean that it might not have operated 
through alternate channels. One possible channel that nations seek-
ing to induce bailouts might use is the strengthening of the tie be-
tween the stability of its local banking sector and its sovereign debt. 
The story here would be that nations who present the risk of not 
only going into a sovereign debt crisis, but also producing a domestic 
banking crisis, have a much higher likelihood of causing contagion 
than a country that just has a “plain vanilla” sovereign debt crisis. 
Therefore, these types of nations have effectively ensured a higher 
likelihood of receiving a bailout for themselves. Even if we were to 
find that this was the DMH dynamic at play though, that still would 
not explain the mandatory CACs. That is, not unless one turned to 
some ex post justification as we did in the prior section. 
At the end of the day, there is a practical reason for why there is a 
need to know what the relevant rationale for the Euro CAC initiative 
is.  The Euro CAC initiative is already in place and countries have 
been issuing bonds with the new CACs for some months now.  There 
are, however, open questions regarding implementation and inter-
pretation of these new provisions – the answers to which will require 
an understanding of the underlying rationale for the CAC initiative.
26 There are other stories that one can tell for the mandatory CACs, such as the 
positive network externalities that might occur from having uniformity in contract 
terms and the need to solve a first-mover problem and so on. The problem with 
these alternative explanations, though, is that there is no indication that they were 
anywhere at play when the idea of CACs for the euro area was thought up in late 
2010.  See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 2. 
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Political, Fiscal and Banking 
Union in the Eurozone
Edmond Alphandéry* 
Political union in the eurozone 
I have been asked to talk about the Franco-German relationship, 
how it has been evolving with the euro crisis, and whether any new 
alliances are taking place in the euro area.
When we discuss Franco-German axis, it is essential to put it in its 
historical perspective. This is what I will do first, before giving my 
own views on the present situation and about what we can expect 
from it in the future.
For my presentation, I will divide the role and the place of the 
Franco-German relationship into three stages: first, before the 
creation of the Euro; then, the first ten years of the European cur-
rency; and finally, the period since the beginning of the euro crisis to 
the present. I am not planning to provide an extensive analysis of this 
relationship, but will instead share my ideas with you about what is 
necessary to understand the current situation.
Just a couple of facts to start with: the Maastricht treaty dates from 
February 1992. At that time, the European Economic Commu-
nity was made up of only twelve states: the six founding members 
*Professor Emeritus, University of Paris II
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(France, Germany, the Benelux and Italy), Spain, Greece and Por-
tugal, Ireland and two countries that had negotiated an opting out 
-- the UK and Denmark. In terms of monetary arrangements, we 
were then living with the EMS (European Monetary System) which 
had two characteristics: it was asymmetric, the Deutsche Mark play-
ing the role of the system’s anchor and, due mainly to liberalization 
of capital flows, it had become more and more unstable, leading to 
the exit of the UK in 1992 and to the enlargement of the band of 
exchange rates fluctuation in August 1993.
At that time, the Franco-German relationship was the cornerstone of 
the European construction. Not only thanks to heritage of history: 
the construction of Europe has been a long journey where, following 
the footsteps of the founding fathers, General de Gaulle and Kon-
rad Adenauer, then Valery Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, 
and later on François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, played a lead-
ing role. But in the Europe at 12 which I have had the privilege to 
observe from the inside, nothing important could have been decided 
which would not have emerged from the Franco-German couple. 
The German reunification (October 1990) which came just before 
the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty had, in my opinion, a sig-
nificant impact on EMU. The European Currency was certainly jus-
tified on technical grounds: due to its instability and its asymmetry, 
the EMS was doomed to disappear in a more or less near future. 
There was also a need for a unique currency to complete the sim-
ple market. But the European currency should have taken root and 
gained its true significance (and EMU should probably have found 
a better balance between its monetary and economic branches), in 
the simultaneous deepening of European political integration. And 
I remember the time when two prominent German politicians, Karl 
Lammers and Wolfgang Schäuble, came to Paris in 1994 to present 
a roadmap for European political integration...without any success! 
At that time, the French were not ready for such a bold step. With 
hindsight, knowing now what we do about the current Eurocrisis, we 
cannot but regret it.
But in the minds of certain people in France, the equilibrium which 
dated back to the post war period, based on a distribution of roles 
141Edmond Alphandéry
where France was supposed to lead politically and Germany had the 
stronger economy, was being destabilized by German reunification. 
And in this period of so called “cohabition” in France, when power 
was shared, at least on foreign affairs issues, between another couple 
(the socialists led by François Mitterrand and the Gaullists which 
were still the more powerful political force in the UDF-RPR coali-
tion government led by Edouard Balladur), France was not in the 
best political position to welcome this Lammers - Schäuble initiative.
The discussions between the French and the Germans on the future 
European currency focused on the status of the European Central 
Bank: if the Germans were to agree to abandon the Deutsche Mark, 
there would clearly have to be a bottom line:  the European Central 
Bank would have to be totally independent and have a unique man-
date which was to secure monetary stability. In France, where the 
independence of Banque de France was a prerequisite to an indepen-
dent European Central Bank, when it came down to its vote, there 
was huge resistance in Parliament. When, as Finance Minister, I pre-
sented the bill to the Parliament, I faced huge resistance from the left 
(Mitterrand himself attacked the law in front of the Conseil Con-
stitutionne for not conforming to the constitution), but from the 
Gaullists as well who, despite belonging to the Governing coalition, 
fiercely fought against the law. There was no majority at that time in 
France in support of an independent European Central Bank. 
We therefore ended up with a monetary construction (in which 
each member of the couple believed that it had made major conces-
sions to the other) which led to a European monetary union where 
the economic dimension remained wanting: the French called for 
a “Governement économique européen” which the Germans re-
fused to support because they viewed it as a Trojan horse against 
the European Central Bank independence; while the Germans called 
for deeper political integration, for which the French were reluctant 
because of their fear of destabilization of the balance of power in the 
Franco-German relationship.
I move now to the second period: during the first ten years of its exis-
tence (1999-2009), the eurozone seemed to function to the satisfac-
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tion of both partners: the Germans, since the ECB was really inde-
pendent and was staying the course of price stability, and the French 
as well since they could pursue their demand push policies painlessly.
No wonder, therefore, that the Franco-German couple appeared to 
function smoothly, well enough for the two members to jointly de-
cide to violate the Stability and Growth Pact they had solemnly put 
in place together in 1997. 
The problems we can observe now in the Franco-German relation-
ship are deeply rooted in the different ways the two countries man-
aged their economies during this decade.
The Germans, who entered this new monetary era with an overval-
ued currency and a lack of competitiveness (they posted a current ac-
count deficit at the time) undertook the necessary structural reform 
steps (in the first place on the cost of labor) needed to return to a 
competitive economy. And they succeeded remarkably well.
The French realized that, thanks to the euro, they would not have 
to worry about the consequences of any current account deficit 
which, in the pre-Euro period, would have led to dramatic currency 
crises. They therefore embarked upon policies aimed at increasing 
consumption as a means of fostering economic growth. They did 
not focus enough on fiscal discipline and they delayed significant 
structural reforms.
When the Euro crisis struck, position of the two countries had 
changed: while in the 90’s, the French economy was the more com-
petitive (it had a current account surplus as opposed to Germany), 
ten years after the inception of the Euro, Germany had become 
stronger: in economic terms, but also at the political level where the 
gap in favour of France had dwindled, certainly because of the en-
hanced credibility of the German economic policy, but also because 
the German government had become more and more assertive in the 
international arena.
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With the election of François Hollande, slippage between the two 
countries came to light: it appeared both in their different views 
about the types of economic policies needed to fight the crisis, as 
well as in the divergent paths of their economies. Concerning eco-
nomic policies, there is no monolithic bloc: neither in France, nor in 
Germany. So we should be careful not to simplify a situation which 
is complex and in flux. Nevertheless, everyone can see that there are 
major differences between the approaches of the current leaders of 
Germany and France. The Germans have a culture based on stabil-
ity and discipline and view the economy in a long term perspective, 
and they are therefore reluctant to engage in any active anticyclical 
economic policies. The French (at least the current government) are 
more Keynesian. They believe that fiscal and monetary authorities 
are capable of  influencing the course of economic activity, thus lead-
ing to Francois Hollande’s policy of trying to provide stimulus to 
foster economic growth: “refusal of austerity and fight for economic 
growth” has been the motto of the current French Government in 
the European Arena.
Furthermore, the Germans do not hide their commitment to a mar-
ket economy in which the decision-making process is economically 
and socially decentralized (the social market economy), while in 
France there is a tradition of faith in the State for solving economic 
and social issues. These discrepancies appear in the relative weight of 
public expenditures in the GDP of the two countries and in the role 
given to Unions in the firms governance.
In this context, it is no surprise that when the French Government 
was choosing a demand push approach to stimulate economic growth 
policy, the Germans adopted an export-led growth policy. And cur-
rent account imbalances between the two countries are still increas-
ing, with Germany currently posting annual surplus of about 170 
Billion euros, while France has a deficit of about 60 Billion euros.
Considering this situation, should we conclude that the Franco-Ger-
man axis is doomed and that the euro is therefore in danger? I do not 
think so. On the contrary, I do think that there are good reasons to 
remain optimistic. 
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The Germans are well aware that they need France -- they do not 
have an alternative. A weak France is neither in their interest nor in 
the interest of the eurozone. And since the euro is here to stay in the 
interest of all parties, and especially Germany, the Franco-German 
couple has to remain the backbone of the euro area. This is why, 
despite all these differences, the couple is still alive and remains solid.
Furthermore, the Germans understand that, despite their need for 
discipline, they have to make concessions; it is worth noting that 
Finance Minister Schäuble openly admitted that wages in Germany 
should increase at a faster pace, and has recently agreed to try to 
boost consumption by a reduction in pension contributions. The 
Germans, although reluctantly, accepted the implementation of a 
European Banking union which will certainly involve fiscal transfers 
among member States. They did not object to the principle OMT 
operations by the ECB and they feel more and more concerned about 
the social consequences of austerity policies in peripheral countries. 
The Germans therefore do not seem to be totally deaf to the argu-
ments put forward by the French authorities.
As for the French, they are perfectly aware that nothing can replace 
the Franco-German couple. They know that if they tried to form 
a bloc with the southern member States of the euro area, the euro 
would be in great danger. Splitting the eurozone into two parts that 
have two different approaches and hold diverging economic perspec-
tives would be suicidal not only for the euro, but for the Mediter-
ranean member States as well.
Furthermore, little by little, French authorities are starting to un-
derstand that they have to embark upon deep structural reforms, 
however painful they may be, not for the sake of the eurozone, but 
for their own sake.
For the future of the eurozone, the main issue is not so much the 
strength of the Franco-German axis, which I do not believe to be in 
danger, but the impetus that the alliance should give to the European 
construction. In this respect, and this will be my final remark, I think 
that under its leadership we still have to formulate the foundations of 
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a European political platform which, through increasing European 
integration, is the step we need to take in order to put a final end to 
the euro crisis.
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The Eurozone Crisis, Institutional 
Change, and “Political Union” 
Peter L. Lindseth 
The conference organizers have given me three tasks. First, they asked 
me to reflect on various possible meanings of “political union” in 
the EU. Second, and more specifically, they wanted me to consider 
whether there might be a tension between “de jure” and “de facto” 
dimensions of the concept. Finally, they asked me to highlight any 
“barriers to real political union within the Eurozone and what the 
sources of those barriers might be.” I’ll do my best to answer these 
three queries in sequence, although they obviously overlap. 
Of the three tasks, I suppose I am least comfortable with the first, 
on the various possible meanings of “political union.” We all know 
the concept is slippery, with a meaning that differs depending on the 
person you ask.  
We know, for example, that Angela Merkel has expressed support 
for eventual “political union.”1 Upon closer scrutiny, however, her 
conception is notoriously limited, at least for the present.  She usu-
ally speaks more vaguely of the need for “more Europe”2 and of 
1 “Germany’s Chancellor Merkel Urges EU Political Union,” BBC, June 7, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18350977. 
2 “Merkel Demands ‘More Europe!’,” Deutsche Welle, June 7, 2012, 
http://www.dw.de/merkel-demands-more-europe/a-16007150. 
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member states “ceding sovereignty” (as she did in the week leading 
up to this conference).3 Encompassed within these slogans are cer-
tainly notions of a “fiscal union.”4 But her real aim appears to be 
increased supranational discipline over national budgets—the “six 
pack,” the “two-pack,” etc.5 —but not any significant fiscal transfer 
mechanisms, debt-mutualization, or the supranationalization of tax-
ing, spending, or borrowing power under the authority of some kind 
of European federal “government.”6 If she contemplates any of these 
steps, they are for the distant future, after a process of political and 
structural reform in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone.  
Also included in Merkel’s idea of “more Europe” is some kind of 
“banking union,”7 again in recognition of one of the principal func-
tional challenges that the current crisis has revealed. By banking 
union, however, she apparently means primarily a single supervi-
sory mechanism for a segment of European banks (the very largest), 
as well as perhaps some kind of coordinated network of European 
bank-resolution authorities operating according to shared princi-
ples, although funded nationally.8 Merkel’s vision of banking union, 
however, does not at this point include any kind of jointly financed 
deposit-guarantee scheme or common resolution mechanism.9 These 
latter steps would again raise the unacceptable specter of an open-
ended transfer mechanism or financial commitments that Germany 
3 Noah Barkin, “Merkel Says Euro Members Must Be Prepared to Cede Sover-
eignty,” Reuters, April 22, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/22/us-
eurozone-merkel-idUSBRE93L0GO20130422. 
4 Derek Scally, “Merkel Urges Greater Fiscal and Political Union,” Irish Times, June 
8, 2012, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/merkel-urges-greater-fiscal-and-political-
union-1.1064682. 
5 See generally Marco Buti and Nicolas Carnot, “The EMU Debt Crisis: Early Les-
sons and Reforms,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50, no. 6 (2012): 899–911. 
6 “Merkel Insists on Fiscal Union Before Debt Sharing,” EurActiv.com, June 28, 
2012, http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/merkel-insists-fiscal-union-debt-
news-513613. 
7 “Merkel Warms up to EU Banking Union,” EurActiv.com, June 5, 2012, http://
www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/merkel-warms-eu-banking-union-news-513122. 
8 Alex Barker and Peter Ehrlich, “EU Split over Plans for Bank Resolution,” 
Financial Times, April 29, 2013,  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/463e53e8-b0e1-
11e2-80f9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2S29T3uIi. 
9 Patrick Donahue, “Merkel Rejects Part of Euro Banking Union, Defends Aus-
terity,” Bloomberg, April 25, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-25/
merkel-rejects-part-of-euro-banking-union-defends-austerity.html. 
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is currently unwilling to accept (and indeed, which might cause sig-
nificant legal problems at home in light of prior rulings of the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court).10
There is, of course, an alternative vision of “more Europe,” one that 
aims for a “political union” in the most robust sense of the term, in 
which true political power and legitimacy would be shifted beyond 
the confines of the member states to supranational institutions.  I am 
thinking here of positions advanced by a whole array of committed 
European federalists, for example, Jürgen Habermas,11 the German 
philosopher and sociologist, or more prosaically, Andrew Duff,12  the 
Lib-Dem MEP and President of the Union of European Federalists. 
Federalists like Habermas and Duff would include in their notion of 
political union a greatly augmented taxing, spending, and borrowing 
capacity at the EU level, something that Angela Merkel clearly now 
rejects.  Moreover, federalists call for a deep legal and political trans-
formation of the European Parliament and European Commission 
into an autonomous legislature and government of the Eurozone, in 
order to legitimize the expanded fiscal authority of the EU, which 
they see as a crucial necessity. 
From the federalist perspective, in other words, European institu-
tions must become the embodiment or expression of a new kind 
of democracy transcending national borders, whose legitimacy flows 
from a single political community (“Europe”) rather than from the 
various national political communities.  In the words of Habermas, 
“the steering capacities which are lacking at present, though they are 
functionally necessary for any monetary union, could and should be 
10 See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, “Understanding the German Constitutional 
Fault Lines in the Eurozone Crisis: Der Spiegel’s Interview with Udo Di Fabio,” 
EUtopialaw.com, January 12, 2012, http://eutopialaw.com/2012/01/12/under-
standing-the-german-constitutional-fault-lines-in-the-eurozone-crisis-der-spiegels-
interview-with-udo-di-fabio/.  See also the cases cited infra, note 32. 
11 See, most recently, Jürgen Habermas, “Democracy, Solidarity and the European 
Crisis” (KU Leuven, Belgium, April 26, 2013), http://www.kuleuven.be/commu-
nicatie/evenementen/evenementen/jurgen-habermas/en/democracy-solidarity-and-
the-european-crisis.
12 See, e.g., Andrew Duff, “Federal Union Now,” September 5, 2011, http://an-
drewduff.eu/en/article/2011/509160/federal-union-now-new-publication-by-an-
drew-duff. 
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centralized only within the framework of an equally supranational 
and democratic political community.”13 Only then can Europe rise 
to the challenges confronting it, according to the federalists. As 
Joschka Fischer, himself a federalist, has put it “It has become com-
mon knowledge in Europe that the ongoing crisis will either destroy 
the EU or bring about a political union” and that there is “[n]o alter-
native [to the latter] – and certainly not the status quo.”14
Perhaps. But as several speakers at this conference—people with 
much greater technical expertise than myself—suggested at numer-
ous points in our discussion, there are a number of policy options 
adequate to stabilizing the EMU in the near or intermediate term 
that fall well short of “political union” (indeed, well short of “fiscal 
union”).15 I lack the technical expertise to judge whether that is in 
fact the case. But what is important here is not technical details of 
policy but the fact that these options exist at all. Precisely because 
they exist, they will be tried, certainly before any steps are taken 
toward full-blown political union on the model advocated by Euro-
pean federalists. 
This is true not just because, as leader of Europe’s ultimate paymas-
ter, Angela Merkel has a bit more political power than your average 
philosopher or MEP.  Rather, to bring the discussion back to my 
own area of expertise—the history of modern governance—it is true 
because Merkel’s vision is much more consistent with the overall pro-
cess of institutional change in integration since its inception. This 
process has been characterized by the increasing delegation of regula-
tory power to the supranational level to meet certain pressing func-
tional demands, but the retention of democratic and constitutional 
legitimacy, for better or worse, within the member states. 
13 Habermas, “Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis,” supra note 11. 
14 Joschka Fischer, “The Erosion of Europe,” Project Syndicate, April 30, 2013, 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-european-union-s-crumbling-
foundations-by-joschka-fischer. 
15 I am recalling in particular the contributions of Daniel Gros and Hélène Rey, but 
those of several other economists on the program would likely fit the description as 
well. 
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I trace this process in my most recent book, Power and Legitimacy: 
Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (2010).  “To capture [its] 
full import,” I write:  
one must undertake an examination that is sensitive to change 
along three interrelated historical dimensions:  first, the “func-
tional,” in which existing institutional structures and legal cat-
egories are brought under pressure and even transformed as a 
consequence of objective social and economic demands (e.g., 
international competition, the extension of markets beyond na-
tional borders, transnational environmental challenges [or, one 
might add for our purposes, the exigencies of the Eurozone cri-
sis]); second, the “political,” in which divergent interests struggle 
over the allocation of scarce institutional and legal advantages 
in responding to these structural-functional pressures; and third 
and finally, the “cultural,” or the ways in which competing con-
ceptions of legitimate governance (often legally expressed) are 
mobilized to justify or resist these changes in institutional and 
legal categories or structures.16
It is important to add, however, that these dimensions of change are 
not hermetically sealed; their separation is in some sense simply an 
analytical heuristic. As I elaborate in Power and Legitimacy:
Of course, the various dimensions of institutional change 
overlap and the causal relationship among them is varied and 
multidirectional.  Functional change is often seen as the prime 
mover ….  But functional change should not be understood as 
the “independent variable” in a social-scientific sense—if that 
were the case, then we would observe much greater evolutionary 
change in legal and political institutions instead of their notori-
ous “stickiness.”  Such stickiness can be explained by the fact 
that structural shifts in the functional dimension (e.g., the ex-
tension of markets beyond national borders) are promoted and 
resisted in the political dimension (e.g., the creation of, or op-
position to, transnational forms of governance to regulate those 
16 Peter L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 13. 
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markets), and then are aided by justifications and interpretations 
mobilized in the cultural dimension (e.g., theories of constitu-
tionalism or democracy “beyond the state,” or invocations of 
“sovereignty” to define the true locus of legitimate governance 
as “national”).17
The approach defined in Power and Legitimacy provides insight not 
merely into the process of institutional change, but also, I would 
maintain, into the likely form of institutional settlement that can 
emerge out of a crisis. I take such settlement to be the central aim of 
this conference: to understand and predict various possible forms of 
institutional transformation that might lead to a banking, fiscal, and/
or political union as a consequence of the Eurozone crisis.  With that 
focus in mind, I would assert:
A durable institutional settlement can only emerge … if the pro-
cesses of change along these various dimensions are somehow 
“reconciled” in some roughly stable way—that is, if structural-
functional and political demands are satisfied but the outcome 
is still recognizable from the perspective of persistent, though 
evolving, cultural conceptions of legitimacy.18 
I would assert that Merkel’s conception of “more Europe” comes 
much closer to the sort of reconciliation between the functional, 
political, and cultural dimensions of institutional change that has 
animated the process of European integration for more than a half-
century. Despite the fervent hopes of federalists stretching back 
sixty years, European integration has remained a process of largely 
instrumentalized rather than idealized supranationalism. Regulatory 
powers have been transferred to achieve certain defined functional 
demands of interdependence, but the locus of political legitimacy 
for those powers has never been properly supranationalized (i.e., ren-
dered autonomous of the members states, as in a genuinely federal 
system). This tension between supranational regulatory power and 
national democratic and constitutional legitimacy has shaped the 
deeper grammar of European governance for nearly a half century, 
and it will likely continue to do so in this crisis.
17 Ibid., 13, n.37. 
18 Ibid., 14. 
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Federalists may well be right that, today, the optimal solution to the 
Eurozone crisis is the shift of full-blown fiscal capacity to a strongly 
legitimated European political “government”—a “political union.” 
But history (not just of European integration but of the modern 
administrative state upon which it builds)19 strongly suggests that 
institutional change is never simply a consequence of functional 
demands. It also entails a complex process of political and cultural 
contestation, in which functional demands are satisfied to the great-
est extent possible, but the outcome remains recognizable in light of 
conceptions of legitimacy inherited from the past. And in the case 
of integration, those conceptions of legitimacy continue to pull to-
ward national institutions, even as functional demands of interde-
pendence—and the resolution of the Eurozone crisis—continue to 
demand the shift of regulatory power to the supranational level. This 
is the challenge of “reconciliation” currently facing Europe.  And, I 
would dare to say, sic semper erat.
These preliminary thoughts bring me, then, to the second and third 
questions posed by the conference organizers: the tension between 
“de jure” and “de facto” political union, as well as what might be the 
possible “barriers to real political union.”
As Power and Legitimacy argues in some detail, integration history 
suggests that there are real limits to what legal and institutional engi-
neering can achieve (what we might call “de jure” integration), par-
ticularly in the face of political and cultural resistance (or “de facto” 
integration). The political union advocated by European federalists 
is undoubtedly “de jure.” It reflects what we might call the Field of 
Dreams theory of integration: “If you build it (legally), then they will 
come (politically and culturally).” That is: If you just transform the 
European Commission into a genuine European “government” … if 
you just make the Commission accountable to an increasingly more 
powerful European Parliament … ; if you just give the EP author-
ity over a genuine European budget worthy of the name … if, in 
other words, you just transform European governance into an au-
tonomously “democratic” system beyond the nation-state … , then 
eventually (but inexorably) democratic loyalty will shift to the Euro-
19 Ibid., 16. 
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pean level, where it rightly belongs given the scope of authority now 
exercised by supranational institutions.20
This faith in the capacity of legal and institutional engineering, 
however, reflects a fundamental misreading of European integra-
tion history.  It confuses regulatory power on the supranational level 
(which is significant) with the shift in democratic and constitutional 
legitimacy—which again, despite the fervent hopes of many ardent 
European federalists, simply has not occurred.  
No doubt, the individual member states have committed themselves 
to a system of supranational discipline across a whole range of do-
mains, enforced by a European technocracy and court system.  This 
“pre-commitment” is the very essence of European integration and 
governance.  In this regard, the fiscal discipline reflected in the six-
pack and two-pack, or in the future system of banking supervision 
within the ECB, is simply the latest and perhaps most demanding of 
these supranational commitment mechanisms (although that is de-
batable).  But the key point is this: Even as these commitments shift 
legal constraints to the supranational level, the democratic legitima-
tion of those constraints remains fundamentally national. In short, 
these constraints would have no validity without that national affir-
mation, through ratification of supranational policy goals defined in 
the various European treaties.  The new mechanisms of fiscal surveil-
lance in European public law, which have become the cornerstone of 
the response to the Eurozone crisis, are in this respect different only 
in degree, but not in kind, from the sort of commitment mechanisms 
that have been the foundation of European integration and gover-
nance in the past.21 The democratic and constitutional foundations 
of these commitments have remained national, even if the instru-
mentalities of these commitments are clearly supranational.
20 See generally Peter L. Lindseth, “Thoughts on the Maduro Report: Saving the 
Euro Through European Democratization?,” EUtopialaw.com, November 13, 2012, 
http://eutopialaw.com/2012/11/13/1608/; see also, e.g., Mattias Kumm, “Demo-
cratic Governance of the Euro: Two Practical Suggestions,” Verfassungsblog, May 23, 
2012, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/democratic-governance-of-the-euro-two-
practical-suggestions/. 
21 Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy, supra note 16, 110–11. 
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This brings me, then, to the third and final question, which focuses 
on the “barriers to real political union within the Eurozone” and 
what their sources might be.  To answer this question, I need to ven-
ture a bit into the realm of political and democratic theory, a terrain 
that economists might find a bit wooly. To make the point about the 
significant barriers to “real political union,” allow me to invoke Lin-
coln’s classic formulation from The Gettysburg Address—democracy 
is “government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people.”22 
The effort to “democratize” the EU commensurate with the vast 
scope of its regulatory power has over the last several decades made 
significant achievements along the final two of Lincoln’s dimensions. 
“Government by the people” refers to what academics call “input 
legitimacy”; that is, popular participation, most importantly via elec-
tions (the European Parliament clearly meets this criterion, as do 
other features of the EU, like the new citizens’ initiative in the Treaty 
of Lisbon).  And, despite the many woes of the current crisis, my 
sense is the EU deserves significant credit in terms of “government 
for the people,” or what the German political scientist Fritz Scharpf 
has famously called “output legitimacy.”23 This can be measured not 
merely in additional points added to net GDP as a consequence of 
market integration (if not of the common currency).  But it also 
includes such things as the removal of border controls; the broadly 
shared respect for human rights and the rule of law; as well as, perhaps 
most importantly, the overall sense of peaceful co-existence that in-
tegration has brought to this historically troubled continent. (Peace, 
after all, was the stated aim the Schuman Declaration in 1950.) This 
“output legitimacy” has given the aspiration of European integration 
a great deal of power.
So what, then, is the problem with the EU’s democratic legitimacy 
and what sort of barrier does this pose for the creation of an eventual 
political union? I would say the problem lies precisely in Lincoln’s 
threshold criterion: “government of the people.” This refers to the 
22 The following discussion is drawn from Peter L. Lindseth, “Of the People: De-
mocracy, the Eurozone, and Lincoln’s Threshold Criterion,” Berlin Journal no. 22 
(2012): 4–7, http://www.americanacademy.de/sites/default/files/Lindseth.pdf. 
23 Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe : Effective and Democratic? (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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historical identity between a population and a set of governing in-
stitutions; that is, to the political-cultural perception that the insti-
tutions of government are genuinely the people’s own, which they 
have historically constituted for the purpose of self-government over 
time. Europeans may favor integration for all sorts of instrumental 
and indeed even deeply emotional reasons (certainly the latter is true 
among federalists).  But Europeans, by and large, do not yet experi-
ence the institutions of integration as their “own” in the sense of 
democratic self-government.
Take, for example, the European Parliament, which federalists usu-
ally posit as the cornerstone of a future political union.24 To my 
mind, despite the effort to replicate a strongly-legitimated legislative 
assembly on the supranational level, there is no better example of the 
disconnect between power and legitimacy in European integration 
than the EP.  This body participates in the exercise of real legislative 
power; it is isomorphically structured along the lines of a national 
legislative assembly; and yet it does not represent, as yet, a histori-
cally coherent political community capable of legitimizing the EP in 
an autonomously “democratic” and “constitutional” sense.  The per-
sistent legitimacy difficulties of the EP demonstrate the limitations 
of what, since 1999, I have called the “parliamentary democratiza-
tion strategy.”25 The EP’s legitimacy, like the legitimacy of the EU as 
a whole, is derivative of the legal commitments made by the member 
states in the treaties.  The EP serves a critically important functional 
and political purpose in integration, no doubt.  But the citizens of 
Europe do not see it, culturally, as an embodiment or expression of 
the capacity of a new European political community to rule itself in 
autonomously constitutional terms.  
What the experience of the EP to date demonstrates is that the dem-
ocratic legitimacy necessary to support political union in the deepest 
24 See, e.g., European Commission, A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union: Launching a European Debate, COM/2012/0777 Final, 
35, accessed May 28, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=COM:2012:0777:FIN:EN:PDF
25 Peter L. Lindseth, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character 
of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community,” Columbia Law 
Review 99, no. 3 (1999): 672–83. 
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sense depends not merely on democracy’s inputs or outputs. Rather, 
it ultimately depends on whether there exists this crucial sense of his-
torical identity between governing institutions and a political com-
munity self-conscious of itself as such—what we might call “demos-
legitimacy.”  As is well known today, the EU is riddled with multiple 
“demoi” across its various member states. This creates a great deal of 
democratic and constitutional legitimacy, unfortunately not for the 
EU, but for national constitutional bodies. (There are exceptions, of 
course, such as in Belgium, Spain, or even the UK, where the coher-
ence of the national demos is deeply contested, thus undermining 
the legitimacy of national institutions.) Regardless, the persistent 
“polycentric” character of Europe is something “deeply rooted in the 
history of [the] continent.”26 Thus, as is broadly recognized through-
out Europe, the EU, as yet, lacks any single, overarching European 
demos. And without such demos-legitimacy—that is, without the 
sense that European institutions are genuinely the people’s own, 
rather than some distant bureaucratic or juristocratic construct—
Europe will always have a great deal of difficulty overcoming its dem-
ocratic deficit, no matter how much input and output legitimacy 
otherwise exists.
Given the lack of demos-legitimacy in the EU, the very idea of a 
“democratic deficit” may itself reflect an elite misapprehension of the 
nature of the problem. The problem in the EU is not a democratic 
deficit, in the sense of needing increased input legitimacy, but rather 
a democratic disconnect:
The notion of a democratic deficit focuses our attention exclu-
sively on the [supranational] level and implies that democratiza-
tion of supranational norm-production can take place through 
changes made largely if not entirely within the confines of supra-
national institutions (e.g., an augmented role of the European 
Parliament) …. The notion of a democratic disconnect, by con-
trast, focuses our attention on the relationship between supra-
national institutions and national oversight and control.  It does 
not deny the need for greater transparency and participation in 
26 Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: the Ambiguities and 
Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
173. 
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the [supranational] regulatory system, but it suggests that any 
democratization strategy must, at least in part, include a rethink-
ing of the linkages between supranational norm-production and 
democratic legitimation derived from the national level.27
Indeed, as I have written previously with regard to banking union,28 
it is very likely that the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) will insist on heightened national par-
liamentary scrutiny of the single supervisory mechanism under the 
auspices of the ECB,29 or the use of the ESM for bank recapitaliza-
tion. And the same will certainly be true of any expanded resolution 
authority on the supranational level. In addressing these institutional 
innovations, the Court will need to reconcile, as it always struggled 
to do, the functional demands of the Eurozone crisis with the con-
stitutional imperative of preserving the democratic character of the 
German state in a culturally and historically recognizable sense.30 
27 Peter L. Lindseth, “Delegation Is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing the 
Democratic Disconnect in the European Market-Polity,” in Good Governance in 
Europe’s Integrated Market, ed. Christian Joerges and Renaud Dehousse (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 151. 
28 Peter L. Lindseth, “‘Dual Legitimation’, Banking Union, and the 
Demokratieprinzip in Germany: Initial Thoughts After the Recent European Sum-
mit,” EUtopialaw.com, July 9, 2012, http://eutopialaw.com/2012/07/09/dual-legit-
imation-banking-union-and-the-demokratieprinzip-in-germany-initial-thoughts-
after-the-recent-european-summit/. 
29 The current compromise proposal on SSM includes some provision for national 
parliamentary scrutiny, but it gives the bulk of the scrutiny rights to the European 
Parliament.  Moreover, the language relating to national parliamentary scrutiny is 
precatory while the corresponding language for the EP is mandatory and much 
more detailed.  Compare Articles 17 and 17aa, Council of the European Union, 
“Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION conferring specific tasks on the Eu-
ropean Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions,” April 16, 2013, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/
st07/st07776-re01.en13.pdf.  Whether such a compromise will prove satisfactory to 
the German Federal Constitutional Court remains to be seen. 
30 Peter L. Lindseth, “National Parliaments in European Integration:  European-
ization, Renationalization, or Reconciliation?,” EUtopialaw.com, March 1, 2012, 
http://eutopialaw.com/2012/03/01/national-parliaments-in-european-integration-
europeanization-renationalization-or-reconciliation/. 
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Even in calmer circumstances, this was not an easy balance to strike.31 
In the current crisis atmosphere, it has been especially difficult.32 
However, precisely because this challenge of reconciliation has been 
and continues to be so difficult, there is inevitably downward pres-
sure on the scope of authority that supranational bodies can legiti-
mately exercise, given their lack of autonomous democratic and 
constitutional legitimacy. As Stefano Bartolini presciently warned in 
his 2005 book Restructuring Europe, “the risk of miscalculating the 
extent to which true legitimacy surrounds the European institutions 
and their decisions . . . may lead to the overestimating of the capac-
ity of the EU to overcome major economic and security crises.”33 In 
other words, overestimating the legitimacy of European institutions 
is not merely an error of academic analysis; rather, it can lead to 
even more profound and dangerous errors of institutional or policy 
design.
The events of the last three years suggest that the EMU, in its original 
conception, was built on just such an overestimation of suprana-
tional capacity.  The common currency was not just flawed economi-
cally (although economists never tire of pointing out that the coun-
tries of the Eurozone—and certainly Germany and Greece—do not 
constitute what they call an “optimal currency area”). Rather, it was 
also flawed constitutionally, in terms of its lack of a foundation in 
demos-legitimacy and therefore ultimately in the necessary degree of 
solidarity to support a genuine political union. Given the downside 
31 See, e.g., BVerfG, German Lisbon Decision, 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009, http://
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.
html (2009). 
32 See, e.g., BVerfG, Greak Bailout Decision, 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 
BvR 1099/10, September 7, 2011, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pres-
semitteilungen/bvg11-055en.html (2011); BVerfG, Bundestag Right of Participa-
tion/EFSF, 2 BvE 8/11, February 28, 2012, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.
de/pressemitteilungen/bvg12-014en.html (2012); BVerfG, Bundestag Right of In-
formation ESM/Euro Plus Pact, 2 BvE 4/11, June 19, 2012, http://www.bundesver-
fassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg12-042en.html (2012); BVerfG, Rejection of Tem-
porary Injunctions ESM/Fiscal Compact, 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 
1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12, September 12, 2012,  
33 Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and 
Political Structuring Between the Nation State and the European Union (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2005), 175. 
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risks that the Eurozone crisis is now revealing, the adoption of the 
euro presupposed a degree of centralized political power and legiti-
macy—most importantly relating to shared taxing and borrowing 
authority—that the EU, or rather the Eurozone countries collective-
ly, simply lack and are not about to gain any time soon. 
So why not just solve the problem by creating the long-sought “po-
litical union” to match the currency union? The answer is simply 
stated, even if its manifestations are complex: “no demos,” or rather, 
“no sense of European solidarity commensurate with the functional 
demands of the Eurozone crisis.” Within a demos-based polity, it is 
“we” who are governing “ourselves” rather than being governed by 
“others.”  And when it comes to taxation, borrowing, and spending, 
the existence of a demos is crucial to formulating policies on a scale 
with real macro-economic significance (not the measly 1% of Euro-
pean GDP that is the current EU budget).34 Within a demos-based 
polity, these fiscal actions involve moving money “among ourselves.” 
But in a polity not based on a demos (alas, the EU, as well as the 
Eurozone), those actions are often perceived as giving money away 
to “others.”35 
European federalists cannot simply wave the political-cultural magic 
wand and create the necessary sense of democratic and constitutional 
self-consciousness across national borders that constructing such sol-
idarity (and hence political union) would demand.36 To do so with-
out the requisite demos-legitimacy—the sense of “government of 
the people”—would be the institutional equivalent of pouring good 
money after bad. At this point in Europe’s history, it cannot get from 
here to there.
Nevertheless, the Eurozone crisis may yet force Europeans into a 
fundamental constitutional choice, particularly if the functional de-
34 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, “What A Real External Bank Bailout Looks 
Like,” Conscience of a Liberal, July 17, 2012, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/06/17/what-a-real-external-bank-bailout-looks-like/. 
35 See generally Peter L. Lindseth, “Cyprus … or Why the ‘No-Demos Problem’ 
Defines the Policy Response to the Eurozone Crisis,” EUtopialaw.com, March 27, 
2013, http://eutopialaw.com/2013/03/27/cyprus-or-why-the-no-demos-problem-
defines-the-policy-response-to-the-eurozone-crisis/. 
36 See, e.g., Habermas, “Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis,” supra 
note 11. 
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mands of this crisis compel them to confer real fiscal capacity on an 
autonomous and strongly-legitimated European “political union.” 
No prior step in the integration process has really presented this 
choice—not the Treaty of Maastricht, not the failed Constitutional 
Treaty, not the Treaty of Lisbon, indeed not even the Fiscal Com-
pact.  Each of those treaties was built on a “pre-commitment” theory 
of European integration, in which only the power to enforce prior 
member-state policy commitments migrated to the supranational 
level, but actual democratic and constitutional legitimacy for those 
commitments necessarily remained national.  
My sense, however, is that it is still unlikely that Europeans will, 
via the Eurozone crisis, finally cross the political-cultural Rubicon—
what Habermas has called “the red line of the classical understanding 
of sovereignty”37 — and attempt to create an autonomous European 
government with a political and constitutional legitimacy (and con-
comitant fiscal capacity) of its own.  I may well be proven wrong on 
this point, particularly if the crisis deepens.  But what is certainly 
true is that, no matter how much European federalists may attempt 
to legally engineer the result, the resulting “political union” will be 
tenuous unless and until Europeans “change fundamentally their un-
derstanding of what democratic self-government means, or where it 
is located.”38 
37 Ibid. 
38 Peter L. Lindseth, “Author’s Reply: ‘Outstripping,’ or the Question of ‘Legiti-
mate for What?’ in EU Governance,” European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst) 
8, no. 01 (2012): 160. 
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The Crises in Which the 
Euro-Crisis Resides
Richard Parker 
I first came to Florence in November, 1966. The Arno had flooded 
and the city’s irreplaceable treasures seemed about to be lost forever. 
I was nineteen, an American in my third year of college, on my first 
trip abroad, and I’d flown to Europe in late August to spend the fall 
at the Universite de Montpellier, two hours southwest of Marseilles. 
By early October, I had a French girlfriend and a Japanese motorcy-
cle, and to celebrate my twentieth birthday on November 5th, we’d 
decided to go to Florence.
By November 3rd, Florence was no place to celebrate anything. Eu-
rope by then was transfixed by the almost minute-by-minute radio 
and TV reports from Tuscany: the Arno, swollen by unprecedented 
rains in the Apennines and rechanneled by poorly-planned growth 
that had destroyed much of its natural floodplains, was rising relent-
lessly. By November 4th, beautiful Florence, bisected by the Arno, 
was drowning in a turbulent, unrelenting Noahtic nightmare of mud 
and debris.  
The city’s mayor called for volunteers to come help—Florentine and 
Tuscan government capacities were being overwhelmed. With two 
of my classmates, I caught the train to Tuscany the morning of my 
birthday. By evening, we were nearly there, after changing trains in 
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Marseilles and Milan. Then shortly after leaving Milan, a conductor 
came down the aisles telling everyone that the station in Florence 
had been closed, that our train would be stopping shortly, and we’d 
all have to get off.
  
That stirred a hurried (and rather anxious) little conversation among 
the three of us. We had no idea what to do, but when the train 
stopped, it was at a little station where a small convoy of trucks from 
the local municipality was about to depart for Florence. Fortified by 
the bottle of cheap red wine we’d purchased in Milan, in a broken 
Franco-Italian-American patois, we talked our way into the back of 
one of the trucks.
Our convoy reached Florence six hours later, just after dawn; within 
half an hour, we were working, industriously but rather haphazardly, 
alongside the men who’d driven us here. 
 
For four days, we toiled in what seemed a dedicated but disorga-
nized rescue effort. We filled sandbags, shoveled mud out of churches 
and shops, and hauled debris of all sorts—chairs, boxes, refrigera-
tors, TVs, baby strollers, mattresses, magazines and books and kitch-
enware and clothes—to massive piles. We slept little, when we did 
crawling into the damp sleeping bags we’d brought with us, curling 
up on empty church pews or a restaurant table or the back of a flat-
bed truck. Coffee, pasta, apples and cheap red wine made its way 
among the rescuers, staving off hunger. 
         
On the fifth day we left.  By then it seemed thousands had arrived 
to help—and with our abominable Italian and lack of construction 
skills, we were surely among the least efficient or useful of the for-
eigners there. By then, our clothes were filthy, our hair matted, our 
sleeping bags soaked. A couple of passengers quickly moved a few 
seats away when we boarded one of the few trains allowed to leave 
Santa Maria Novella.
 
As we headed to Milan, and from there to Marseilles and Montpel-
lier, we told ourselves that even though we’d not done that much, 
we’d been stout-hearted and thick-armed (and perhaps a bit crazy for 
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coming in the first place)—but we also felt a certain amount of pride 
in the little we’d contributed: we’d helped save Florence.  
Back in Montpellier when we told about our adventure, people 
bought us drinks, clapped us on the back, and several French girls 
were especially kind.
In the fall of 2007, forty years later, another flood—an extraordinary 
flood—suddenly started sweeping over not just Florence or Italy but 
all of Europe and indeed the world, as relentless torrential waves of 
debt, default, distrust, and dismay poured out. This time the flood 
rose not from the Arno but from the Hudson and the Thames, and 
soon enough the Rhine and the Seine. And this time it fell to fright-
ened central bankers to fill sandbags and anxious prime ministers 
and exasperated finance ministers to wade into the mess and begin 
clearing the debris—and as of today, I’m not sure they can claim 
more credit for what they’ve achieved than my friends and I did for 
what we accomplished in 1966. It’s something—but it’s not been 
enough.
In November 2009, in the midst of this sodden, turbid, and broken 
landscape, as the first wave of what the press calls The Great Reces-
sion (but I prefer to call The Great Anglo-American Flood) seemed 
to be cresting, I came back to Europe—but not to Florence.
This time it would be Athens, where my friend George Papandreou 
had just become prime minister. I was by now a macroeconomist 
teaching at Harvard, and we’d known each other for years.  In a 
phone call shortly after the election, he told me he’d discovered that 
his predecessor had passed on to him a budget that wasn’t just 6% in 
deficit as the government had insisted weeks before the elections; it 
was twice that—over 12% (and very likely even worse). If he admit-
ted this publically, his finance people were telling him it could start 
a second wave of financial flooding that might very well overwhelm 
Greece—and perhaps worse, Europe. Would I come over and help?  
And so, I found myself heading off to Europe again. This time, 
though, I stayed longer: Greece would prove to be the start of the 
166 The Crises in Which the Euro-Crisis Resides
second wave of the Anglo-American flood, Europe’s own version of 
“The Lehman Moment”—and so I ended up commuting back and 
forth between my Harvard teaching and Maximou, the Greek White 
House, for more than two years. At the end, in January 2012, when 
Papandreou resigned and a caretaker technocrat (a Harvard econo-
mist colleague, as it happened, who’d recently left the ECB) took his 
place, I left feeling unsure whether I’d been able to do much more 
than I’d done in 1966, which was help clear away debris, contribut-
ing some small amount to diminishing the consequences of this new 
disaster.
This time, however, I came away understanding far better how this 
quite manmade Anglo-American Flood had come about—in both 
its first 2007 Lehman-AIG and then its second, Greco-Lehman, 
forms. I also carried away a determined and very clear set of convic-
tions about how not only to resolve the flood’s ongoing damage but 
prevent it from happening again. 
To explain what I learned, let me execute what may seem a rather 
odd shift, by discussing dolls instead of floods. This is because I now 
see the second financial flood that seemed to spring from the Greco-
Lehman moment—what is habitually now called “The Euro-Crisis” 
— as better understood as a middle-sized figure in one of those curi-
ous Russian matryoshka, in which a series of smaller wooden dolls 
nest consecutively inside larger ones.  
The smallest doll in this matryoshka was (and is) little Greece and 
its initially little fiscal crisis—the country, after all, is barely 2% of 
Europe’s GDP and its “enormous” budget deficit a tenth of that.  The 
next larger doll is the gigantic European Union (the world’s largest 
economy) with its monetary union woes—broadly “the Euro-Crisis 
doll.” But the Euro-Crisis doll sits inside a third and much larger 
doll in turn: the three-decade-long American- and British-originated 
re-drawing of financial market rules and their underlying intellectual 
legitimation.
  
This Anglo-American Finance doll in turn fits inside the fourth doll, 
representing a yet larger conservative global re-crafting of public reg-
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ulations governing the economy in a number of ways. (By the way, I 
don’t consider this “re-crafting” the same as “deregulation,” but that 
is for another lecture.) 
The fifth—and largest— doll by far is the one that concerns me the 
most because it represents this: the question of what 21st-century 
Western democracy will become as the East, with its enormous pop-
ulation, low wages, and economic potential, rises over the West. I’m 
in particular concerned about what lies ahead for the Democracy 
doll in terms of the scope, shape, and balance between democratic 
governments’ visible hand and their economies, domestic and inter-
national, that have never operated—East or West—with quite the 
invisibility that the more ardent followers of Adam Smith (unlike 
Smith himself ) have seen as its beauty. That also means I’m also con-
sequently deeply concerned about who will lead those debates about 
allocations of wealth among and within nations, and for whom and 
what values they will speak (more on that momentarily).
Let me now execute a quick second shift, from my matryoshkas, to 
say more about why the future of democracy so concerns me. It lies 
first in the recency of the democratic experiment itself, and the thin-
ness of the cultural-historic soil in which it is planted. Early in my 
Oxford graduate work, I was powerfully influenced by three quite 
legendary books: Barrington Moore’s magisterial Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy, C.B. MacPherson’s rather neo-Hegelian 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, and Karl Polanyi’s endur-
ing The Great Transformation. (Training in economics forty years ago 
required a somewhat broader knowledge than today.)
Drawing on them in years since, I’ve come to see modern democratic 
republicanism as evolving through five distinct stages since 1776. I 
count the American colonists and the French intellectuals and sans-
culottes as initiating Stage I, by throwing off colonialism in one case 
and monarchy in the other. Both were dramatically original at the 
time, and begun only a decade apart, each initially fed hopes and 
practices in the other, and both have ever since been over-claimed 
(by later metrics) for the democratic scope of their original “demo-
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cratic” achievement, not least because one maintained slavery while 
the other plunged into tyranny, empire, and squalid reaction.
Stage II emerged after Waterloo as a two-fold revolutionary struggle, 
and would last more than a century. One contest was between mon-
archy and rising parliamentary democracy; the other was over who 
would choose the members of parliament, and both struggles were 
waged recurrently across Europe and Latin America—and in nascent 
ways in some parts of Asia.  By 1914, this twin political struggle had 
established the fundamental idea of elected rulers in many countries, 
chosen regularly by varying (but by today’s standards, severely lim-
ited) franchise; the era of inherited—even divine—right to govern 
without the advice and consent of the governed—was ending after 
nearly 10,000 years.  
However, as we all well understand, this had become by the early 
20th century the popularly-preferred but not institutionally fully-
realized form. Thus from the defeat of Napoleon to the the assas-
sination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, it produced a combustible 
string of uneasy monarchic/parliamentary franchises that left open 
how broadly suffrage would extend and over which societal institu-
tions the rules of democracy would reign. 
 
Stage III started and ran later, roughly from 1848 to 1945—and laid 
political-economic claim in its socialist and social democratic theo-
ries to both universal suffrage and to extensive (in some variants even 
near-total) public control of the new and rapidly-rising institutions 
of capitalism, in particular the corporation and finance. To the ex-
tent this was a “revolution from below” against the rising dominant 
economic form of capitalism in the name of the rising dominant 
political form of democracy, it would prove more successful because 
those “below” aristocracy cut a broad swath in all societies; to the de-
gree Stage III augured victory for a newly-created industrial working 
class—rather than the competing urban middle class—it was not a 
success and in the thirty fraught years between Sarajevo in 1914 and 
Yalta in 1945, spawned fascist and communist experiments and the 
two bloodiest wars in human history.
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Stage IV began (at least in Europe) in 1945, lasted 30 years, and 
is what I call the Bretton Woods era of democracy. That is, it was 
a stage formed to a great degree by the particular internationalist 
dreams of the United States and acceded to by Europeans because 
Europe after World War II had no other choice save Moscow’s 
suzerainty (or worse, a return to the brutality of the interwar and war 
years). The dream that evolved over the 70 years after Bretton Woods 
convened—and then the break induced in that system by Richard 
Nixon in 1971, with the rise of the Reagan/Thatcher democratic era 
that followed— have brought us here.  
The democratic political institutions that spread steadily after World 
War II across Western Europe (and then Central Europe in a leap 
after 1989), have affixed both the political mechanics of parliamen-
tary power and a near-universal franchise. In both regards, Stage IV 
has completed the Stage II process, and moreover is part of a wider 
achievement that has done the same across Europe, North and South 
America, a substantial part of Asia (and to a lesser degree, Africa).
But the issues of Stage III—the questions of the scope of political 
democracy in relation to economic power—remain complex and no-
where simply resolved. For Europe, the Monnet-Schuman process, 
and the original Common Market that emerged from the Treaty of 
Rome, fit Bretton Woods goals and assumptions by focusing on in-
creasing production (and jobs) through trade, lowering tariffs and 
(while maintaining fixed currencies) loosening capital controls—all 
treated as instruments to strengthen democracy first, and capital-
ism secondarily. When Richard Nixon destroyed Bretton Woods in 
1971, and OPEC followed suit by quadrupling oil prices to recover 
lost purchasing power two years later, a new era began—a Stage V 
“Bretton Woods redux” era emerged in which the dollar still reigned 
supreme internationally but was tied more closely to oil (and from 
the 1990s onward, through trade-for-Treasuries, with China) than 
gold.  
Europe has repeatedly found itself in international economic quan-
daries in Stage V: member countries had recovered from World War 
II’s devastation, thanks to Bretton Woods’ fixed currency relations, 
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Washington’s benignly indulgent interpretation of “free markets” 
that allowed European capital controls to remain in place well into 
the 1960s in exchange for American multinationals’ freedom to 
enter Europe’s consumer markets, and cheap energy—first indig-
enous coal, and then as Europe became a “car culture” like America 
in the late 1960s, Arab oil. After 1973, however, Europe faced stag-
flation, much more expensive oil, and unstable currencies and inter-
est rates that made smooth growth (especially trade-led, high-wage, 
high-employment growth) far more complicated, a difficulty that 
compounded as America and Japan turned toward much more rigor-
ous competition internationally.  
Floating currencies exacerbated that competition—and led both 
Bonn and Paris (and for a time London) in the late 1970s to seek 
ways to recreate something like the stability of Bretton Woods’ fixed 
exchange era—at least inside Europe. (Given the volume of intra-
European trade and its constant growth after World War II—and its 
centrality in maintaining a peaceful prosperity for most—that was a 
shrewd, albeit straightforward enough, idea.)  
But as Europe moved toward creating its own multinational version 
of America’s deeply-integrated continent-sized markets, America, 
OPEC, and Asia—one after the other—intervened to destabilize 
Europe’s half-moves toward integration. First had been President 
Nixon’s float in 1971—done without warning or consultation. A de-
cade later, the EMS (and the pound) fell to chairman Volcker’s poli-
cy-induced recession that was meant to crush the inflation that grew 
from OPEC’s second great price hike in 1979. With Ronald Reagan 
in the White House, and Prime Minister Thatcher at Downing 
Street, the US, Great Britain, and their capital markets then quickly 
humbled Francois Mitterand’s dirigiste plans for massive national-
izations and wage increases through hour reductions—a national 
plan that French Socialists had somehow thought could be exported, 
more or less harmoniously, across the continent.  Starting in 1985, 
the Plaza Accord dramatically lowered the dollar’s exchange rate in a 
show of America’s continued hegemonic strength that was supported 
in starkly bipartisan fashion, embraced by the nation’s “free market” 
right as much as by (what then remained of ) the Keynesian left.  
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Washington may have aimed the Accord mainly at Tokyo but it was 
felt across Europe (and especially in Germany) as a shock to both 
European nations’ growth and sovereignty.  Jacque Delors quickly 
parlayed Franco-German dismay into passage of the Single European 
Act a year later. From there to creating the Euro was a small step 
technically and would finally be politically achieved in exchange for 
not blocking Helmut Kohl’s unilateral move to unify the two Ger-
manys after the Wall fell.
Bretton Woods democracy in its heyday from 1946 to 1971 had 
worked well when governments and goods economies led, and fi-
nancial markets were small and hemmed in by the legacy of Depres-
sion-era controls. That wasn’t the case by the 1990s. As innumerable 
critics warned time and again (though often for widely divergent po-
litical reasons), Europe’s construction of a common monetary union 
without a parallel fiscal union or an EU central bank with lender-of-
last-resort powers would not go well.
What few of the Euro’s planners (or critics) recognized was that far 
more than those two inherently internal structural design flaws, the 
much larger and very real danger lay with the Anglo-American-led 
redrawing of financial regulation, the spread of high-speed IT to glo-
balize the consequences of those decisions, and the eager mimesis of 
New York and London across Europe.
Trying to make the Euro work was never going to be easy in an era 
of high-volume, high-velocity global financial markets, with opaque 
actors and products, flaccid credit agency oversight, and inconsis-
tent, weak public regulation (weak everywhere and inconsistent be-
tween nations—and even sectors of financial markets themselves; I 
think here, as one example, of rules and oversight for banks but not 
for hedge funds). 
 
Exiting this Stage V for a more stable and equitable Stage VI is going 
to be tricky. Politically, it requires universalizing democracy, moving 
it from the political institution under which less than half the world 
lives now to one under which nearly all live (in this it resembles the 
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domestic fight of Stage II to expand suffrage in the late 19th/early 
20th centuries.)
Yet, at the very moment democracy should be universalizing, in its 
European and American heartlands, public confidence in public 
leaders and public institutions is at disastrous lows. Well before ei-
ther the Lehman-AIG crash of 2007 or the Greco-Lehman collapse 
of 2010, Europeans had lost confidence in Brussels’ leadership class, 
and in the project itself. That class— “la bruxelloisie,” as a journalist 
friend of mine calls it—has shown itself (like most national politi-
cian classes) so far incapable of even beginning to confront the large 
challenges that lie ahead for Europeans and Americans alike, and 
why the old power configurations (including the West’s overarching 
five-century-long global hegemonic reach) are no more durable go-
ing forward than monarchy’s chances were a century ago—though 
few in European elites fully understood that (apart from an over-
optimistic left). 
But universalizing suffrage and establishing fundamental democratic 
institutions and norms in the political sphere isn’t the end of the 
problems ahead. We desperately need now global democratic rules 
to govern cross-border, multi-state activity of all kinds—from ocean 
fishing to migration to security against non-state terrorism. Even 
more we need new lines between markets’ invisible hand and gov-
ernments’ visible ones in the domestic economies of the democrat-
ic world. We no less need new boundaries and rules framed in an 
international scale, not a national one that encompass corporations, 
trade, finance, labor, the environment, etc.
  
The global political problem is that the global East and South are 
large, getting larger, and hungry to produce and consume at Western 
levels—but in many cases have political institutions (parties as well 
as government) that are at best only weakly democratic. Universal 
suffrage in one-party states is not democracy.
  
At the moment, Washington is turning more and more toward Asia 
and away from Europe.  Europe and North America encompass the 
richest and most democratic democracies and yet in Stage V—in 
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an almost perfect reversal of the trends of Stage IV—their econo-
mies were austere and increasingly inegalitarian even before the re-
cent austerity adopted in the wake of the Great Recession. Popular 
support for politics in general is eroding in Europe—certainly for 
Euro-politics. Center-right parties have no imaginative solution save 
austerity—and left-of-center parties offer no plausible solutions save 
defending the status quo and Keynesian stimulation.  None of this is 
forward-looking, only place-holding—and place-holding, given the 
monumental shift of power from West to East that is underway, is 
not a viable option.
  
Western intellectuals have failed since expanding and elevating hu-
man rights and environmental claims 40-50 years ago to synthesize a 
description of Stage VI democracy, or their roles in it. “A little more 
of the same” is not a political program, but a sentiment—whether 
voiced by conservatives in defending austerity or the left in defend-
ing nationalist Keynesianism in a globalizing world. In the most ba-
nal terms, Europe and the Euro, I’m afraid, are doomed to survive. 
Whether they survive as somewhere and something important in the 
22nd century—or merely as historical theme parks—remains quite 
open.
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The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear.
  Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks
These famous words of Gramsci, written as he languished in one 
of Mussolini’s prison cells in the 1930s, strike me as apt when one 
considers today’s Europe. Since the eruption of the western world’s 
financial crisis in 2008, we have been stuck in Europe between a 
pre-crisis past remembered, rightly or wrongly, as comfortably pros-
perous and stable and a future whose contours are defined by inse-
curity and unpredictability. As for morbid symptoms, we have them 
in abundance: prolonged economic stagnation or recession, mass 
unemployment, demographic decline, squeezed middle classes and 
malfunctioning welfare states, tensions over immigration, corrup-
tion scandals in our political systems, the spread of organised crime, 
rising political populism and, if we are to believe the results of opin-
ion surveys conducted for the European Commission1, a yawning 
gap between what happens at an institutional level in Europe and 
what citizens regard as relevant to their lives.
1 European Commission, ‘Special Eurobarometer 379: Future of Europe’ (Brus-
sels, April 2012). 
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It is on this last point that I propose this evening to make some 
observations, for nothing in the end will be more dangerous to the 
European Union, and the eurozone, than the erosion of the bonds 
of trust that have allowed citizens to place at least some confidence 
in these still relatively young experiments in multinational co-opera-
tion. Of course, the gap between European institutions and peoples 
is matched, at national level, by declining allegiance to traditional 
political parties and declining faith that politicians hold the answers 
to the modern world’s most pressing challenges. This process owes 
something, too, to the steady disappearance of the class, religious 
and clan loyalties that shaped how people voted in the 20th century. 
But in the societies worst hit by the crisis, the perception has gained 
ground that the solutions devised by Europe’s political leaders and 
bureaucratic experts are actually making matters worse, by requiring 
the imposition of synchronised austerity on depressed economies – a 
policy course that seems never to change even when a nation’s vot-
ers, in a free election, throw out one lot of politicians and throw in 
another.
This is most noticeable in Greece and, more lately, Cyprus, in both 
of which countries, I might add, the European consciousness that 
has accompanied the emergence of younger generations is a rather 
recent phenomenon and by no means an indelible feature of national 
identity. But Greece and Cyprus are not the only examples of alien-
ation from the European establishment. Arguably, a more disturbing 
case is Portugal, where political elites and the broad mass of citizens 
– people who once embraced Europe as the guarantor of a dignified 
and modern way of life – have swallowed the anti-crisis medicine 
prescribed for them by their European peers, only to discover that 
the cure is little closer than at the start of their treatment. Portugal’s 
present government is still, of course, trying to hold the fort, but the 
constitutional court’s recent rejection of a batch of austerity mea-
sures shows that resistance to Europe’s prescriptions has spread from 
society to the guardians of the legal and democratic order established 
after the 1974 revolution. 
For me, the court’s ruling was a terribly important statement, be-
cause in effect it was saying that 1974 was a foundational moment 
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for Portugal, a moment when a new national social contract was 
written, and no one – least of all, foreigners – has the right to tear up 
this social contract, because it expresses our modern identity. 
The frustration of the powerless is all the stronger because, contrary 
to what is imagined in some eurozone creditor states, large numbers 
of citizens in the bailed-out countries – and I include Ireland here as 
well – proved perfectly willing in 2010 and 2011 to criticise them-
selves for their pre-crisis recklessness. They accepted the trade-off 
between sacrifices at home and solidarity from abroad. But external 
solidarity turned out to be a cake with a poison plum inside. And 
the capacity of human nature to engage in indefinite self-criticism 
is no stronger than it is to endure indefinite stomach disorders. No 
sinner, whether well-fed or hungry, jobless or employed, will tolerate 
a lecture in economic morality for the rest of his days. Apathy, pride, 
resentment and revolt will breed in his heart in close proportion to 
the self-righteousness of the lecturer. So if this is what is stirring in 
the relatively small eurozone states that have been bailed out over the 
past three years, I leave it to your imagination what furious passions 
would be unleashed if the same potions and homilies turn out to 
deliver the same lack of success to relatively large states such as Italy 
and Spain.
Hesitant crisis management of this kind is sowing divisions across 
the European financial, economic, social and political landscape. 
The long-term borrowing costs of states, and of private companies 
within those states, diverge sharply between what in loose geographi-
cal terms we call northern and southern Europe. Competitive ad-
vantages pile up on one side to the detriment of the other. Private 
sector capital flees troubled states and redoubles the distress already 
inflicted on their citizens by fiscal austerity. Once solid banks are 
dragged towards the abyss by the weakness of sovereign bond issuers. 
The superficial integration of financial markets achieved in the euro’s 
first decade is no more2. I see that David Lipton at the IMF summed 
up Europe’s condition this week as one of “weak growth, fragmented 
markets, impaired balance sheets and half-completed reforms.”
2 Philip Whyte, ‘Alice in Wonderland: What Political Union for the Single Cur-
rency?’ (Centre for European Reform: (London, 9 October 2012). 
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You might say, as some do in Brussels, well, it was much worse 12 or 
18 months ago, and some imbalances are in the process of being re-
dressed. Yet I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that the turbulence 
of the past three years, though clearly originating in misbehaviour 
and policy errors going back all the way to and beyond the euro’s 
launch in 1999, owes a great deal also to the misjudged attempts at 
recovery from crisis. It is, you could say, an architectural problem 
– by which I mean that, if a tornado damages the roof and walls of 
your house, there are good ways and bad ways of repairing them. As 
several Brazilian and Chinese friends have reminded me, Europe is a 
wealthy place and it owns all the materials required to strengthen the 
roof and walls. But the architects, bricklayers and roofers are going 
about their work in laborious and sometimes contradictory fashion, 
because they cannot agree among themselves on how to insure them-
selves against future tornados and how to cover the cost of the first 
tornado.
The consequences of this indecision are not only that Europe’s citi-
zens feel cut off from Europe’s power centres, but that the political 
and technocratic elites of certain countries find themselves hand-
cuffed to a project in which idealism is giving way to fear that it is 
delivering precisely the opposite results to those anticipated in the 
1990s. I will confine my remarks here to three countries. First, I 
regard it as inconceivable that any Italian politician would have ar-
gued 15 years ago that the benefits of sharing a monetary union with 
France and Germany were worth the price of an almost complete 
absence of economic growth since entry into the eurozone, bond 
yields permanently higher than those of Germany and sometimes at 
dangerous levels, a financial sector gasping for capital, and the seem-
ingly permanent threat of entering an international life support ward 
next to Greece and Cyprus.
Secondly, I would recall that, in French eyes, the entire point of going 
ahead with the euro was to establish equality in a European dimen-
sion with an inevitably more powerful post-unification Germany, to 
regain a modicum of control from the Bundesbank over Europe-
wide monetary policy, and in this way to continue the rather success-
ful post-second world war strategy of using Europe to protect and 
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advance French national interests3. The crisis has torn these ambi-
tions to shreds, and it is far from clear what Paris plans to do about 
it. Less than a decade and a half after the euro’s launch, Germany’s 
economic supremacy over its partners in the monetary union is more 
pronounced than ever. Moreover, it has become increasingly appar-
ent during François Hollande’s presidency – though the signs were 
there in Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007-2012 spell at the Elysée as well – that 
the Germans regard French efforts at fiscal and economic reform as 
inadequate to the challenges that lie ahead. In short, the crisis is ex-
posing as somewhat hollow the pre-euro notion of a Franco-German 
couple operating in balance and in mutual confidence.
As for Germany itself, the unshakeable self-belief that characterises 
German attitudes at EU and eurozone sessions on economic pol-
icy masks a feeling, similar to that in Rome and Paris, that mon-
etary union is turning into a creature very different from the tame, 
house-trained pet they thought they were getting in 1999. This one 
bites, scratches, costs money and never says thank you. To put it 
in more concrete terms, Germany did not expect that giving up 
the Deutschemark might require propping up weaker nations for 
eternity by means of a banking union, fiscal transfers or what are 
loosely known as common eurozone bonds. Germany did not expect 
that the European Central Bank, modelled quite deliberately on the 
Bundesbank, would one day cast aside core Bundesbank principles. 
Still less did the Germans expect their democratically elected leaders 
to be labelled arrogant representatives of a Fourth Reich, as in bailed-
out Greece, or even to be dismissed as “stubborn,” as Jacques Delors 
branded Angela Merkel in March 20124.
If truth be told, Germany’s political classes have shown considerable 
patience in coming to the rescue of one embattled country after an-
other, and much resilience in holding together a consensus among 
the main political parties for pursuing this course. I, for one, be-
lieve that Germany is ready to do much more. Yet it is only a belief, 
based on more than 30 years of living in, working in and visiting 
3 Simon Tilford, ‘It’s the Politics, Stupid!’ (Centre for European Reform: London, 
April/May 2013). 
4 EurActiv.fr, ‘Jacques Delors flingue l’Union européenne de Merkozy’ (Brussels, 
30 March 2012). 
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Germany. I cannot state with confidence what Germany’s end vi-
sion of European integration is and how it proposes to get there. I 
appreciate all the domestic social and political constraints that slow 
down German action, but I worry that this slowness is giving time 
and space for the political and social fabric in other countries to wear 
down, and for a loss of faith in the European idea to spread further 
across the continent than at any time since the second world war.
I am talking here about one vital element in the quadruple identity 
of citizens: the element that is not local, not regional, not national, 
but European. People in the most economically stricken countries 
are questioning this fourth, European element of their identities.
It is what Mario Monti, not long after taking up Italy’s premier-
ship, called the “psychological dissolution” of Europe. We are not yet 
there, but we are on the road and we may be closer to it today than 
many of us dare to admit.
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POSTSCRIPT
Monologic Thinking and the 
Eurozone Crisis
Patrick O’Callaghan  
1. Introduction
We use the word “crisis” to describe the quandary in which the eu-
rozone now finds itself. A crisis, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED), is a “vitally important or decisive stage in the 
progress of anything.” The OED adds that the word is applied es-
pecially to “times of difficulty, insecurity, and suspense in politics 
or commerce.” That the eurozone’s present difficulties represent a 
decisive stage in the progress of European integration is clear. We 
are witnessing not just financial and economic crises, but a political 
crisis of unprecedented proportions in the history of the European 
Union. But more controversial are questions of what caused the crisis 
and how we can resolve it. The uncertainty about the viability of the 
single currency (and, thus, the very future of the “European project”) 
means that these are also times of “insecurity” and “suspense.” 
In this paper, I will argue that narratives have emerged in Europe 
about how the financial and sovereign debt crises were caused and 
the best ways to resolve the accompanying economic and political 
crises. I contend that these narratives are the product of monologic 
thinking on the part of many policy-makers and opinion-formers. 
By “monologic thinking,” I mean path-dependent behaviour in the 
182 Monologic Thinking and the Eurozone Crisis
manner described by the Russian literary theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin. 
Bakhtin understood monologue as a wholly negative and destruc-
tive exercise. This is because the monologist always has the “ulti-
mate word,” his monologue attempting to “materialize all reality.” 
Counter-arguments or alternative narratives fail to register because, 
to the monologist, they do not have any “decisive force.”1 This would 
be concerning enough on its own, but in the context of the eurozone 
crisis, monologic thinking poses distinct risks not only to a successful 
resolution of the crisis but also to the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU. In what follows, I identify three narratives on the causes of the 
crisis and solutions to it that have attempted to “materialize all real-
ity” in the destructive manner envisaged by Bakhtin. 
2. The First Example: “This time is different”
The unbridled optimism about the euro in the years before and after 
its introduction was, in itself, an example of monologic thinking. 
The original decision to allow Greece, the birthplace of democracy, 
to join the monetary union was quite clearly a political one, intended 
to be deeply symbolic. The euro itself was to be permanent. Indeed, 
while Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) allows 
for Member State withdrawal from the EU, no such arrangement 
was made in the Treaty framework for exiting the euro. Warnings 
about deficiencies in the euro project (e.g., the lack of an optimum 
currency area) were ignored. This is because the monologic thinking 
of the time was that the euro project would achieve its four goals, as 
described by Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos:2  
“The first was to build a unified European identity. The second was to 
eliminate nominal exchange rate fluctuations and the large imbalances 
that those could create. Of special concern was channelling the export 
dynamism that Germany had displayed since the 1960s. Third, it would 
create a monetary authority isolated from political pressures. This was 
particularly welcomed by countries with poor inflation records such as 
1 M. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (C. Emerson, ed. and trans., Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 292-293. 
2 J. Fernández-Villaverde, L. Garicano and T. Santos, “Political Credit Cycles: The 
Case of the Euro Zone” (2013) Working Paper, available at 
http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/~jesusfv/Political_Credit_Cycles.pdf 
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Italy or Portugal. The fourth goal ... was to broaden support for structur-
al, supply-side reforms to improve Europe’s growth rate. The main chan-
nel through which a monetary union was thought to affect the political 
economy of reform was by imposing additional constraints on monetary 
and fiscal policy. Without their own monetary authority and with fis-
cal policy limited by the Maastricht Treaty, national governments would 
have few options but to implement structural reforms they had previously 
been reluctant to undertake.” 3
But the Maastricht Treaty did not restrain Member States in the way 
many had anticipated it would. Rather, the lure of suddenly low in-
terest rates in the periphery countries (compared to traditional levels) 
was too much to resist. What all of this meant was that alongside en-
try to the euro, the countries of the periphery experienced a “gigantic 
credit inflow.”4  
Monologic thinking also proved to be a feature of the resulting credit 
bubbles, as becomes clear when we consider the work of Fernán-
dez-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos. The general exuberance that 
emerges during a bubble, when people perceive that their wealth is 
increasing, masks what is really going on in the economy. In other 
words, it becomes more difficult to extract accurate information 
about the performances of financial institutions or government. This 
leads to a general deterioration in governance. So, “[w]hen all banks 
are delivering great profits, all managers look competent and when 
all countries are delivering the public goods demanded by voters, all 
governments look efficient.”5 But added to this is the phenomenon 
of “self-attribution bias,” the idea that:
“it is hard to convince agents that the good things that are happening 
are not a result of their own outstanding decisions. As they become more 
overconfident, they are increasingly likely to overreach.” 6 
Here we find the classic elements of monologue in Bakhtin’s sense. 
The monologue weaves a specific narrative: one of success, in 
3 Ibid at 4. See also H. James, Making the European Monetary Union (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2012) 
4 Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos, n 2 above, at 5. 
5 Ibid at 8. 
6 Ibid at 9 
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this case. It is a monologue that “materializes all reality” as all of the 
perceived success is presented as a product of the monologist’s poli-
cies and decisions. But the monologist also has the “ultimate word.” 
Those who criticise policy by pointing to the existence of a bubble 
are dismissed as naysayers.7 This is monologue in its most destructive 
sense, because the larger the bubble grows (fuelled by cheap credit), 
the bigger the ambitions become.8 Consider, for example, the then 
Irish Prime Minister’s (Bertie Ahern’s) plan to build a massive sta-
dium, pejoratively known as the “Bertie Bowl,” when two other large 
stadia already existed in Dublin.9 Such “grandiose investments,” as 
Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos put it, “create persis-
tently lower growth, since they involved multi-year commitments 
that must be funded through future taxation.”10 Alongside general 
deterioration in governance, the most obvious destructive effect of 
the monologic thinking during the bubbles in Spain and Ireland 
was the rapid house price inflation. Large numbers of households in 
these countries are now unable to meet mortgage repayments and, in 
many cases, in significant negative equity.
3. The Second Example: “The PIIGS caused the crisis” 
It is clear, then, that there were significant problems in the periphery 
in the period leading up to the eurozone crisis. But this only goes 
so far in explaining the origins of the crisis. Yet, in the meantime, 
7 During the Irish property bubble, Bertie Ahern, the then Irish Prime Minister, 
made the following controversial remarks, for which he later apologised: “Sitting on 
the sidelines, cribbing and moaning is a lost opportunity. I don’t know how people 
who engage in that don’t commit suicide because frankly the only thing that moti-
vates me is being able to actively change something.” See RTE News (4th July 2007) 
http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0704/90808-economy/ 
8 Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos point to other destructive effects of 
bubbles, including what they call a “variant of the ‘Dutch disease.’” During a credit 
bubble, we find that capital (including human) is reallocated from the production 
of goods that can be traded to other activities, e.g., construction investment. Among 
other things, this means that once the bubble bursts, large numbers of people are 
“unprepared for more sustainable activities.” Fernandez Villaverde, Garicano and 
Santos, n 2 above. 
9 See RTE News (1st February 2002) http://www.rte.ie/news/2002/0201/22769-
stadium/ 
10 Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos, n 2 above, at 10. 
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this has become a monologic explanation for the cause of the crisis. 
The problem with this narrative is not only that it is wrong, but 
it distracts our attention from the fundamental deficiencies in the 
euro project itself, most especially the absence of a system of fiscal 
transfers. 
Monologic thinking about problems in the periphery as the root 
cause of the crisis downplays the role of private credit bubbles in 
which core banks were heavily implicated. Before the onset of the 
financial crisis, Ireland’s and Spain’s debt to GDP ratios were lower 
than those of many core countries. We cannot simply attribute blame 
to some and exonerate others. As de Grauwe has argued:
“The truth is that the responsibility for the euro crisis is shared. For every 
reckless debtor there was a reckless creditor. The northern countries were 
all too ready to provide loans to southerners so as to be able to accumu-
late export surpluses. The northern countries’ banks involved in these 
lending operations managed to shift the loan losses to their respective 
governments.”11
Like our first example, this second example of monologic thinking 
has been destructive because it has provided a justification for the 
policy response of austerity, which we will consider in more detail 
below. But it has also resulted in other mistakes. Early on, for in-
stance, there was a failure to distinguish between States that were 
insolvent and those that were solvent but suffering from illiquidity.12 
This delayed the inevitable, namely the restructuring of Greek debt 
and the ECB acting as a de facto lender of last resort in the govern-
ment bond markets through the mechanism of outright monetary 
transactions (OMTs). The persistent tendency to understand “fiscal 
extravagance” on the part of the so-called PIIGS as the cause of the 
eurozone crisis has ensured that legal arrangements for the future of 
the monetary union are structured in a way that makes it even more 
difficult for the economies in the periphery to recover. So, as Petch 
11 See P. de Grauwe, “The New Bail-in Doctrine: A Recipe for Banking Crises and 
Depression in the Eurozone,” CEPS Commentary (4th April 2013), p. 3, available 
at www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/7914/pdf 
12 On this point, see T. Petch, Legal Aspects of the Eurozone Crisis (London: Slaugh-
ter and May, 2012), p. 59. 
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points out, the restrictive rules in the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (e.g., 
Article 3 (1) which requires a cap on annual structural deficits of 
0.5% of GDP) will limit the ability of States to deal with future 
recessions in an effective way.13 Those most affected, of course, will 
be those States that are already in the deepest political and economic 
difficulties. 
4. The Third Example: “Austerity is the only solution”
The third example of monologic thinking concerns the means of 
dealing with the crisis, namely through the politics of austerity.14 
This is commonly justified as an absolute necessity. Because they 
no longer have the option of currency devaluation, periphery gov-
ernments, so the narrative goes, must introduce austerity measures 
in order to “get their houses in order.” The austerity politics try to 
imitate pre-crisis German labour and welfare reforms that supported 
export-led growth based on price competition.15 While these policies 
may have proved successful in Germany, it does not follow that they 
should be adopted as a general strategy for the eurozone.16 Those 
who support a “one size fits all” solution seem determined to ignore 
the fact that the eurozone crisis had multiple complex causes, that 
Greece’s problems are not necessarily similar to Spain’s or Ireland’s. 
For this reason, Boyer argues “if the sources of the crisis differ, so 
should the economic policies.”17 Understood in this way, we might 
regard the drive towards imposing austerity measures as an aspect 
of a “pre-Keynesian fallacy” that if all countries “repeat the strategy 
that has proven to be efficient for an individual country the world 
economy will recover.”18 
 
This monologic thinking has its roots in ordo-liberalism, a theory 
that has had a profound influence on successive German govern-
13 Ibid at 60. 
14 This section draws on P. O’Callaghan (2012), “Collective Memory in Law and 
Policy,” Legal Studies 32(4), 642. 
15 R. Boyer (2012), “The Four Fallacies of Contemporary Austerity Policies: The 
Lost Keynesian Legacy,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 36(1), 283-312. 
16 Ibid at 300. 
17 Ibid at 301. 
18 Ibid at 306. 
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ments and the Bundesbank.19 Inevitably, perhaps, it has also shaped 
EU law and policy.20 The need to maintain price stability through low 
inflation, for example, is a pillar of the ordo-liberal Verkehrswirtschaft 
(transaction economy).21 Of fundamental importance in the EU Treaty 
framework is the idea of a monetary union as a Stabilitätsgemeinschaft 
(community based on stability). Consider, in this context, the ECB’s 
legal obligation to maintain price stability (Article 127 TFEU), the 
euro convergence criteria (Article 140 TFEU) and the “no-bailout 
clause” (Article 125 TFEU).
The policy of austerity, inspired, at least in part, by ordo-liberal theo-
ry, remains the dominant paradigm at a policy level in the eurozone. 
It explains the opposition on the part of many Germans to the ECB’s 
recent decision to act as a de facto lender of last resort in the govern-
ment bond markets. Consider, for instance, Jürgen Stark’s (the for-
mer chief economist of the ECB) resignation in September 2011 in 
the wake of the ECB’s purchase of Italian and Spanish bonds. Stark 
had once said that Walter Eucken’s (the father of ordo-liberalism) 
seminal work was “a constant source of inspiration throughout [his] 
career.”22
Like the other two examples of monologic thinking, this example has 
also had destructive effects in Bakhtin’s sense. The austerity measures 
have weakened domestic demand in individual economies leading 
to a contraction in GDP and high unemployment, especially among 
the under-30s. Youth unemployment in Greece is now over 60%. In 
Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Italy we find a similarly worrying trend. 
But what is significant here is not just the higher numbers (concern-
19 Key ordo-liberal texts include W. Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (Lon-
don: William Hodge, 1950); E.W. Dürr, Wesen und Ziele des Ordo-Liberalismus 
(Winterthur: Keller, 1954); F. Böhm, Reden und Schriften (Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller, 
1960). 
20 See C. Joerges (2005), “What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A 
Melancholic Eulogy,” European Law Review 461. 
21 See D.J. Gerber (1994), “Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liber-
alism, Competition Law and the ‘New’ Europe,” 42 American Journal of Compara-
tive Law 25, at 47-48. 
22 “Monetary, fiscal and financial stability in Europe,” Speech by Jürgen Stark, 
Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, 11th Euro Finance Week in Frankfurt
(18th November 2008), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/sp081118_1.en.html 
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ing as they are) but the fact that there has been an upward trend since 
the onset of the crisis, Greece’s overall unemployment rate almost tri-
pling in that period. So-called structural reforms have been ongoing 
for several years but unemployment continues to rise. This is surely 
evidence enough of the destructive nature of the monologic thinking 
about austerity. 
5. Conclusions: Monologic Thinking and Democratic 
Legitimacy
The prospect of a “lost generation” of young people who have not 
had the opportunity to contribute to the workforce and society in 
the same way that the previous generation did is deeply concerning. 
But equally important are the implications for democratic legitima-
cy. What do these developments mean for the future of European 
integration? The work of the political scientist Fritz Scharpf is par-
ticularly instructive here.23 Scharpf argues that up until the euro-
zone crisis, the European polity was “beyond the horizon of citizens’ 
expectations.”24 What this means is that: 
“[u]ntil recently ... the moderating influence of national governments on 
EU legislation, and their continuing accountability for its implementa-
tion, has shielded the Union against the legitimacy crises which authors 
and politicians castigating its democratic deficit should have expected. In 
the present euro crisis, however, the shield of legitimacy intermediation 
has been pushed aside as citizens are directly confronted with the massive 
impact of European policies – and with their manifest lack of democratic 
legitimacy.” 25
Understood in this way, there is a general loss of autonomy. This is 
the case in debtor countries where citizens experience the agonies of 
austerity policies and creditor countries where politicians talk about 
defending the euro at all costs and citizens feel like they are “carrying 
the burden” for the rest of Europe.26 
23 F.W. Scharpf (2012), “Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European 
Polity and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis,” MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/6, available at 
http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp12-6.pdf 
24 Ibid at 17. 
25 Ibid at 19. 
26 Ibid at 27. 
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While some see the eurozone crisis as an opportunity for further 
political integration, Scharpf thinks that the prospect of a federal 
Europe with a centralised budget is further away now than before 
and the crisis risks “destroy[ing] the past achievements of European 
integration as well.”27 This is because:
“the euro crisis, its dominant framing as a consequence of fiscal irrespon-
sibility, and the disastrous impact of rescue policies designed by creditor 
governments on the basis of this frame have provoked conflicts of interest 
and identity, mutual distrust and recrimination, and widely diverging 
public discourses in national politics.” 28
It is always useful to remind ourselves why European integration was 
pursued in the first place. Quite simply, the EU evolved because the 
people of Europe “live unavoidably side by side,” as Kant would have 
put it.29 But European integration demands more than a mere politi-
cal structure or a set of institutions. If the EU is to constitute any-
thing meaningful, its citizens need to have a “sense of political com-
munity” and trust between citizens is surely a prerequisite.30 Indeed 
politics, as Waldron writes, “always requires us to put our lives into 
the hands of others. It is a question of which hands we are trusting 
enough to deliver ourselves into.”31 Rather than continue to engage 
in monologic thinking, policy-makers must seek imaginative ways to 
regenerate trust among the citizens of the EU. Of critical importance 
here is tackling the plight of the young unemployed by any means 
possible. While many criticised the “fiscal extravagance” of periphery 
countries before the onset of the crisis, perhaps now is the time for 
27 Ibid at 30. 
28 Ibid at 29-30. 
29 J. Waldron (2011), “The Principle of Proximity,” New York University, School of 
Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper no. 11-08 
(January). 
30 Scharpf emphasises the importance of what David Easton called a “sense of po-
litical community.” Scharpf quotes Easton: a “sense of political community” is “… 
the feeling of belonging together as a group which, because it shares a political 
structure, also shares a political fate … [T]o the extent there is a feeling of political 
community, the members will possess mutual sympathy and loyalty with respect to 
their participation in a common political unit.” Scharpf, n 23 above, at 13, quoting 
D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965) pp. 184-189.
31 Waldron, n 29 above, at 24. 
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some form of stimulus in the eurozone with the aim of achieving 
full employment. Only in this way do we engender the trust that is 
necessary for the EU to survive and thrive as a political community. 
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